


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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***THE WORKING CLASS & THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD***

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# Soviet Union

## The Working Class & The Contemporary World

### No 3, May-June 1987

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**1917 Revolution's Meaning for Today's Working Class Expounded**

18070376b Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS I*  
*SOVREMENNY MIR* in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87  
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[Article by I. K. Pantin: "October and the Liberation Mission of the Working Class"]

[Text] An interpretation of the significance of a historical event, particularly one such as the Great October Socialist Revolution, is always an interpretation from the viewpoint of one's own times and that entire "running time" of the development of world history which is focused around the event in question. Study of the past is only of significance if the researcher is able to use the event as a point of effective contact between the present day and history and is able to make himself a part of an actual social relationship of the "feedback" type. This is the case with an understanding of the historic significance of the Great October also.

Bourgeois and reformist ideologists suggest that the October Revolution be seen as an event predominantly of local, regional significance, overtaken, what is more, by subsequent development. But not to mention the fact that proletarian socialism became a reality and entered for the first time world history and the life of peoples and countries thanks to the 1917 revolution, for us communists this event is of importance in another respect also: it is the point of departure for the formulation of our opinions concerning the development which the working class has enjoyed in the past 70 years and an evaluation of the successes (and failures) of the workers movement.

It would be absurd to ignore the specific features of the historical ground in which the October Revolution emerged and not to see the traces of the origin of real socialism in our country connected with the conditions of the "second echelon" of the development of capitalism. The history of a people is not a straightforward "change" of cultures, formations and civilizations. The new does not spring from the deep ready-made like Pallas Athena from the head of Zeus: something is always rejected, something is inherited and continues to live and some traditions are preserved, more, are "built into" the new structure of society. Naturally, the revolutionary workers movement of one country, even one such as Russia, could not have exhausted all possible forms of the transition to socialism, nor did it claim to have done so. But there can be no doubting one thing: the October Revolution proved that the international working class had become a new factor in the movement of contemporary society and history. It is not fortuitous that the new line of ascent in the course of world events starts here.

The exceptional confluence of historical circumstances, not to mention the particular seriousness of the class struggle in the revolution, which had grown directly out of an imperialist war and developed into a civil war,

made for the specific course of the revolution and the inimitable features, impeding, initially particularly, a correct understanding of the significance of the social revolution which had occurred and engendering conformist arguments concerning the "price of revolution". As if the course of history follows our plans and does not conduct unexpected, at times bewildering, experiments. To this should be added the most important singularities of the October Revolution which ensued from, if it may be so put, Russia's "middle" position. As V.I. Lenin observed, "Russia, which stands on the frontier of civilized countries and... the countries of the entire East, extra-European countries... had to exhibit some peculiarities which are, of course, in the general line of world development, but which distinguish its revolution from all preceding ones of West European countries..." (1).

Even for the sincere supporters of socialism it was difficult to theoretically comprehend and reconcile with the customary patterns of historical development the fact that the victorious breach of the world chain of domination of the bourgeoisie had been accomplished in Russia (a country of "middling-to-weak" development of capitalism) and not in the developed West European states, in which socialist revolution could have realized its material possibilities rapidly and without hindrance. But history in the era of imperialism "disposed" of things such that a vast country, in which all the objective prerequisites of a socialist economy and society had not fully matured, was the first to accomplish a victorious socialist revolution, initiating—on a world-historical scale—the replacement of capitalism by the new, communist, social and economic formation. It was here that the working class, uniting around itself all the working people, embarked on the accomplishment of the most complex tasks of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism and the creation of the foundations of the new society.

The Russian working class made its history (and the history of its country) not by way of the measured evolution which many people longed for, even less did it proceed solemnly along a path of progress charted in advance. The October Revolution was brought about by the obstacles which the proletariat had to break down with the aid of a tremendous exertion of effort—deliverance from the domination of the bourgeoisie and the landowners was not possible peacefully, by way of consistent and gradual reforms. The class struggle, as has been the case in history repeatedly, was the decisive argument. The concentration of events in a short interval of time—two decades—together with the gigantic surge forward revealed the most characteristic features and aspects of the genesis of the new society. And however distinct from the October Revolution the subsequent development of socialism on a world scale has been and whatever subsequent phases of development it will experience (foreseeing which is, of course, impossible), the events of the Russian revolution will nonetheless remain in the memory of generations of the working class.

What is the value of the experience of the October socialist revolution for the struggle of the working class of our day?

It would be a mistake to see the decisive significance of the Great October for the workers movement in the Russian proletariat's formulation of the universal political tactics of the oppressed class. Although the Bolshevik tactics were of tremendous significance for the development of the workers movement of the West at that time and given those circumstances (failure to understand the international significance of these tactics ultimately made the leaders of the Second International opportunists and traitors to the cause of the revolution and socialism) and although study thereof is important today also in the broad historico-sociological plane, it would be wrong today to regard it as a practical injunction with which the party of the working class must necessarily comply. And it is not simply a question of the fact that this is the experience of one country ("...in each individual country the movement suffers from this one-sidedness or the other and this theoretical or practical shortcoming or the other of individual socialist parties" [2]) and that a capacity for the full and comprehensive use of all the possibilities of class struggle arises only as a result of assimilation of the international experience of the workers movement. The main thing lies elsewhere. The singularities and original features of situations and processes require, particularly in our time, a growing variety of solutions of specific problems which in each country confront the forces of the social transformation of society. It is with good reason that the revolutionary process encompassing societies with different economic systems and social structures provides examples of diverse forms of action and various paths, unexpected at times.

It should be added to this that the tactics of vanguard of the working class built on a sober, strictly objective consideration of all class forces in an individual country and outside it, on a world scale, must today be made to conform with the new circumstances and conditions. "Experience is memory," A. Cunhal writes. "But memory is not a repetition of previous experience in a new specific situation. Remembrance of experience includes remembrance of a most important experience, namely, that revolutionary struggle must always take account of specific conditions" (3).

Russia in 1917 pertained, even in terms of the comparatively modest yardsticks of the start of the century, to the countries of the "middling-to-weak" development of capitalism. True, by the start of the 20th century and, particularly, at the time of the imperialist war it had already become involved in the relationships of world-wide capital. The country's incorporation in a more extensive system of world relationships made a specific imprint on the revolutionary processes in it, accelerating the delineation of class forces. Without the war the country might have lived for years and decades without a revolution against the capitalists. But the economic

and political crisis which had arisen in the course of the imperialist war and which had been caused by it made radical change a necessity. Under the conditions of impending national catastrophe and the ruination of the country revolutionary measures which in their totality signified a break with capitalism and steps toward socialism were required. There was no path of bourgeois reforms leading out of the crisis: no reform, radical even, carried out in concordance with the bourgeoisie could have saved Russia from chaos.

Let us not forget also that in such a country as ours it was easier to start a revolution because Russia's relative backwardness distinctively blended proletarian revolutionary spirit against the bourgeoisie with the peasant revolution against the landowners, because the political backwardness intensified by the existence of vestiges of serfdom had summoned into being the unusual power of the revolutionary onslaught of the masses, because the "general rehearsal"—the 1905-1907 bourgeois-democratic revolution—had provided a very great deal for the political education of the workers and peasants and so forth (4). But it was immeasurably more difficult for us, as for any comparatively backward country—and this also was foreseen by V.I. Lenin—to continue, that is, implement socialist transformations.

The current situation in the capitalist world differs appreciably from the situation at the start of the 20th century. We refer not only to giant progress of the socialization of production both on the scale of individual capitalist countries and on an international, worldwide scale. It is a question of the unfolding of a new system of requirements in modern society, new directions of the development of democratism and, finally, of such a factor as the spread of the S&T revolution. In this connection particular significance is now attached to a consideration of the nature of the changes of which contemporary society is in need. The working class and all democratic forces have to subordinate the technological revolution to the goals of social progress and formulate the strategic line corresponding to the tasks of the struggle for a new quality of development. Nor, apparently, has the social revolution in the West a historical counterpart in the sense that the spontaneous action of the laws of capital could be replaced here by the effect of the "laws of social economics and associated labor" (K. Marx) not immediately but via a number of intermediate stages and phases for which in the past, even the recent past, the necessary domestic and worldwide conditions were lacking. The question of the reserves of capitalism created by utilization of certain elements of social progress, which have been gained on a fundamentally different basis in the struggle against capitalism, is also connected with this prospect.

In the era of the hugely grown internationalization of production and communication the problem of the social liberation of the working class and the majority of the people appears in a new light—from the viewpoint of a world perspective. The new, broader perspective has

been digested in contemporary bourgeois society by a minority of the people as yet, even a minority of the working class, although the problems of the nuclear threat to mankind, "third world" problems and questions of raw material resources, the ecology, education and so forth are increasingly a stimulus to the emergence of spontaneous mass movements and, consequently, general questions. All the more important is it to see that the workers, more broadly, the liberation movement of the West reach a turning point: it has no chance of effectively fighting for social justice while remaining aloof from problems affecting all mankind and fighting "at home" without simultaneously opposing the oppression of the majority of the population of other regions suffering from poverty, starvation and neocolonialist oppression.

It is just as wrong to believe that the Great October was the conclusive argument in favor of the use exclusively of the revolutionary method of action as a counterweight to the "reformist," slow, cautious-circuitous path. Not to mention the excessiveness of the emphasis on the method of revolution seen in isolation from its always regenerating content, interpreting the experience of October as proof of the effectiveness solely of forcible methods is wrong theoretically and harmful in practice. As far as the theoretical aspect of the problem is concerned, K. Marx even raised the question of the possibility of large-scale social transformations capable of leading to "a transitional state of society, when on the one hand the present economic basis of society has yet to be transformed, but, on the other, the working masses have accumulated sufficient forces to compel the adoption of transitional measures geared to the realization ultimately of the radical reorganization of society" (5). But questions of the interaction of reforms based on a given social order and transformations of a transitional period became particularly pertinent in the 20th century, with the start of the era of imperialism. The growth of the material and sociopolitical prerequisites of socialism under the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism affords a realistic prospect of the expansion and enrichment of the social functions of reforms: being constantly extended and enriched with anticapitalist content, they could be a part of a permanent process of transformations of a revolutionary nature. Under current conditions the customary formulation of the question—reform or revolution—is inadequate and abstract: it is more often than not a question both of "ascending reforms" (V.I. Lenin) and of the transformation of society in its essential aspects. The question of reforms here has recently been linked increasingly often with the prospects of the assumption of office of left, democratic forces (communists, socialists and others) (6).

In the practical sense absolutization of the method of revolution is harmful because in an era of historical change and abrupt break with the old it is extraordinarily important, albeit extraordinarily difficult, to clearly understand "what tasks and when may and what may not be tackled by revolutionary methods" (7). The fate of

the revolution sometimes depends on this understanding. "True revolutionaries will perish (in the sense not of outward defeat but of the intrinsic failure of their cause) only if—but for certain—they lose sober-mindedness and imagine that a 'great, victorious and world revolution' can and must necessarily accomplish in revolutionary manner each and every task under any circumstances and in all spheres of operation" (8). It was not fortuitous that as soon, as a result of the victory of the proletariat in our country gained with the help of forcible methods, the possibility (and necessity) of advancing step by step toward socialist transformations had appeared, Lenin oriented the party toward the NEP policy—slow movement forward, toward socialism, but movement on a considerably broader basis, together with the entire mass of petty producers, peasants primarily.

In other words, the correlation of revolutionary and reformist methods in the transforming activity of the working class at each stage of history is specific; the contradiction between the growth of the role of reforms as an aspect of the movement of the revolution and the inadequacy and "impasse nature" of the reformist solutions is resolved on each occasion differently, in the course of the working people's struggle for their rights and for social progress. And although an appreciable movement to the right of the policy of ruling circles and the entire domestic situation in certain capitalist countries cannot be precluded, it will evidently be necessary to advance by winning, in F. Engels words, "in harsh, persevering struggle one position after another" (9) and making each of them a springboard for further advance. Under these conditions mastery of all forms of struggle, however far removed they are at first sight from the ultimate goals of the socialist revolution, is for the workers movement an urgent necessity and primary duty.

The true essence of the Great October as a historic turning point and its decisive significance for the fate of the workers movement worldwide is that it laid a fundamentally new channel of social development opposed to the bourgeoisie and directed against capitalism. For the first time the transition to socialism ceased to be simply a cherished hope, aspiration and desired outcome and was expressed in the actual practical building of a new society and a fundamentally new policy on the international scene. In this sense the Russian working class, having overthrown the domination of capital, was a pioneer, more, its example and experience provided the preliminary and general outlines of the historic work which the worldwide proletariat has sooner or later to perform. Thanks to October, socialism, particularly socialism as a world system, has become an inalienable component of contemporary civilization.

A proletarian state in the form of soviets appeared not as an attempt to implement some abstract project with the aid of the law but as a direct need of revolutionary development expressed in stern class struggle. Its creators and leaders lived not by fantastic projects of the

rearrangement of society on the basis of universal justice, their minds preoccupied with the immediate requirements of the present. They personified the aspiration of the broad masses of workers and peasants to have done with the imperialist carnage, to realize the age-old hopes of the peasantry concerning land and to save the country from impending economic catastrophe. In the way of realization of these revolutionary measures stood the bourgeois and the class-collaborationist parties of the rightwing SR's and Mensheviks which had been removed from power. Even the bloody civil war unleashed by the Russian bourgeoisie, in which the Entente states intervened, was powerless to restore the domination of the ousted classes. In this sense historical necessity blazed a trail for itself in spite of the frenzied resistance of the old world.

Breaking the bloody circle of imperialist war by revolution, the Russian proletariat and the Bolsheviks constituting the vanguard of the country's workers movement were under the conditions of that time the foremost detachment of the international, primarily West European, proletariat. They believed, not without reason, that there was no way out of the criminal imperialist slaughter other than proletarian revolution and were confident of the support of the world and, primarily, West European proletariat. However, history took a more complex and winding path. The working class of West Europe rendered the Russian working people support, not allowing the proletarian revolution to be crushed, but it proved incapable of developing it and extending it to its own countries.

On the frontier of the 1920's the all-European crisis brought about by the imperialist war and the revolution in Russia was over. And when the bourgeoisie succeeded in inflicting a defeat on the working class of Hungary, Germany, Finland, Austria and Bulgaria, it became clear that the historic situation which had brought the direct revolutionary onslaught of the proletariat to the forefront of the political stage had vanished. The victory of fascism in Germany and Italy completed the process which had begun. The tactics of a united antifascist front were the order of the day. It took a long time and, what is most important, the smashing of fascism by the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, in which the Soviet Union played the decisive part, for the working class in West Europe to be able by other paths and with other methods to join as a leading force in the political struggle.

Nonetheless, we repeat: in the world-historical plane October was a very great pivotal event of the 20th century and determined the general direction and main trends of world development.

The genetic connection of the contemporary workers movement and the Great October Socialist Revolution is not straightforward and rectilinear; it may be understood only within the framework of a complex historical process of world significance.

The triumph of October meant the solution of the main contradiction of the capitalist system in our country. The victory of the working class had far-reaching international consequences: it altered the basic antagonism of the bourgeois world—between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Since October the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has assumed the nature of the main social conflict of our era—between socialism and capitalism. It is their conflict and the resultant of their trends which now determine the main direction of the development of events in the world. In this respect the dynamism of the socialist society and its capacity for rapidly ascending the steps of progress is becoming a factor of world politics.

"Our economy is being tested for high efficiency, receptivity to progressive technology and an ability to produce first-rate products and rival competitors on world markets," the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum said. "Our morality and the entire Soviet lifestyle are being tested for the capacity for unswervingly developing and enriching the values of socialist democracy, social justice and humanism. Our foreign policy, for firmness and consistency in the defense of peace and flexibility and forbearance under the conditions of the feverish arms race being pumped up by imperialism and the international tension it is inflaming." And the paths of social progress throughout the world and the fate of the liberation movement will depend on how socialism responds to the challenge of history.

In respect of the international workers movement the experience of the Bolshevik Party combined with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution served in many countries as a decisive stimulus for the most conscious elements of the proletariat's break with social democracy, which did not correspond to the requirements of the revolutionary struggle of the working class and the creation of "parties of the new type"—communist. Since that time the communist parties, like the communist movement as a whole, have covered a long path and accumulated rich and varied experience. In some countries they have become the ruling parties and have headed their peoples' struggle for the socialist reorganization of life. In others they represent mass parties of the working class in opposition to governments pursuing a bourgeois policy. In yet others they have yet to gain the support of the working masses. But everywhere the communists are giving all their efforts and all their energy for the cause of the struggle of the working class for social justice, peace and democracy.

October initiated the contemporary world revolutionary process. Henceforward the relatively uniform European revolutionary character would become a general character with a tremendous diversity of types and forms of the latter. The boundaries of historical action, geographical and social, expanded even more: many dozens of peoples and hundreds of millions of people, whose being is connected with almost all the structures and social forms known to history, have become a part of the progressive

movement of history. V.I. Lenin's forecast that "subsequent revolutions in countries of the East immeasurably richer in population and immeasurably more distinctive in diversity of social conditions will present ...undoubtedly, more peculiarities than the Russian revolution" (10) has been fulfilled. Today we are talking of profound social changes on the scale of the whole world, changes whose purpose is building the foundations of civilization on a world scale and defending the peoples inhabiting our world against the destructive effect of late capitalism and the disasters which it entails. These changes, as the experience of the Great October testifies, demand the accomplishment of tasks of revolutionary content and scope.

Finally, the Great October, thanks to its theoretical interpretation in Marxism-Leninism, is a very rich source of political experience and ideas. The three Russian revolutions posed together with the question of socialism, in, naturally, the historical form in which they could at that time be posed, the main problems which the organized workers movement in the West, which has reached maturity and which has recognized its particular goals, has encountered decades later. The main ones among the latter are the question of peace, of the transition from democracy to socialism and of the building of a socialist society. And it is not fortuitous that the representatives of the working class which are endeavoring to realize their actions in full are returning again and again in their thoughts to the first victorious socialist revolution, to the circumstances under which it emerged and to the difficulties, contradictions, achievements and problems of its development.

Today's working class exists, showing its worth, growing and developing as an actual subject of contemporary history and its positive force determining alternatives of social development. For this reason a mechanical addition to reality of formulas taken from past eras is now more dangerous than ever, and an analysis of actual, historically particular reality is more important than ever. Concentration on an analysis of the historically particular, which was characteristic of the leader of the Russian revolution, V.I. Lenin, expressed not just an individual attribute. It was, as we can now see for ourselves, the main line of the development of Marxism and the condition of its preservation and continuation in a situation of the profound changes which have matured in reality itself.

In our time, as at the start of the century also, the world is once again at a "fork" of historical paths and experiencing a crisis stage of development.

The majority of Western specialists links this crisis with the spread of the "third technological revolution". Soviet literature speaks more often than not about a new stage of the S&T revolution. But whatever this revolution in the development of mankind and history is called, one thing is clear: it is changing modern society to

its foundations and in all spheres. A real social revolution in the meaning of this word as it was understood by K. Marx—with all its possibilities and difficult problems for the working class, the working masses, society and mankind as a whole—is essentially unfolding before our very eyes.

In fact the new technology is bringing with it unprecedented opportunities for the humanization of social labor (the elimination of heavy physical labor and also monotonous machine labor) and enabling labor to be infused with creative, intellectual content. With the help of the new technology individual work time may be reduced appreciably and the job brought nearer to the home. And a society in which the responsible and integral activity of the working people predominates and with less and more flexible work time represents a fundamental step forward in the direction of the elimination of the traditional division of labor. The process of internationalization of the productive forces—the basis of the future unity of mankind, as a result of which each individual country or group of countries will be able for the first time to act as a nationally particular and at the same time integral part of the world-historical process—is gaining tremendous stimuli.

The new technology which has appeared in bourgeois society entails tremendous dangers also. Capitalist use of microprocessor technology is leading to negative consequences for the working class—the increased intensity of labor, the introduction of a coercive production rhythm, nervous strain, the growth of the social isolation of certain categories of wage workers and so forth. Not to mention such social costs of the S&T revolution under capitalism as the disqualification, demoralization and marginalization of broad strata of the working people in the grip of structural unemployment. Nonetheless, the main danger in the age of electronics and information science is that there is a monstrous growth under capitalism of the arms race and militarism; the efforts of the latter are turning the most progressive S&T thought into a means of “exterminating everything living on Earth” (11).

Under these conditions tremendous significance for the fate of civilization is attached to the ripening of the prerequisites of a new grouping of social forces going beyond the framework of the strict juxtaposition of the two classes—“bourgeoisie-proletariat”. It is connected with the accomplishment of a task in which all the threads, all the problems of the present day come together—prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and the solution of most urgent human problems. The course of social progress is not only confronting the working class and its party with the need to tackle new tasks at a higher level but demonstrating the objective connection of the “old” goals of the workers movement—the achievement of social justice, an improvement in work conditions, the development of democracy—with the “new” ones such as the struggle against the danger of war, the solution of ecological problems and a change in the quality of life.

Indeed, the threat of nuclear catastrophe looming over the world has tied together the main socioeconomic problems caused by the S&T revolution and the problems of general struggle against the arms race, militarism and the imperialist ambitions of the ruling circles of the United States. This connection is so direct, so close that no separate accomplishment of “traditional” socioeconomic tasks is possible for the working class at the present time without the elimination of militarism in policy and the domination of military-industrial complexes in social life and also in the arena of international relations. In other words, the struggle for social progress in capitalist countries of the West today must inevitably be directed against the militarist faction of the bourgeoisie as the most dangerous, fierce and implacable enemy of all progressive changes within the country and on the international scene. A new political division has arisen based on more developed, more interwoven social relations, international included. On one side the peaceable forces, including the widest spectrum of social forces—the working class, middle strata, peasantry, the professionals and the sober-minded part of the bourgeoisie—on the other, the imperialist strata relying on the military-industrial complexes, militarist circles and unbridled anticommunist, antidemocratic elements.

Protests against the military danger cannot, of course, do away with class contradictions and a difference in political orientations. Communists are not about to abandon the class approach as long as it is historically inevitable. But the development of the struggle for peace is not contrary to the logic of the working class' struggle for social progress, in addition, without the preservation of peace, progress itself could be impossible. Furthermore, many participants in the antiwar movement belong precisely to the strata which are only just rising to political life. Participation in the antiwar movement is awakening them from political slumber and, given certain conditions, is channeling their protest against the common enemy of progress—the most unbridled imperialist circles. In this case the antiwar movement could expand the sphere of political alliances and open a new page in the antimonopoly struggle of the people's masses.

The movement (more properly, the totality of movements) pointing to the problems which have to be tackled today by the parties of the working class is growing. These are the so-called alternative movements closely linked with the antiwar movement. It would be no exaggeration to say that their appearance is to a certain extent a symptom of the narrowness of the programs of the traditional workers parties, including those of the communists and social democracy. In any event, one thing is clear: the supporters of these movements recognize the need for specification of the ideal of a general and progressive movement opposed to present-day capitalism. Renewing social and political life with the aid of struggle against the endeavor of capital to monopolize the political and other spheres of society, “reconciling” the economy and ecology, shaping a convincing program opposed to the policy of militarism,



doing away with the domination of the "ruling elite" in the news media and bureaucratization and so on and so forth—this entire action program, despite utopian elements in the concepts of the "alternativists," touches in one way or another on the content of the objective changes at whose sources stands the workers movement of the West. In any event, the endeavor of the "alternativists" to show that the prevailing type of social life characteristic of capitalism is becoming outmoded and dangerous for the immediate future of mankind and their appeal to the interests of "base democracy" and criticism of the mentality of consumerism, aspirationality and "positivism," granted all their exaggerations and weak spots, is preferable in the plane of the prospect of the struggle against capitalism to the "sober" and uninspired ideology of traditional "economist" trade-unionism.

Involving the proletarian and people's masses of Western countries in political action which is revolutionary in terms of the scope of the tasks and content just by struggle for "purely worker," shop interests is impossible. A warning against this was with brilliant foresight given at the very start of the century by V.I. Lenin, when he opposed the prejudice that "the working people can and should by themselves alone, by their 'individual initiative' take charge of the worker's cause, not endeavoring to merge it with socialism, not endeavoring to make the worker's cause the progressive and vital cause of all mankind" (12). Also testimony to this is the experience of the Great October, when the working class, guided by the Bolsheviks, embodied in "its" proletarian revolution the hopes and aspirations of the vast majority of the population of Russia. History will show how far and to what extent the surmounting of "development from above," for which (the surmounting—I.P.) the new social movements are campaigning, may constitute an alternative to the current state of affairs. But it is becoming clear even now that without "utilization" of the legitimate aspects and elements of the new social movements the parties of the working class will be unable to ascend to the level of the contemporary tasks of the struggle for social progress.

Capitalist society has now entered a most protracted and profound crisis. This crisis may with every justification be termed all-embracing inasmuch as it has affected the entire organism of bourgeois society, its basis and superstructure, value system and culture.

The long structural crisis of the capitalist economy has called in question the policy of state-monopoly regulation and, consequently, the existence of the Keynesian "welfare" state based on social consensus. The bourgeois state under these conditions is pursuing a policy of support for business and market relations, cutting back considerably on programs aimed at control of the economic process in the interests of society. Capital has switched to the counteroffensive, attempting to deprive the working people of a substantial part of their social

gains. Antiworker laws are being introduced. An offensive against the unions is under way. But the working people's social organizations are hereby finding themselves in a situation new for them, when confrontation with the employers and the state is becoming unavoidable.

It has to be noted that the crisis and technological restructuring have engendered a highly contradictory gamut of reactions in the working class. On the one hand some workers are succumbing under the influence of the crisis and the growing uncertainty to egotistic and corporate sentiments. The appeals of the conservatives for a "recovery" of the economy by way of affording private capitalist enterprise "greater freedom" and for a lessening of the burden of government social spending are finding a response in this environment. On the other, a perception of social defenselessness and moods of despair and apathy are growing in broad strata of workmen of the "old" and "new" sectors, those who owing to their unpreparedness in terms of occupational skills for technological change have been forced to work in specialized operations, youth who cannot find work, the long-term unemployed, working people forced to consent to temporary jobs and so forth.

Nor should we overlook when speaking of the mood of part of the working class the changes in the position of workers and employees brought about by the change in the forms of organization of production and, consequently, labor. The process of class consolidation is occurring slowly at newly formed enterprises in view of the smallness of the personnel. Also less auspicious for them are the possibilities of cohesion for defense of their vital interests, particularly when the new enterprise is territorially distant from the main industrial centers. The development of forms of work in the home and the expansion in certain sectors of temporary employment are contributing to the dispersal of the forces of the working class.

Finally, the question of foreign workers is intensifying in the period of structural crisis. The progressive significance of the migration of foreign manpower cannot be denied. At the same time we should also remember the particular features of the current immigration situation, features on which rightwing, profascist forces are attempting to speculate, cultivating among a certain stratum of local workers, particularly among the petty bourgeoisie, chauvinist sentiments.

As we can see, a whole number of new problems and new difficulties, both external and internal, confronts the workers movement today. And it is in far from all instances that the working class and its organizations are finding a way out of the current situation on paths of development of the class struggle.

Of course, the working class is continuing the struggle. In the detachments thereof which are threatened most by the crisis and the capitalist modernization of production

a militant mood and resolve to defend its rights and interests are strengthening. The unions are increasingly occupying positions of active repudiation of the policy of the monopolies and the bourgeois state. And the reformist wing of the union movement also is recognizing increasingly clearly the scale and depth of the threat. The executive bodies of these unions cannot fail to see the dangers of the monopolies' policy of "fragmentation" of the army of wage workers undermining the union movement as a whole. The crisis processes and the economic and social shifts connected with them are prompting the unions to formulate solutions and projects which might be capable of averting the threat looming over the working class. In fact it is a question of the creation of an alternative "model" to the existing orders, which, considering the traditions of "purely" economic trade-unionism in the Western workers movement, would be a significant step forward.

A new situation is being created for social democracy also. In their endeavor to remain "popular" parties the social democrats, those in office particularly, had grown accustomed to sacrificing the long-term socioeconomic interests of the exploited to opportunist considerations of "electoral arithmetic". The demands of the unions and the bulk of wage workers can today no longer be ignored without a risk of loss of the working people's social support. It is not fortuitous that the struggle between right and left currents has intensified in a number of social democratic parties; groupings expressing doubt as to the salutary nature of the "historic alliance" of the bourgeoisie and "progressive forces of democratic socialism" are gaining momentum.

Nonetheless, to overcome the defensive nature of the workers' struggle and continue the cause of the renewal of society it is essential to assimilate—theoretically and practically—the specific features of the new socioeconomic reality consisting of the transition from one model of development to another and to determine the new possibilities of the incorporation of the communist and workers parties in the political process at all its levels. It is becoming apparent today that the forces of the left, whose nucleus are the parties of the working class and wage workers, can no longer count, as they could in the recent past, on economic growth which more or less "automatically" resolved acute social problems. An entire period in the history of the struggle of the working masses of the industrially developed countries has passed. The working class and its parties are now confronted by the course of events with fundamentally new, "structural" problems, on which the fate of the working class depends, like the accumulation process, determination of the goals of capital investment, renewal of the production structure, introduction of new technology, technological unemployment and the nature of manpower.

The development of new technology based on the application of science will continue. In this respect the industrially developed countries have just one path. But the

forms of this development may be dual. S&T progress could proceed under the conditions of the monopoly oligarchy's usurpation of the "general productive force". A discrepancy between S&T development and social progress and a social application of science directed against the interests of the working people would then be inevitable. At the same time the S&T revolution could develop in a fundamentally different form also, its goal being the interests of the vast majority of the nation, the assured material foundations of the life of all working people and development of the culture of the masses.

It is a question of the cardinal issue of further social development. Who will determine the processes of innovations and changes on the scale of all of society: the "market" (that is, the monopolies, the TNC, the banks and the military-industrial complex) or will the changes materially affecting the world of labor be under the control of the working masses? Both paths are objectively possible, more, both these types of evolution are already showing through in the social life of developed capitalist countries. And only by having understood the difference of these types and the nature of their attitude toward social progress can we correctly evaluate the significance of the strategic and tactical concepts being put forward by different parties and currents. Within the framework of this understanding the prospect of the working class' protest against the negative consequences of the S&T revolution and its advocacy of its use in the interests of the working class is assuming an antimonopoly nature, moving to the center of the contemporary social struggle and becoming the touchstone of manifold and diverse social conflicts.

The Great October showed that the socialist revolution, just like the classical revolution of the bourgeois era, can conquer only by having become national, that is, the decisive problem of the life of different classes and the majority of the people. For many years and decades a principal cause of the lagging of the workers movement of the West was, inter alia, the fact that the "1789" of the bourgeois revolution was behind it, but the "1789" of the socialist revolution had not matured. In our time the state of affairs is changing. The process of the development of new production conditions and the emergence of global interests are making the deliverance of society from the domination of the monopoly oligarchy a vital necessity and prerequisite of the preservation and development of civilization. Whence also the new function of the working class as a progressive social force—conversion of the possibilities afforded by the S&T revolution into factors of the democratic education and political development of the people's masses. And for this it is essential to overcome the "economist" trade-unionist consciousness and "economist" trade-unionist traditions among significant numbers of the working class. Only on this condition will the circumstances which are at first sight leading to a divergence from the socialist perspective appear as new resources and forces accelerating the movement toward social progress.

The growing internationalization of production on a worldwide scale has confronted national production structures with the need to adapt to international demands. The capitalist economy is becoming at an accelerated pace, with the active assistance of the transnational corporations and banks, a uniform, albeit full of contradictions and conflicts, economic mechanism, the parts of which are most closely functionally interconnected. The need to supplement competition and private-monopoly regulation of the economy with an adjustment on the part of the state and internationally has appeared. And this is changing a good deal in the mechanism of intra-country regulation, which has to a considerable extent been deformed owing to the sharply increased interdependence of the national economies (13).

Undoubtedly, present-day capitalism has great adaptive potential, which could in principle enable it to accomplish even this very major restructuring. But it should not be forgotten that the creation of a system of interstate regulation of the world capitalist economy will be accompanied by considerable upheavals in the economic and social life of bourgeois society. The ineradicable class antagonisms within each country of state-monopoly capitalism, permanent interimperialist contradictions and the growing confrontation between the capitalist and developing countries stand in the way of the achievement of interstate "consensus". In short, the capitalist world is entering a period of exacerbation of its problems and contradictions, and it is very important that the progressive anticapitalist forces in West Europe, the United States and Japan, primarily the working class and its parties, be able to formulate an effective alternative to the imperialist methods of internationalization of production and integration of the economy and social life on a world scale.

It has to be emphasized that the objective basis of international interaction in the modern world is broader. It incorporates as an obligatory component the socialist countries. As the 27th CPSU Congress said: "The course of history and social progress is demanding increasingly insistently the establishment of constructive, creative interaction of states and peoples on the scale of the whole planet. Not only demanding but also creating the essential prerequisites for this—political, social, material." The creation of such a world and, particularly, approbation of the transitional stages thereto represents a long process full of tremendous difficulties and deviations—such is the real dialectic of development.

As we can see, the workers (more broadly, the liberation) movement is faced today with most complex tasks such as did not in such a form at the start of the century confront the working class of either Russia or West Europe. Capitalism has moved far ahead in recent decades; "transnational" capitalism is not that which it was prior to WWII and immediately following it. It is a question of the concentration of economic power, which has assumed supranational features and is based on the

penetration of increasingly broad spheres of technology, information technology particularly, and a question of the subordination of each and every structure of the nonsocialist world to the interests and logic of movement of monopoly capital. From the TNC and the highest forms of state-monopoly capitalism equipped with the most modern technology to primitive peasant communes based on primitive "equipment"—such is the range of the differences characteristic of the modern world of exploitation and oppression. What is most characteristic is that the type of diversity with a tremendous difference between the developed state of some countries and regions and the backwardness of others is engendered by modern capitalism and grows "organically" from the system of its contradictions. The most backward countries here are becoming "donors," as it were, for the more advanced.

Of course, noncoincidence in forms and rhythm of development of countries, peoples and civilizations has existed throughout human history, but in our time it is of an entirely different nature—particularly conflict-full and antagonistic. The bourgeois content penetrating social relations is failing completely to smooth over the contradictions between the capitalist evolution of a country as a whole and backward modes of production in city and village, the reverse, it is exacerbating them and attaching to the barbarity of precapitalist and early-capitalist forms of relations all the defects of late capitalism. As time goes by, the question of the creation of the initial, basic conditions for the unification of mankind is moving to the forefront increasingly in the progress of world civilization. Capitalism as a world system exists, has already evolved and has developed to the state-monopoly transnational stage, having created for itself the corresponding class grouping on a vast territory, in many countries, however, the conditions for the process of social development are still lacking. Winning them is the objective purpose of the movement for economic independence and a new economic order, a movement in which the peoples of the emergent countries are participating. Its historical validity is not a transition to socialism: the struggle is to afford the entire human race, the overwhelming majority of the world's population, conditions which afford hundreds and hundreds of millions of people an opportunity for existence and social development.

What can explain the delay in development and the difficulties of the economic and social integration of these countries with the centers of world capitalism: shortness of time? The incredible backwardness of their social organism? Or, on the contrary, does the backwardness of the social and economic structure derive from the method of capitalist industrialization of these countries conditioned by the interests of the former metropolises? In the context of the Marxist understanding of the genesis of the problem of the unity of the world the question is resolved more or less unequivocally. The obstacles to economic and social progress are not exhausted by the

shortness of the time of development of bourgeois relations or the traditionalism of social relations; as long as the TNC and foreign finance capital boss the show in these countries, modern-type social structures will take shape with tremendous difficulties and costs.

Under these conditions the parties of the working class propounding the ideals of socialism (understanding by these at times very different things) cannot accomplish the goals of social progress and peace by confining themselves to the industrially developed capitalist countries and not participating in the solution of the dramatic problems of the "third world" and North-South relations. Moral, political and, particularly, economic support are of significance here. Also important here is the struggle for the establishment of a new type of international relations, economic interrelationships and exchange of cultural experience. For independent economic development today is determined not only by the composition of the forces and direction of the evolution of this country or the other. An important, sometimes decisive, part is played by the fact that the material conditions of the foundations of the modern civilized condition are to an appreciable and ever growing extent worldwide and global in nature. Whence a difficult problem, the prerequisites of whose solution are beyond the scope of this article, in the world economy and international relations—conversion of the opportunities afforded by the progressive movement of mankind into the organic chemistry of national development. After all, if the worldwide (in the sense of use of the "last word" in organization and technology) is becoming a part of the material prerequisites of an independent development path, the greatest importance is attached to the state of international relations and world economic relations and relations between capitalist and socialist countries for the fate of the progress of the economy in the developing countries. In this respect the historical turning point connected with the Great October Socialist Revolution and the formation of the world socialist system is of incomparable significance for countries of the "third world". By virtue of the existence of socialist states in the world unprecedented opportunities for the evolution of the emergent countries are appearing—the path of a socialist orientation. Today a number of developing countries are no longer societies of dependent capitalist development but societies breaking with this dependence on the path of a socialist orientation.

A huge complication of the conditions of the struggle for social progress and, consequently, the paths of the transition to socialism is occurring at the end of the 20th century. The boundaries of revolutionary action are being moved apart. In our times they encompass socialist and democratic actions of a truly planetary scale with an infinite variety of existing and interacting structures, types and versions of the revolutionary process and an interweaving of old and new forms of social practice. The times are making new high demands on socialism, testing it for dynamism and capacity for development.

Today's Marxists must endeavor to introduce this multifaceted movement to their theory, if only in the form of a "skimmed," logically refined result. And if Marxism is the most objectively active among the mental movements of mankind—and it has proven this by its capacity for actively influencing the actual movement of history—the special form of historical reality which the world represents on the frontier of the 21st century should move its supporters to elaborate a particular form of theory and specify the old and create new concepts catching and expressing the distinctiveness of this stage of social evolution.

No actions, however revolutionary, will ever untie all historical knots, the less so in that in untying old ones they tie new ones. A progressive shift in the development of mankind, the possibility of which is contained in the new stage of the S&T revolution and the competition of the two social systems, will inevitably occur if a mechanism of realization of the new sources of the assertiveness of the revolutionary creativity of the working class and the entire mass of working people is found and cultivated. This also is a lesson of October, and a most important one, perhaps.

#### Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 45, p 379.
2. Ibid., vol 17, p 182.
3. A. Cunhal, "The Party As It Is," Moscow, 1986, p 13.
4. See V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 38, p 306.
5. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 16, pp 384-385.
6. See "The Revolutionary Process: General and Particular," Moscow, 1981, p 78.
7. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 44, pp 223-224.
8. Ibid., p 223.
9. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 22, p 536.
10. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 45, p 381.
11. "Material of the 27th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1986, p 9.
12. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 4, p 272.
13. See Yu.V. Shishkov, "Certain Concepts of Economic Development" ("Long Waves": Research, Explanations") in RK i SM No 1, 1986, p 81.

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## Changes in Chinese Society Owing to Economic Reforms Analyzed

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[Article by V. G. Gelbras: "Social Changes in Chinese Society"]

[Text] More than a decade has elapsed since the memorable events of October 1976, when the "Gang of Four"—Mao Zedong's closest "cultural revolution" assistants—were removed from the PRC's political scene. These years have been marked by striking changes in all spheres of China's social life. The year of 1976 completed, as it is customary to now say in the PRC, a "decade of chaos" and began a "new historical period" (1). At its third (1978) and sixth (1981) 11th Central Committee plenums and at the 12th party congress (1982) the CCP summed up the past and drew lessons from it. The CCP condemned the "cultural revolution," blamed Mao Zedong for its organization and implementation, initiated turbulent activity to overcome its consequences and embarked on a search for the ways, forms and methods of genuinely socialist development and an upturn of the economy and the people's well-being.

The first serious successes have been achieved on this path. The Sixth Five-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development (1981-1985) was fulfilled. In March 1986 the Sixth National People's Congress Fourth Session summed up what had been done and adopted the Seventh (1986-1990) Five-Year Plan (15 April 1986) (2). Thanks to the restructuring and development of the economy, it was possible at the end of the 1970's to halt the decline in the people's living standard, which had lasted throughout the 1960's and 1970's almost, and begin a gradual increase therein. A qualitative improvement in the people's well-being showed through: the majority of the population had resolved the problem, as they say in China, of "warmth and repletion," and consumer durables—television receivers, refrigerators, washing machines and such—which even recently had been totally unknown to the vast majority of working people, began to be a part of the daily life of millions of them. Tremendous political and socio-psychological significance was attached to the placement in jobs of tens of millions of young people, as a result of which the proportion of those awaiting jobs in the cities diminished from 4.9 percent in 1980 to 1.5 percent in 1985 (3).

At the same time, however, party and state leaders are warning that far from all shortcomings have been eliminated and that there is still much to be done to rectify the style and methods of the work of the party and the organs of power, in combating bureaucratism, profiteering, bribe-taking, corruption and nepotism and so forth.

A central feature of the restructuring of social relations on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's were the spread in the Chinese countryside of the household contract, the

elimination of the rural communes and the creation of district people's governments, which were completed by 1984, in the main. On the basis of the large-scale experiments which had taken several years the CCP 12th Central Committee Third Plenum (1984) adopted a decree on the implementation of an economic reform oriented mainly toward the urban economy. In the Seventh Five-Year Plan it is contemplated, according to Zhao Ziyang, acting general secretary of the CCP Central Committee and PRC State Council premier, creating "the framework of the new economic system" (14 April 1986).

The abrupt changes in production relations and the recovery and growth of the economy have exerted a pronounced influence on the social situation, having engendered entirely new processes for the PRC. The changes which have occurred have not yet had time to form an integral system of new social and economic relations. For this reason by social changes what is meant, as a rule, is not completed processes but merely the start thereof. Attention is concentrated on the most fundamental social processes and phenomena.

Owing to the incomplete nature of statistical indicators, the inevitable delay in their analysis and publication, the lack of a series of factual data and the inadequate degree of study of the latest socioeconomic processes and phenomena, a number of the conclusions and considerations offered in the article are of a preliminary nature.

## Social Development Trends of the 1970's-1980's and the Economic Reform

Studies of past years made it possible to ascertain several fundamental trends of the social development of Chinese society throughout the 1960's-1970's (4) born of the system of extra-economic compulsion (5). There was a break with this system in the PRC on the frontier of the 1980's.

First, the elimination of the essentially political relations of domination and subordination and their replacement with economic, commodity-money relations between the state, collectives and individual working people began. The compulsory physical and labor duties of the population were reduced, diverse restrictions on its production and economic activity were cut back sharply and numerous dues and obligations (except for those determined by the law and central government decrees) were banned. The mass rehabilitation of persons repressed at the time of the "cultural revolution," which encompassed entire strata and groups of the population, entailed the acknowledgment as mistaken and baseless and the emphatic cancellation of a variety of ignominious labels pinned in preceding years on enterprises of so-called urban collective ownership (6) and the peasants' personal smallholdings. The principle of material interest, piece-rate remuneration and the payment of bonuses were rehabilitated. Millions of citizens were paid compensation for the losses caused them, and

victims were introduced to work in keeping with their general educational and vocational training. These and other measures of 1978-1980 made it possible to eliminate the sociopolitical crisis in Chinese society and stimulate the socially useful activity of all classes, strata and groups of the population.

Legal and moral-political barriers between individual groups and strata of the population were broken down also. Artificially created strata and groups are departing from social life. Some of them are to disappear completely (the "literate youth in the countryside," for example), others, to undergo major transformation (the gangbu [7], for example), yet others, to continue to develop in a new capacity (workers and employees of "urban collective ownership"). The removal of the provisions and practices which had distinguished the ganbu as a particular social stratum, the institution of job inheritance in the state sector and the legal and moral-political barriers separating the urban and rural population is changing the very type of social development: from exclusive social formations classes, strata and groups of the population are becoming open formations, and social migration, which is an organic part of all stages of the development of the socialist society, is emerging.

Second, all forms of personal dependence are being broken down and the formation of a society of socioeconomically and politically equal and competent classes, strata and groups of the population has begun. The social position of the intelligentsia, working people of "urban collective ownership," specialists and highly skilled workers and also the huaqiao and the families of huaqiao and representatives of the groups of the population which in the recent past were categorized as exploiter, counterrevolutionary and "harmful" has changed or begun to change. The revival as of the end of the 1970's of the petty commodity individual (sole-proprietor) sector in the cities and, subsequently, in the villages also was essentially the embodiment of this same process.

Third, the formation of such norms of life as free choice of place of residence, work, profession and type of occupation and also voluntary hiring and voluntary association in production, supply-sales, credit and other economic associations has begun, as has, consequently, a reduction in the sphere of the state's direct intervention in citizens' personal life. As a result there has been an appreciable change primarily in the socioeconomic position of the peasantry: it has acquired an opportunity in its production and economic relations to go beyond the framework not only of the rural district and area but of the province even. The exchange of activity between individual strata and groups of the population has intensified sharply. New interests and requirements and new methods of satisfying them have appeared in society. New horizons have opened to all classes and strata of the population, and their ideas concerning the surrounding world have changed.

Fourth, there is a gradual increase in the population's real income, housing conditions are improving and the administrative-political barriers in the way of the growth of the population's requirements, as, equally, a variety of compulsory regulations concerning the measures and nature of their satisfaction, have been eliminated, in the main. The living standard of the bulk of the working people has risen more recently than in the 20 preceding years.

The economic reform is designed to accelerate the said processes. A most serious problem of the future is how and to what extent it will be possible to make compatible the proclaimed goals of the reform and the actual opportunities for achieving them.

So none of the leading trends of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical development of the 1960's-1970's has been preserved in the China of the first half of the 1980's.

At the same time, however, the incomplete nature of the formation of the new trends of development is making its mark on all aspects of the life of the PRC. Restrictions on the production and economic activity of the population are preserved in the country. This puts city dwellers and rural inhabitants in different economic positions. It has not been possible to fully realize and enshrine all the declared freedoms and rights of the citizens, and for this reason fundamental changes have been not been achieved everywhere in the position of the intelligentsia, the workers and employees of "urban collective ownership" and certain other groups of the population. It has not yet been possible to completely eliminate dues and in-kind and monetary duties established by the local authorities, which is having a pronounced effect on the production assertiveness of individual strata and groups of the population, particularly the peasants and also workers and employees of "urban collective ownership".

Nonetheless, China's social development has acquired features of exceptional dynamism characteristic of a period of abrupt change. One of its manifestations is urbanization. In 15 years—1966-1980—the country's population increased by almost 262 million, but the urban population (including the administrative suburbs), only 61 million. In the last 5-year period—1981-1985—however, an entirely different process emerged: the country's population grew by 59.3 million, but the urban population, by more than 140 million. The population of cities as such (that is, not counting the rural areas under the administrative jurisdiction of the cities) accounted for approximately half this increase (73 million), including their nonagricultural population for 24.5 million (9). In other words, an unprecedented phenomenon for the PRC had emerged—following a long period of the extremely slow development of the cities, their avalanche-like growth began. Their nonagricultural population accounted for more than 41 percent of the increase in the country's entire population in 1981-1985.

The rapid release of workers from agriculture is remarkable. While remaining in the countryside, increasingly large numbers of working people are beginning to take up nonagricultural activity. In the said 5-year period the increase in the number of persons working in rural localities constituted almost 57 million or 71 percent of the entire increase in society's manpower (10). The increase in the number of people working in agriculture here declined annually by an average of 11.2 percent, but in industry it accelerated by an annual 7.5 percent, in trade, by 6.9 percent, and in construction, by 18.7 percent. The increase in the numbers of those in work in 1985 was distributed by sector as follows: agriculture accounted for 6 percent, industry and transport for 70 percent, construction 19 and trade and services for 5 percent of new workers (11).

The PRC's subsequent economic and social development will largely be determined by how rapidly and universally it will be possible to introduce general, compulsory free elementary education based on common statewide quality criteria, eliminate the illiteracy of more than 230 million of the adult, mainly rural, population and the semiliteracy of even greater masses thereof (12) and provide for the systematic vocational training and retraining of the working people.

Significance of particular scale and consequences in the life of Chinese society is attached and, to judge by the works of Chinese scholars, will continue to be attached for many years to come to the problem of the placement and rational and economically and socially efficient use of the country's giant labor resources. Thus according to the forecasts of Chen Baoguan, citing material of the corresponding departments, at the end of 1981 one-fourth of persons working in the national economy pertained to the "superfluous personnel" category (13). According to this author's outlines for the future, there will in 1990 be 187-192 million "actually and potentially superfluous workers," in 1995, 130-156 million, and in the year 2000, 40-103 million (14). According to other forecasts, by the end of the century the manpower surplus could amount to 300-400 million persons (15). According to the data of He Guang, deputy minister of labor and personnel of the PRC, as NCNA reported on 9 September 1985, in the 5-year plan which has just begun the scale of the problem is determined by the coming of able-bodied age of approximately 6 million persons annually, the release of approximately 10 million workers and employees in the course of modernization of production and improvement of the management system and the release of a further 100 million persons from agriculture. Truly colossal proportions.

Without any doubt, the quest for a solution of this problem, one of the PRC's biggest social and economic problems, and the nature of the measures adopted (16) will have an appreciable impact on the fate of all classes and strata of Chinese society and their mutual relations.

## State Workers and Employees

This category of working people is the biggest in industry and certain spheres of construction, in a number of types of transport and in communications establishments, not to mention education, health care and the system of finances and state administration. By the end of 1985 the PRC had 123.1 million workers and employees, of whom 89.9 million, that is, approximately 73 percent, were employed in the state sector. In the 1981-1985 five-year plan the absolute increase in the number of workers and employees in the country constituted 18.7 million persons, including 9.7 million or almost 52 percent in the state sector. People working in the state sector accounted in 1985 for 18 percent of the employed population (17). The state sector occupies the commanding heights in the economy and completely controls and directs the development of the national economy.

A system of "permanent" workers and employees had taken shape in past years in China: the state authorities issued compulsory job assignments; the working people did not have the right to choice of place of work, occupation or specialty; enterprises could not dismiss workers, nor, equally, could they take on new ones at their own discretion; workmen retiring on pension were replaced by their children. State workers and employees were, and at the present time remain, the most privileged working people. In recent years the Chinese press has noted many instances of the families of state workers and employees forbidding their children to marry representatives of other strata and groups of working people (18).

A system of social insurance based on the contributions of enterprises and the working people themselves has begun to take shape in the PRC in recent years. Experimental insurance systems extending to workers and employees of enterprises and industrial organizations of "urban collective ownership" have been set up in a number of cities (19). The measures which have been adopted are a step forward along the path of surmounting social differences between working people working at enterprises of state, cooperative and other forms of ownership, however, much still has to be done to solve this problem. The new social problems have engendered an influx into the cities of peasants, for whom special conditions of hiring and life in the city have been established.

There will be changes in the position of state workers and employees in the course of the economic reform. It is planned gradually abolishing completely the rules and practice of job inheritance, introducing a variety of agreed forms of hiring (contract and competitive) and granting enterprises the right to independent revision of permanent staff schedules, including the dismissal of superfluous and recruitment of additional workmen, and also a restructuring of the pay systems.



There has been a pronounced replacement of state workers and employees in recent years. In the period 1966-1975 the absolute increase in the numbers of state workers and employees constituted 26.9 million, in 1976-1980, 17.9 million, and in 1981-1985, 9.7 million persons (20). The actual increase in the past 10 years has been considerably greater thanks to the mass retirement on pension of workers and employees of the senior age groups. As a result there has been a rapid renewal and rejuvenation of the body of state workers and employees: persons 35 and younger have formed the majority in labor outfits and at a number of enterprises, and in some sectors the proportion thereof has come to amount to 80-90 percent.

The young people starting work were, for the most part, active participants in the "cultural revolution" and were members of Red Guard and zaofang detachments which administered justice and instituted reprisals against workers of the party-state authorities, representatives of the intelligentsia and production pacesetters. At that time they did away with the system of administration under anarchic slogans of struggle against the "bourgeoisie" and against "diktat" and "pressure" on the part of the intelligentsia, which was allegedly endeavoring to "restore capitalism" and so on and so forth. They had had instilled in them from childhood a revulsion for the market, commodity-money relations, the principle of material interest and the technological discipline of large-scale production. A significant proportion of this youth remained not simply uneducated, it was brought up in a spirit of scorn for learning and derision toward the intelligentsia and specialists. It was it which was affected the most strongly by the processes of demoralization and disorganization born of the "cultural revolution" and it was it which was hit to the greatest extent, according to the Chinese press, by a crisis of faith in socialism and a crisis of trust in the CCP (21).

The CCP stated openly that its ties to the labor outfits had weakened sharply on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's and had become particularly weak with the young replenishment of the labor outfits (22). During the 12th CCP Congress the journal RED FLAG wrote of the need to "win" these masses over to the side of the party (23).

In this situation implementation of the economic reform ran into a lack of understanding and resistance even on the part of some state workers and employees. Abuse of production pacesetters and resistance to measures to make wages directly dependent on the results of work and bring production and technological discipline to bear—such is merely certain testimony to the difficult situation in a number of labor outfits. Difficulties born of the "cultural revolution" have also arisen in the course of the creation of worker and employee assemblies (conferences) and the organization of their activity (25), the revival of the trade unions and the development of their work in other spheres also.

Thanks to the ideological and educational work performed by the CCP in the worker environment in recent years, large numbers of workers and employees have occupied active positions and are making their contribution to the development of production and implementation of the economic reform. By International Workers Solidarity Day, 1 May 1986, the title of "production pacesetter" had been conferred on more than 10 million working people. In the past 5 years more than 30 million workers and employees have been taught at illiteracy elimination and general and vocational training courses (31 December 1985). According to incomplete data encompassing seven provinces and Shanghai and Dalian, in the first 10 months of 1985 workers and employees submitted 2.48 million efficiency proposals and engineering improvements (15 January 1986).

There is, however, evidence of other, negative, phenomena: an undue enthusiasm for an expansion of the bonus funds, which has become a state problem (12 April 1985; 14 April 1986); the overgrowth of state enterprises with daughter enterprises (they have served, as a rule, as a means of accommodating the superfluous manpower released from the basic production of the founder-plant (27 November, 17 December 1984); the involvement of enterprises in economic crime connected with the manufacture of substandard products (medicines, for example, which required the adoption of a political decree and legislative prohibition) (13, 22 September 1984), profiteering and market speculation and the organization of a boycott of the products of related enterprises (29 December 1983; 24 December 1984; 29 May 1985).

### Workers and Employees of 'Urban Collective Ownership'

At the end of 1985 the numbers of this category of working people were in excess of 33.2 million, that is, constituted less than 7 percent of the employed population and approximately one-third of urban working people (26). It has almost doubled in the past 10 years. The absolute dimensions of its growth are increasing also: in the period 1966-1975, when "urban collective" ownership was being branded as the "tail of capitalism," this growth constituted 5.4 million persons, in 1976-1980, 6.5 million, and in 1981-1985, almost 9 million persons (27). The proportion of young people therein has grown considerably also.

The majority of working people of these enterprises had no prospect of finding work in the state sector owing to a lack of the necessary family connections, low general training and poor health. Considerable numbers of women, for whom owing to many circumstances it is far from always possible to obtain the same education as men, are employed here, however. They too often encounter various forms of discrimination, although it has been outlawed politically and legislatively, and the social organizations are struggling against it (15 October 1983; 26 January 1984; 30 January and 17 March 1985).



Workers and employees of the "urban collective ownership" enterprises are concerned to see the complete elimination of the remnants of the past discrimination and the full, actual equalization of the rules, principles and social conditions of work at enterprises of different forms of ownership.

A considerable portion of the enterprises and organizations of this sector functions in conformity with market conditions. Owing to the undeveloped state of transport and local transportation, trade and public catering and also practically all sectors of the service sphere, "urban collective ownership" could enjoy great development in the coming years. However, the pace and scale of its increase will be determined to a great extent, as in previous years, not so much by the requirements of the market as the current practice of material-technical supply, the pricing system, and the wage, tax and credit policy of the state modified by the local authorities.

### The Peasantry

Some 370.6 million persons or more than 74 percent of the employed population were concentrated in the rural economy at the end of 1985. The absolute numbers of people working in this sphere is increasing: by 64 million in 1966-1975 and by 71.2 million in 1976-1985, including almost 57 million in the last 5-year period (28). The relative significance of persons working in the nonagricultural sectors of the rural economy is growing here—from 3.7 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 1985.

The profound changes in the agrarian policy of the CCP which have occurred in the period since 1979 have had a profound impact on all aspects of the life of village society, although it has been markedly different in the underdeveloped areas from the developed areas. The rate of economic development of the first has been quite modest, but the second has accomplished literally a surge forward. The CCP Central Committee and PRC State Council have by a number of decisions outlined a set of measures to assist the poor areas (9 May 1985; 23 February 1986).

Several typologically different versions of the change in collective farms born both of the elimination of the rural communes and the formation of district governments and the spread of household contract forms in production and economic activity have taken shape in the Chinese countryside.

First: there has been a strengthening of the collective farm based on the development of diverse and flexible cooperative financially autonomous structures encompassing basic production and crafts, the primary processing of agricultural raw material, industrial production, transport, construction, trade and the industrial and consumer service sphere.

Second: the sphere of the industrial and economic activity of the collective farm has narrowed. Its chief function is being "the main service entity" of the contract households. In this case group forms of the organization of production and labor have been partially preserved.

Third: the collective farm is formally preserved, but only as owner of the land. The peasant homestead has become not simply the main but at times the sole independent production cell of the farm.

A new organization—a collective farm economic-managerial service—has taken shape in the PRC in the past 2-3 years. Such service centers now exist in more than 24,000 districts of over 400 administrative areas (the country has more than 2,200 administrative areas altogether). Over 87,000 specialists and 120,000 accountants and bookkeepers are helping the collective farms in the countryside draw up specific forms of the contract organization of production and also the terms of the contract agreements (they have helped conclude approximately 160 million such agreements), reorganize bookkeeping, set up cost accounting and so forth. In accordance with the instructions of the CCP Central Committee and the PRC State Council, these centers started work on "putting in order" the finances of the collective farms in the villages. By mid-1985 it had been completed in more than 90 percent of former production teams and over 70 percent of large production teams (9 May 1985).

As of 1984 the CCP has begun to pay increasingly close attention to the collective farms, encouraging the development of forms of collective-group ownership of the most varied degrees of socialization and methods of management (23 February 1986).

Owing to the "scissors" in the prices of the most important agricultural crops and the product of industry, the peasantry is in principle interested in the collective farm. It alone is capable of providing for the redistribution of income to compensate the expenditure of households employed in obligatory, but unprofitable or low-income production.

Such a phenomenon as the emergence in the countryside of the new economic associations (NEO) merits attention. They are at the very initial stage of development as yet. Their formation has been brought about by the economic independence and enterprise of individual peasant households, the appearance in the countryside of spare cash, the availability of unused or not fully used manpower, the development of production and economic requirements, the bureaucratic incorrigibility of forms of the collective farm which had taken shape in the past and other things.

From the form of ownership viewpoint the NEO may be subdivided into four main groups: an association of ownership of several peasant households; a combination of the ownership of peasant households with state or cooperative ownership, when the NEO are formed on the

basis of several participation; an association of ownership of two or several collective farms; and the combination on a shared basis of the funds of a state and/or collective organization and the local authority.

Typologically the NEO differ from one another quite appreciably, there being among them consistently socialist farms, associations of a semisocialist type and farms distinguished by socioeconomic characteristics of various orders (semicapitalist and traditional-archaic, for example). The PRC State Statistical Administration began publishing consolidated statistical data pertaining to the NEO in 1984. According to an NCNA report of 26 June 1986, by the end of 1985 the overall number of NEO had risen to 480,000, they employed 4.2 million persons and the proportion of wage workers and apprentices had increased from 19.8 percent in 1984 to 28 percent in 1985. A comparison of the data for the 2 years shows that simultaneously with an increase in the number of NEO of 3 percent, the number of people working in them of 18 percent and in fixed capital of 42 percent the numbers of members of the NEO grew only 6 percent, but of "available" workers, by 67 percent! (29) Their logic of development will be determined to a large extent by the economic reform, the profound differences in the level of economic development of individual areas which have already taken shape and other circumstances. It has to be considered that the villages of the PRC had in 1985 more than 1.65 million collective enterprises, at which almost 38.5 million persons worked, more than 900,000 enterprises created on a shared basis by several peasant households and over 3.3 million production and economic units belonging to individual households (13 November 1986). The production and economic activity of the peasantry is organized and supported by the restructured supply-sales and credit cooperatives, in which more than 90 and over 80 percent respectively of all peasant households are shareholders (14 April 1985; 6 March 1986).

Thus cooperative construction in the PRC has entered a new period, considerably more complex than ever before. It will inevitably be distinguished by a great diversity of forms and rate and method of development in individual parts of the country. The complementarity, coexistence, rivalry, competition and struggle of the former collective farms and the NEO, restoration of the disintegrated and strengthening of existing collective farms, search for new directions of the development of cooperation—such are the main processes which will determine the changes in village society in the years ahead. The urban economy will have a tremendous and ever increasing impact on it.

The transition of the countryside to the new conditions of management has summoned into being a rapid process of the division of labor and the formation of different social elements in the peasant environment.

"Individual industrial-trading households". This group has lost its connections with the collective farm and, as a rule, with farming. At the end of 1985 there were in the

villages over 8.1 million such households with 13 million workers or a little more than 4 percent of peasant households and approximately 3 percent of the country's employed population (30 October 1985; 23 February 1986). They will be dealt with in more detail below.

"Self-managing households". This group is transitional from members of the collective farm to individual workers. The households of this group do not participate or participate little in the production activity of the collective farms but make payments into the collective farm's social funds and are full members thereof. The main thread linking these households with the collective farm is the "food minimum" plot of land ("kouliang tian"). The group incorporates for the most part households connected by their activity with the market, and they engage in crafts, maintenance, freight haulage and in other spheres. A special part of the "self-managing households" is formed by peasants who have found work per contracts of service at rural or urban nonagricultural enterprises.

Members of collective farms engaged in production for the market ("specialized" households). Following the introduction in 1985 of uniform criteria of definition of this group of households, it has turned out that there are not that many of them—only 4.25 million or 2.3 percent of all peasant households (30)—although 25 million such households were being reported quite recently even (31). Three main factors are limiting the development of this group of households: the limited nature of arable areas and an acute shortage of fuel (primarily gasoline and lubricants) and also chemical fertilizers. Only a gradual increase in supplies to agriculture of chemical fertilizers is possible in the foreseeable future.

The economic significance of this group of households is very appreciable. The process of the concentration of arable area, pasture, orchards and forest plantations on hillsides, in awkward locations and so forth which has begun is connected with it. It enjoys the material and moral support of the CCP, is the predominant force in the market and acquires in practice the bulk of its privileges along forward contract purchase lines: in credit and provision with producer goods, chemical fertilizers and so forth.

Needy households, "five guarantees" households and deceased servicemen and war invalid households. This part of the peasantry is not in a position to keep itself independently, without help on the part of society and the state. In 1984 some 2.96 million persons met the conditions of the "five guarantees," and almost 2.7 million of them were in receipt of assistance. It was also rendered 7 million needy peasant households, as a result of which, it was reported, approximately 3 million households ceased to pertain to this group (32). Following the introduction of the contract system, the households of this group were also in many localities endowed with "food minimum" fields; since 1984 they have been prompted to forgo such and switch to food provision from the collective farm.

Members of collective farms engaged in predominantly subsistence or semi-subsistence farming. This group incorporates the bulk of the peasantry, that is, approximately 80 percent of households. The average peasant household, according to the material of a survey organized by the CCP Central Committee Secretariat Agrarian Research Center, consisted on average in 1984 of 4.8 persons and had 2.67 workers. It had at its disposal a contract allotment of land of 8.35 mu, that is, 0.55 hectares divided on average into 9.7 plots (30 April 1986).

For a description of the differences between peasants engaged in commodity production and the "ordinary" peasants, as a report of the PRC State Statistical Administration says (33), we may resort to a comparison of the most important economic indicators of their activity. For this purpose we availed ourselves of the material of two random surveys carried out by the PRC State Statistical Administration (34), developing somewhat the system of comparisons employed by Chinese statistics (see table 1).

Table 1. Comparative Data Pertaining to 'Specialized' and 'Ordinary' Peasant Households, 1984

	Unit of measurement	'Special'd'	'Ordinary'	First as % of second
1. Composition of household, total	persons	5.8	5.37	108
Working, total	persons	4.31*	2.87	151
Family load factor	%	1.33	1.87	171
2. Fixed capital per original valuation per workman	yuan	1,272	202	greater by a factor of 6.3
3. Net income per workman	yuan	1,866	697	greater by a factor of 2.68
4. Sales volume per workman	yuan	2,745.8	339.5	greater by a factor of 8
..Proportion of sales in gross income	%	76	38	two times as much
5. Taxes and payments** per workman	yuan	201.5	32.6	greater by a factor of 6.2
6. Per capita net income after payments and tax***	yuan	1,243.5	355.3	greater by a factor of 3.5

Note:

\* Including "auxiliary" manpower (the PRC State Statistical Administration gives no explanation for it).

\*\* Meaning payments into collective funds.

\*\*\* Excluding "pools," "dues," donations and so forth.

Sources: XINHUA YUEBAO No 7, 1985, pp 105-106; "Zhongguo tongji nianjian," 1985, p 570.

The "specialized" households represent a commodity farm which exists thanks to the investment of resources, quite considerable in terms of the present-day conditions of the Chinese countryside, in the expansion of production, in equipment, in the increased fertility of the cultivable land and so forth. Their production outgoings constitute more than 48 percent of gross income compared with 22.4 percent in "ordinary" households. On consumption needs the first spend somewhat more than 46 percent of gross income, the "ordinary" households, almost 74 percent. Some in any way pronounced use of

agricultural and other equipment is economically impossible in the latter since expenditure thereon would be inordinately great compared with income. In such a household the use of live labor is more profitable than embodied labor. It is a different matter for the "specialized" household. In terms of "provision with equipment" it is little different from the rural collective nonagricultural enterprises and the NEO.

What are the advantages of the "specialized" households? In its report the PRC State Statistical Administration cites several factors meriting close attention:

these households have at their disposal a large and skilled work force (more than 25 percent of the workers have undergone vocational training) and also appreciable "basic capital" (2,910 yuan per household in agriculture, 6,430 yuan in industrial production, 8,925 yuan in services). The scale of production therein is considerable. Finally, they are demonstrating an ability to manage (35). It may with every justification be said that the "specialized" households belong to an entirely different economic era than the bulk of the peasantry engaged in predominantly subsistence or semi-subsistence farming.

Indeed, the present-day Chinese peasantry is not a homogeneous social whole. The separation among it of "specialized" and "ordinary" households even does not provide a full picture of the social differences in the peasant masses. China is beginning to write increasingly often about three main groups: lowest, middle and highest. The first includes households with a net per capita income of less than 200 yuan. In its analysis of the living standard of the peasantry for 1984 the PRC State Statistical Administration points out with a reference to "calculations made with regard for the current situation" that "more than 200 yuan are essential for maintaining the minimum living standard of one peasant and simple reproduction in a normal area." The second group unites peasant households disposing of a per capita net income of 200 to 500 yuan. They are capable of feeding themselves at the level of the physiological norms and effecting simple reproduction. Finally, the highest group is formed by households with a per capita income of over 500 yuan, which are capable of effecting expanded reproduction (37).

Judging by the material of the survey organized by the CCP Central Committee Secretariat Agrarian Research Center, almost 26.3 percent of peasant households constituted the lowest group in 1984. They accounted for 8.2 percent of the sum total of income of the households surveyed (9.3 percent in 1978). The second group incorporates 48.4 percent of peasant households. Some 25.3 percent of households, which obtained in the year of the survey 51.7 percent of the sum total of income of the peasant household encompassed by the study (47.7 percent in 1978), represented the highest group. The last group contains the approximately 5.5 percent of households with a disposable per capita net income of over 1,000 yuan (38).

The prevalence of the household contract under the specific conditions born of the "cultural revolution" has brought about complex socio-psychological consequences in the peasant environment. Entirely new life and value orientations have become prevalent in the countryside: individualism, enterprise, mercantilism and rejection, particularly by the youth, of the previous standards and principles of village life. A tangled knot of contradictory socio-psychological hopes, expectations and aspirations has evolved in village society. Significant numbers of peasants are endeavoring to transform all the conditions of their existence, orienting themselves

toward the market and the city and attempting to master modern science and technology. They are characterized particularly by sentiments of the "fear of a return to the past" type, as they say in the PRC. There are marked aspirations to the speediest enrichment thanks to the use, at times, of any means on this path. A heightened sense of envy of those who are successful, as, equally, despair from fruitless attempts to raise their own farming leading at times to extremist acts and crime, has taken shape. Contentedness with their daily bread, a return to the standards of traditional living and indifference to the calls for increased production predominate among some peasants. Finally, opponents of the new agrarian policy of the CCP and the state exist and are operating, as before, as the Chinese press notes.

The Chinese countryside has found itself faced with completely new social changes.

### The Intelligentsia

The numbers of workers of mental labor (persons with higher and secondary education) have exceeded 25 million, which constitutes 6 percent of the employed population. According to the 1982 census, the country had 6 million persons with higher education (including 1.6 million self-taught persons and students) (39).

From being politically discriminated against and persecuted (the "ninth dregs"), the intelligentsia has in recent years come to be an officially venerated, politically important and active part of the population. The process of this conversion is occurring slowly and encountering many prejudices and difficulties, but gaining ever increasing strength and scope.

The intelligentsia is the stratum of the population which by its position in society has a vital interest in order being brought to bear in the country as quickly as possible, an upturn of the productive forces, a sharp increase in production efficiency, an improvement in the population's work and social conditions and the democratization of all aspects of the life of society. Admittance of the intelligentsia to the CCP, the promotion of its representatives to executive positions and the revival of a united front policy are extending considerably the possibilities of its influence on the country's development. Thus 580,000 specialists were enlisted in the party in the period 1978-1983. Their proportion of the total number of those admitted to the CCP in 1978 constituted 8.3 percent, in 1982, 23.6 percent, and in 1983, 27 percent. In 1984 this indicator in Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia amounted to or exceeded 50 percent, in Hunan, 47 percent, and in Shandong and Henan, approximately 30 percent (40).

At the same time the possibilities of the Chinese intelligentsia are limited owing to its smallness (the absolute majority thereof, furthermore, is employed in the state sector), the fact that it is constrained by existing rules

and the practice of assignment to enterprises, organizations and departments (41), insufficient training and separation for many years from world science, culture and art and owing to the absence of an influx of young people for more than 10 years and other factors. By virtue of the said and other factors, not all specialists work with full input.

The majority of the intelligentsia is participating active in implementation of the economic reform. The content of the debate of recent years on problems of scientific socialism, philosophy and political economy shows that a wide spectrum of views on the country's further social and economic development has taken shape in the country. The CCP Central Committee Sixth Plenum (1981) condemned both supporters of the tenets of the period of the "cultural revolution" (or, as is said in the PRC, the "two absolutes") and those who are opposed to socialism and the CCP leadership (42). It would seem that this characterization of the range of differences in views within the party is perfectly serviceable also for a definition of the positions of representatives of scientific circles which have been ascertained in the debates of recent years.

### The Gangbu

There are approximately 22 million gangbu in the PRC (43). They account for 4.5 percent of the employed population. The gangbu are a special social stratum of the population which has taken shape over many years. It was therein that the crisis of a bureaucracy which demonstrated infinite inventiveness in respect of its own survival, limitation of the initiative and creativity of the working people and the establishment of petty tutelage over any in any way mass movement had ripened. However, forces have come to the fore from this environment in recent years which are inspiring and organizing a restructuring of Chinese society and the eradication of the consequences of the "cultural revolution".

The social position of the gangbu has already undergone certain changes. The loss of executive positions by considerable numbers thereof, the gradual elimination of the past irresponsibility, nonaccountability and nonanswerability, the CCP's struggle against nepotism, bribery, corruption, theft and other crimes of office—these and other phenomena of recent years represent a serious blow to the entire institution of the gangbu (44). Competitive examinations and the contract system of hiring, limited and fixed timeframes of the occupation of executive office, test of professional suitability and remuneration depending on the results of the economic activity of the managed area are, like the other measures being implemented in the country also, leading not only to elimination of the former standards of the activity of the gangbu born of the exclusive nature of this system but also to a considerable personal change of executive personnel. This process has already begun. Some 1.2

million elderly gangbu were retired in 1982-1985 (8 September, 22 October 1985). They are being replaced intensively by persons with higher and secondary specialized education (45).

There are among the gangbu both supporters and opponents of the economic reform. The composition of both is variable and heterogeneous. The multi-character appearance of the latter may be judged, for example, from the gangbu's crimes and abuse of office. Mention needs to be made, first, of economic crimes (speculation, embezzlement, profiteering and so forth); second, the illegal transfer of relatives and friends from the rural to the urban population category, their employment as permanent or temporary workers of the state sector, occupancy of excessively large living space and so forth; third, participation in business activity and the creation of joint-stock and other companies.

Granted all their diversity, the economic crimes are characterized by the fact that the persons guilty of them, while operating in the "channel" of the economic reform, as it were, go far beyond the framework determined by the law. In their eyes the economic reform is essentially insufficiently radical, and they are demanding complete freedom of maneuver in entrepreneurial activity. The second group of abuses of office testifies that part of the gangbu is treating the changes occurring in the country with fear, distrust and pessimism. Such gangbu are having to undergo educational sanctions, and malicious offenders are being dismissed and expelled from the CCP.

As distinct from the first two, the final group of abuses is characterized by actions which are formally not entirely necessarily connected with breaches of the law. However, the organizational possibilities occasioned by their office, knowledgeability concerning economic conditions, official and personal connections and even simply the availability of a telephone make the gangbu desirable companions in business activity. In 1984 party and state workers were prohibited from creating industrial and trading enterprises and joining NEO based on share capital and profit distribution. It was also recommended that the gangbu not engage in trade (20 November 1984; 13 April 1985). At the same time, however, the local village leaders and members of the CCP in the countryside are, on the contrary, being encouraged to develop commodity production.

So by virtue of their social position, the gangbu have been forced to adopt particular standpoints. They are active: some as vigorous supporters and proponents of the social changes, others as their opponents or more or less passive observers. On the side of the first are the objective requirements of the development of Chinese society, although there are among them different ideas concerning the goals and most important parameters of economic policy and the methods and means of achieving these goals.

### The Individual (Personal) Petty Commodity Sector

The sector is represented predominantly by family forms of management, despite the limited hiring permitted by law and the availability of unemployed or not fully employed manpower.

Less than 4 percent of the population was concentrated in this sector at the end of 1985 (46) (see Table 2). The revival as of 1978 of the individual petty commodity sector as yet preserves in all respects the features of a process which has only just begun: it is developing

extremely unevenly by area of the country, and the majority of its representatives is employed in trade, and only a minority, in crafts and so forth. There have in the years that have elapsed been several rises and falls in the expansion of this sector. Thus in the first half of 1986 the numbers of persons employed in individual activity in the sphere of trade, catering, service and maintenance had declined by 210,000 compared with the end of 1985. For this reason the total numbers of persons engaged in individual labor activity in mid-1986 remained the same as in the corresponding period of 1985—17 million (47).

Table 2. Certain Indicators of the Development of the 'Individual Industrial and Trading Households'

	Unit of measurement	1982	1983	1985 (first 6 months)
Numbers	households, mill.	2.6	5.9	11
...of whom in the countryside	% of total	57	71	73
Employed	millions	3.2	7.4	17
...of whom in the countryside	% of total	57	72	—
Number of persons working per household	persons	1.21	1.27	1.45
Total capital	yuan, billions	0.8	3.1	15.1*
Capital per household	yuan	313	520	1,342*
Economic turnover	yuan, billions	10.07	21.09	38**
Turnover per household	yuan	3,820	3,575	3,454

Note:

\* As of September 1985.

\*\* Preliminary figures.

Sources: "Zhongguo baike nianjian," 1984, p 395; RENMIN RIBAO, 30 October 1985, 23 February 1986; JINGJI XUE ZHUOBAO, 9 February 1986.

The process of quantitative increase in the "individual industrial and trading households" has occurred as yet mainly thanks to the countryside. The majority of these households are economically weak: despite the almost fourfold growth of utilized capital in 1983-1985, the sum total thereof per workman in the first half of 1985 was only 25 percent more than the annual wage of the worker and employee.

Only a small proportion of the "individual industrial and trading households" has assumed a capitalist nature. Zhao Ziyang said in this connection at the start of 1985 that the "private (siren) enterprises are a capitalist production mode in a socialist state." "Their development," he continued, "is limited and will not enjoy great development. It will be controlled with the aid of taxes" (48). Such a tax was imposed in 1986 (25 January 1986).

The role of this section of the populace in the economic and social life of Chinese society will be pronounced, at least through the end of the 1990's. Judging by the plan outlines, it is intended increasing the numbers of persons employed in "individual industrial and trading households" to 50 million by 1990, that is, almost threefold (49).

As of 1980 individual workers have begun to unite in an independent association. In 1986 organizations thereof existed in 27 provinces, autonomous regions and in cities of central jurisdiction, in 95 percent of cities of provincial jurisdiction and in 91 percent of districts, townships and neighborhoods (50).

So the socioeconomic forces directly or indirectly endeavoring to transform all aspects of the life of contemporary Chinese society are quite impressive. Their social and economic power is considerably greater than their share of the population. First, they determine the activity of the party and state machinery organizing and directing the life of the country. Second, the degree of their impact on an acceleration of socioeconomic development is determined by the growing role not only of modern industry, transport, communications and other sectors of the urban economy but also the nonagricultural sectors in the rural economy. Third, they personify the actual economic power of the union of city and countryside and are conduits of the mutual influence of city and countryside. It is important that large-scale urban industrial culture is contributing to the growth of

commodity production in the countryside, but the small-scale pre-industrial culture of the countryside is manifested in the city in forms superimposed, as it were, on commodity-money relations, which have become part of the population's flesh and blood. Fourth, this is the most literate, qualified, searching and creative part of the urban and rural population.

The most important social changes in the PRC which began on the frontier of the 1980's are of a progressive nature. The scale and complexity of the objective problems of development, the inevitability of a certain amount of time being spent on the ultimate development of PRC policy and the methods of its realization in the interests of the building of socialism and the serious consequences of the "cultural revolution" determine the confusion and contradictoriness of the socio-psychological situation in the country.

Implementation of the economic reform demands, as the leaders of the CCP and the state declare, well-conceived and careful actions. The accomplishment of two tasks is of particularly great political significance. The first is the establishment of the CCP's close ties to the younger generation of workers and employees and an acceleration of the process of the conversion of this generation into conscious, educated and qualified workers raised in the best traditions of the working class. In tackling the second the CCP will have to find paths of the socio-economic and cultural development of the overwhelming mass of the peasantry to lead it from the narrow little world of traditional subsistence farming to the creation of new forms of production, exchange and relations.

#### Footnotes

1. CCP Central Committee resolution "Some Questions of Party History Since the Formation of the CCP," Beijing, 1981, pp 22, 23.
2. Here and subsequently references to the newspaper RENMIN RIBAO are adduced in parentheses in the text with notification of the date without mention of the source.
3. See BANG YUE TAN NO 2, 1986, p 11.
4. For more detail see V.G. Gelbras, "Sociopolitical Structure of the PRC. 1950's-1960's," Moscow, 1980, pp 69-81; "The Working Class in the Sociopolitical System of the PRC," Moscow, 1981, pp 27-35, 51-70.
5. Its predominant role in the social relations of the 1960's-1970's is now recognized by many leading Chinese scholars and specialists.
6. We refer to enterprises and industrial organizations formed thanks to intrinsic resources by the local authorities, their sectoral administrations, state and cooperative enterprises and also groups of citizens. They began as of the end of the 1970's to be converted into units of

mixed and collective-group ownership based on share capital, several participation and other principles and also into cooperative enterprises.

7. The gangbu are the executive nucleus of the party and state machinery and army regulars. For more detail see V.G. Gelbras, "Sociopolitical Structure of the PRC," Moscow, 1983, pp 160-220.

8. The huaqiao are ethnic Chinese who emigrated from China. In this case it is a question of huaqiao who have returned to the PRC.

9. "Chinese Statistical Yearbook," 1985, pp 185, 189; XINHUA YUEBAO No 8, 1986, p 53.

10. "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1985," p 213; "Concise Statistical Handbook. 1986," p 28.

11. JINGJI XUE ZHOUBAO, 24 August 1986.

12. See "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1984," Beijing, 1984, p 94.

13. See "Countermeasures Pertaining to the Structure of the Economy," Beijing, 1984, p 271.

14. See *ibid.*, pp 272-273.

15. See BANG YUE TAN No 2, 1984, p 41.

16. Some Chinese authors are writing about the impossibility in the PRC, before the end of the 20th century at least, of a "full employment model" ("Countermeasures Pertaining to the Structure of the Economy," pp 271-276). In this connection they write most often about the need for the lengthy existence of a "multistructure economy," of individual labor activities particularly.

17. See "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1985," pp 213, 215; "Concise Statistical Handbook," 1986, p 28.

18. See, for example, GONGRENG RIBAO, 4 July 1979; 1 November 1984.

19. See "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1984," Beijing, 1984, pp IV-57; GONGRENG RIBAO, 30 October 1984.

20. See "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1985," p 215; "Concise Statistical Handbook. 1986," p 28.

21. See, for example, RED FLAG No 17, 1982, pp 29-30; No 19, pp 35-36.

22. See, for example, RED FLAG No 19, 1982, p 35; No 20, pp 39-40; XINHUA YUEBAO NO 7, 1984, p 108; BEIJING RIBAO, 6 February 1985; RENMIN RIBAO, 1 January 1986.

23. See RED FLAG No 19, 1982, p 36; No 23, p 27.

24. See, for example, RED FLAG No 22, 1982, pp 27-32.
25. See, for example, RED FLAG No 20, 1982, pp 38-41.
26. See "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1985," p 215; "Concise Statistical Handbook. 1986, p 28.
27. See *ibid.*
28. See "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1985," p 213; "Concise Statistical Handbook. 1986, p 28.
29. See "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1985," p 291.
30. See BANG YUE TAN No 2, 1986, p 10.
31. See GUANGMING RIBAO, 27 January 1986.
32. See "Chinese Encyclopedic Yearbook. 1985," pp 516, 517.
33. See XINHUA YUEBAO No 7, 1985, pp 105-106.
34. See *ibid.* and also "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1985," p 570. The data pertaining to the "ordinary" households in the PRC State Statistical Administration sample differ from the average for the country. Judging from the material of the complete record of the State Statistical Administration, the average peasant household in 1984 consisted of 4.8 persons, including 1.9 persons working. The family load factor constituted 2.35 (see "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1985," p 237).
35. XINHUA YUEBAO No 7, 1985, p 106.
36. *Ibid.*, No 1, 1986, p 123.
37. For more detail see "Social Aspects of the New Phenomena in the Agrarian Policy of the CCP," USSR World Workers Movement Institute, Moscow, 1986, pp 5-21.
38. NONGYE JINGJI WENTI No 6, 1986, p 6.
39. See "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1983," pp 116-117.
40. See RED FLAG No 23, 1984, p 16; See GUANGMING RIBAO. 19 November 1984; 18 January 1985; RENMIN RIBAO, 2, 23 February 1985. Of the 40 million-plus members of the CCP as of the start of 1985, only 4 percent had higher education, 13.8 percent, secondary, and 30 percent, incomplete secondary, 42.2 percent had completed only elementary school and 10 percent were illiterate (15 March 1985). It was reported in September 1986 that the proportion of CCP members with education above 7-year school had grown from 14.9 percent in 1980 to 23.9 percent in 1985.
41. A number of places have succeeded, as they say in the PRC, in doing away with such "jobs ownership" and "department ownership," and specialists have come to be accorded the possibility of employment in keeping with the training which they have received and their wishes.
42. See "Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhunyang Wei-yuan-hou Guanyu....," p 51.
43. See RED FLAG No 7, 1985, p 18.
44. Some of the participants in the debate being conducted in the PRC advocated preservation of the Gangbu institution (see "Chinese Encyclopedic Yearbook. 1984," p 474).
45. Some 21 percent of the Gangbu have higher education, 42 percent, complete secondary and secondary specialized education (see RED FLAG No 7, 1985, p 18).
46. See "Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 1985," p 214; JINGJI XUE ZHOUBAO, 23 February 1986.
47. JINGJI XUE ZHOUBAO, 3 August and 19 October 1986.
48. BANG YUE TAN No 4, 1985, p 62.
49. See JINGJI XUE ZHOUBAO, 9 February 1986.
50. BANG YUE TAN No 21, 1986, P 30.
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- 8850
- Japanese Attitudes Toward Work, Social, Political Issues Examined**  
*18070376d Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS S I*  
*SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87*  
*(signed to press 17 Apr 87) pp 86-91*
- [Article by Yu. I. Berezina: "Dynamics of the Social and Political Orientation of Japanese Working People"]
- [Text] The contradictions of present-day capitalism in the economic and social spheres and the changes in the class structure of the industrially developed capitalist countries and the social position of the mass strata have been reflected in the social consciousness and spiritual life of the peoples and in their political orientation and behavior.
- The distinctiveness of these processes in Japan—a country which is distinguished by comparatively fewer negative consequences of technological innovations and a better adaptation to crisis situations than other capitalist countries—evokes the broad interest of both Japanese



and Western experts. Bourgeois sociologists are attempting to portray certain specific features of the structure of society and social consciousness in Japan as an important social factor contributing to the maintenance of social stability under the conditions of bourgeois society. In this connection particular relevance is attached to an analysis of the regularities of social and political development common to developed capitalism and the particular features characteristic of Japan.

Cardinal changes have occurred in the postwar decades in Japan, as in other industrially developed capitalist countries, in the structure of society. This process, spurred by the high economic growth rate, has been more intensive than in the West. Given an overall increase in the numbers of the gainfully employed population of the country in the period 1950-1980 of 20.7 million, the numbers of the working class grew by 23.2 million, and of the bourgeoisie, by 2.9 million, while the middle strata diminished by 5.4 million persons. In terms of basic characteristics of the social structure Japan had by the mid-1970's directly approached the main industrially developed capitalist countries. The gap between Japan and the other main capitalist powers in such indicators as the proportion of wage workers and the working class in the country's gainfully employed population had been notably reduced.

The significant reduction in the numbers of independent owners, that is, the social category closely connected with capitalist relations, and the increase in the army of wage workers have exerted a tremendous influence on the value orientations and tendencies not only of individuals but of entire social groups also and on their social and political preferences and behavior. At the same time Japan's social life continues to be influenced by the particular features of its social structure and, more than in the other industrially developed capitalist countries, by the degree of proletarianization. In the gainfully employed population the proportion of wage workers constituted 71.8 percent in 1980, and of the working class, 65 percent, the proportion of those employed in agriculture, 12 percent, and the proportion of the middle strata, 28.7 percent, and the bourgeoisie, 6.3 percent (1). The process of the expansion of the composition of the working class has been more rapid than in the West. Correspondingly, the changes in the correlation of different detachments of the proletariat have been manifested here more clearly than in other industrially developed capitalist countries. By the start of the 1980's the trading and office proletariat had begun to predominate within the Japanese working class (54.8 percent in 1980—the highest level in the capitalist world), given the minimum proportion of the agricultural proletariat (1.1 percent in 1980).

The particular features of the formation of the Japanese proletariat and the addition of new social groups, whose value orientations and political behavior have continued in a number of instances to reflect their former social position, superimposed on national historical traditions

of social relations, have determined the specific features of the changes in the value orientations of the working masses and the motivation of their political behavior. An essential role has also been performed by such consequences of S&T progress as the abrupt diminution in the rural population and the petty bourgeois strata of the city and the growth of the numbers of the new middle strata, whose value system differs to a large extent from the traditional system. In keeping with the rapid rate of social transformation here, the changes which have occurred in the social consciousness of the people's masses have been in Japan far deeper than in the West.

Whereas prior to and during WWII the "good of the homeland" had pride of place in the system of life's ideals among the vast majority of Japanese and self-sacrifice "for the good of the homeland" through personal participation was perceived as the rule of behavior, after the war values oriented toward "happiness of the family" and "personal happiness" occupied the predominant position.

The data of surveys of the Japanese national character carried out in the 1950's-1970's testify to the decline in the significance for Japanese of such traditional ideals as "pure and honest living" (by a factor of 2.7 in the period 1953-1973) and "serving society" (twofold) and the growth of the significance of new ideals: "living in one's own style" and "living without worries" (more than twofold) (2). Contemporary Japanese prefer mainly such life aims as "pleasure" and "love". The results of numerous polls conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the structure of family spending show that in our day the Japanese family frequently spends more on "pleasure" (23 percent of the family budget) than, for example, on food (10 percent), housing (6 percent), clothing (5 percent) and transport (5 percent) (3).

Increasingly large numbers of Japanese report at the time of polls on their use of their free time that they spend their leisure time mainly in recreation or entertainment. Thus at the time of a poll conducted by the newspaper ASAHI in December 1980 some 30 percent of those polled expressed themselves in favor of "recreation," and in favor of "entertainment," 22 percent, whereas 2 percent expressed themselves in favor of social duties (7 percent gave no answer, 33 percent preferred to devote more free time to their children's education and upbringing and 6 percent expressed themselves in favor of sports) (4). The orientation toward "entertainment" has led to the disappearance of such traditional values as "thrift," "moderation" and "asceticism". The particular "consumer" thrust of technical progress, as a result of which the Japanese market has been inundated with consumer goods which are new to the country, the number of consumer models has increased considerably and the range of the use of household appliances has expanded, has contributed to this. As a whole, the family spending of Japanese working people connected with

consumption has in the postwar years grown more than fourfold. There has been a sharp increase in the structure of expenditure in the proportion of resources spent on services.

The proportion of expenditure on food products in Japan is now roughly at the same level as in Britain, France and the FRG, the proportion of expenditure on clothing, as in the FRG, France and Italy, and on furniture and housewares, as in the United States and Britain. The proportion, however, of spending on services is higher than in many other developed capitalist countries, and this is, to all appearances, quite a long-term trend.

The transition from accumulative to consumer values, although not reflected in the mass consciousness of Japanese as strongly as has been the case in the West, has nonetheless represented a serious change in traditional value orientations. It has been accompanied by a gradual transition from an orientation toward the group to individualization. Orientation toward the group and the collective has primordially been the most traditional and base value in Japanese society. The sharply increased interest in the development of the personality has in recent decades been accompanied by a pronounced weakening of the group orientation, although it has as yet far from disappeared from Japanese society. The family remains the center of private life in Japan. The orientation toward "happiness of the family" is expressed considerably more strongly than toward "personal happiness" among Japanese.

The shift toward personal interests has entailed a change in the attitude toward work as the highest value, which was traditionally the basic feature of the Japanese national character. The simplification of the nature of workers' labor, which is frequent at the present stage of technological restructuring, and their increased isolation in the production process together with a gradual departure from the job-for-life system are evoking among workers a sense of estrangement and cultivating the habit of considering their work somehow temporary and transitory. These trends have strengthened particularly in recent years as a result of the exacerbation of the competitive struggle under conditions of the growth of unemployment connected with the technological restructuring.

Whereas in the 1973 and 1978 surveys the main preference of those polled was given work (44 and 43 percent respectively), at the time of the survey in December 1983 only 28.4 percent of those polled cited work in response to the question: "What is your main interest in life?" (5) A trend toward a reduced orientation toward work (toward training included) was manifested particularly strongly in the youth environment.

The attitude toward work merely as a means of earnings or a "moral value" is gradually changing. Numerous surveys, at the time of which a wish for the content of

labor to correspond to the capabilities, learning and creative potential of the individual is expressed increasingly often, testify to this. All this, in turn, is changing the working people's attitude toward their firm and their enterprise. The enterprise occupies a special place in the life of the Japanese worker. It is through incorporation within the framework of the enterprise (firm) that the process of the socialization of the Japanese takes place and his social standing is established. For this reason a perception of the community of their interests and the interests and goals of the enterprise has become firmly established among considerable numbers of wage workers. Nonetheless, the attitude toward the enterprise as toward "one's own home" is gradually ceasing to be the predominant attitude. At the time of the 1983 survey 59.4 percent of those polled answered in the negative the question: "Do you wish to give your all to serve the enterprise at which you work?" (6)

The narrowing of loyalty to one's enterprise is contributing to a more critical approach to capitalist efficiency promotion. An increasingly large place in the consciousness of the workers is occupied by an orientation toward the humanization of labor and an aspiration to self-expression in the labor process. The extent of Japanese workers' recognition of their position in the social hierarchy of society is of great interest in this connection. Data on this question may be drawn from regular surveys of social place. Judging by them, a stable majority of Japanese puts itself in the middle strata category: this is how 73 percent of those polled thought in 1962, 78 percent in 1975, 81 percent in 1978 and 89 percent in 1983 (7).

Such self-attribution is not, however, the equivalent of a disregard for one's real class positions; it merely means that those polled consider their material position and living standard "median". A large part of persons attributing themselves to the middle strata here simultaneously recognizes its membership of the working class. For example, at the time of the survey conducted in the mid-1970's some 77 percent of those polled at one and the same time ascribed themselves to the middle stratum, and 71 percent to the working class. When, at the time of 1955, 1965 and 1975 national surveys, those being polled were asked to answer the question of the class to which they attributed themselves, an absolute majority cited the working class (67.5, 65.2 and 71 percent respectively) (8).

Nonetheless, a heated debate flared up in the Japanese press in the 1970's concerning the "median consciousness," that is, consciousness of belonging to the middle stratum, and its origin and role in contemporary Japanese society. The majority of the scholars who spoke on this subject were inclined to the idea that the "median consciousness" had enjoyed extensive development as a result of the growth of "new middle strata," thanks to which a vast uniform "middle stratum" homogeneous in terms of living standard and lifestyle and also consciousness had allegedly taken shape in Japan. Some authors

who participated in the debate maintained that the growth of the "median consciousness" was connected with the rise in the population's living standard compared with the past period. However, it is incomprehensible in this case why an absolute majority in any age group ascribes itself to the middle stratum. The sociologist Mitiko Naoi, for example, writes, commenting on the results of a survey of social stratification and social mobility conducted in 1975 under the leadership of Kanichi Tominaga, professor at Tokyo University: "The 'median living standard' in our day is interpreted very broadly—the living standard of the lowest layer of the middle stratum and the number of people attributing themselves to it are growing, to which the results of the survey attest. However, this does not mean that the subjective perception of the stratum and the 'objective stratum' do not differ both theoretically and empirically" (9).

In the opinion of Tadashi Fukutake, professor at Tokyo University, the reason for the appearance and spread of the "median consciousness" is the fact that, given the growth of the level of consumption, large numbers of the people ascribing themselves in a class respect to the working class simultaneously attribute themselves to the middle stratum; the idea of the inequality of life's prospects and instability is disappearing in them and the ideal of a 'median' path is emerging (10).

The results of numerous polls testify to a growth of the interest in a discussion of political problems and simultaneously a growth of mistrust of politicians. Whereas at the start of the 1950's approximately 38 percent of those polled declared their refusal to "entrust" vitally important problems to politicians, at the end of the 1970's the figure was 58 percent (11).

Certain changes have occurred in Japanese working people's attitude toward the unions. This is connected to a considerable extent with the changes in the country's trade union movement. In the first years following WWII, years of the restoration of the economy and the severe material deprivation which was the lot of the people's masses, the unions were the sole bastion in their struggle for their rights. Although in this period the level of union consciousness and also the maturity of the workers movement was extremely low, the slogan advanced by the unions of the cohesion of the working people was broadly supported. Union members acted vigorously in defense of their demands, and the workers movement manifestly had a political coloration.

Following the completion of restoration of the economy there came a period of a high rate of economic growth, during which the working people's living conditions improved, their educational level and the level of their knowledgeability rose and their inclination toward individualism grew. In this period the unions were recognized in law, union associations were formed in all sectors of production and the unions' sphere of activity broadened appreciably. However, the Japanese system

of the organization of the unions by enterprise made for the comminution of the unions and their inadequate cohesion. In addition, the lessening of life's burdens had contributed to an easing in the consciousness of the working people of the negative attitude toward the social system as a whole, which created additional difficulties for the unions. The improvement in the employment situation and work conditions and the increase in real wages gave rise in some union members to doubts as to the need for the trade union organization. The unions, in turn, were unable to properly consolidate the gains of the working class, overcome the comminution and cement solidarity.

When the period of a slowing of the rate of economic development arrived (as of the mid-1970's), the unions were unable to adapt to the due extent to the new conditions. In the latter half of the 1970's-start of the 1980's forces of the right became more active in Japan's union movement. This exacerbated the problem of unity of the trade union movement and had a negative effect on the assertiveness of the working people.

At the same time expectations connected with the political role of the unions came to be manifested more clearly among Japanese workers. At the time of a number of polls of the 1970's the proportion of supporters of traditional "economist" trade-unionism did not exceed 15 percent, whereas approximately 70 percent of those polled pinned their hopes on the unions' political activity (12).

The majority of workers does not expect big changes in the workers movement in the future. The data of a poll of workers in 1979 on how they imagined the workers movement would be in 10 years time are indicative in this respect. The largest number of those polled answered that they expected no big changes (24.4 percent); 20.5 percent predicted the increased comminution and indecisiveness of the workers movement, 19.1 percent, the workers' more extensive participation in the solution of political problems and in management processes, and 14.2 percent, a broadening of the cooperation of labor and capital (13).

The level of the workers' consciousness is characterized by the data of polls concerning the attitude of union members toward socialism and capitalism. In 1976, for example, at the time of a survey of organized workers conducted by the Labor Research Institute, 37.8 percent of those polled recognized the capitalist system as good, but expressed a desire for stimulation of the creation of a "welfare state"; 25.2 percent were of the opinion that it was necessary to "rectify" the capitalist system since there are in free competition bad sides also; 20.8 percent were unable to make a definite choice; 12.6 recognized the need for a transition to socialism, but given a "borrowing of the positive aspects of free competition"; and 3.6 percent declared themselves supporters of socialism based on the elimination of the system of free competition (14).

Those polled of all ages more often than not linked with capitalism "differences between rich and poor and inequality," with socialism, the notion of "the planned economy and absence of unemployment," total social security and the "happiness of the working people".

The political consciousness of the masses is manifested most clearly in their attitude toward the parties and their behavior at elections. Compared with other industrially developed countries political parties in Japan enjoy considerably less influence and popularity among the people's masses. A poll conducted by the newspaper ASAHI in December 1983, for example, at the time of which 65 percent of Japanese (15) expressed no desire to support the activity of political parties, testifies to this.

Only in rare instances do the Japanese, when voting, proceed from the programs of the political parties. As numerous polls conducted in the 1970's-1980's testify, the majority of the electorate has a poor knowledge of these programs, does not attend election meetings and is guided, when voting, mainly by the personal attributes and capabilities of the candidates. For example, at the time of a poll in November 1975 significant numbers of the electorate refrained from answering the question of how they saw the political program of this party or the other. Thirtytwo percent of those polled declined to express their opinion on the program of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), 36 percent, of the Socialist Party (JSP), 35 percent, of the Communist Party (JCP), 38 percent, of the Komeito, and 48 percent, of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) (48) (10). A survey conducted in December 1983 by the Kyodo News Agency also showed that many Japanese do not have a clear idea of the nature of the activity of the political parties. To the question: "Do you consider this party or the other 'honest'?" 32 percent answered "don't know," to the question: "Can this party or the other be trusted?" almost 38 percent gave the same answer.

A poll of organized workers at the time of the 1979 election campaign showed that paramount significance for them is attached to the "personality and experience" of the candidate, then came the "union's recommendation". At local election level "conformity with local interests" is usually added, although those polled are far from always aware of what "local interests" consist. At the time of a survey of the views of Tokyo residents in connection with the elections for governor of the capital in the 1970's almost half of those polled answered in the negative to the question: "Has your family discussed the nominations for the next governor?" Over 80 percent declared that they had not attended election meetings, and more than 70 percent acknowledged that their election decision had been made under the influence of the personal charm of the candidate (17). A survey conducted in 1983 in certain prefectures of the capital testifies that only 30 percent of the electorate was interested to this extent or the other in the activity of the local authorities. At the time of a survey in Tokyo in September 1983 more than 50 percent of those polled admitted

that they did not know the name of the mayor of the capital (18). As a whole, more than 70 percent of the Japanese electorate casts its vote guided by its emotions to a considerable extent.

In connection with this particular feature of electoral behavior the main electoral tactic of the ruling party has been and remains the advertising of the candidate's personal attributes. As a rule, the party allegiance of the majority of candidates is either not mentioned at all or mentioned in passing. At the same time the candidates, when addressing the electorate, usually emphasize their readiness and capability of winning certain subsidies for this area or the other, which is of considerable importance for electoral success.

According to the data of many polls, there is a growing number of capable citizens in Japan supporting no one party. Whereas in 1953 some 19 percent of those polled said such, 10 years later the figure was 22 percent, in 1973, 33 percent, and by the end of the 1970's, 40 percent. Polls conducted at the start of the 1980's confirmed this trend. Thus an all-Japan survey in December 1983 ascertained that almost 34 percent of those polled do not support any political party; at the time of a YOMIURI newspaper poll in October 1983 some 36.5 percent replied that they supported no political party, and in November 1983, 39 percent. The highest degree of an apolitical attitude here is observed in the youth, including student, environment.

The numbers of those not supporting any one political party are also growing among the organized workers, despite the fact that an increased interest in politics and also the expectations connected therewith have been noted among them recently, and a diminishing faith in elections as a means of influencing policy is observed simultaneously. At the time of a survey to study the political consciousness of workers (mainly at large enterprises) conducted in October 1978 under the leadership of the Labor Study Council more than 80 percent of those polled expressed the opinion that for an improvement in life what was needed, aside from one's own efforts, was "improved policy". However, to the question: "Can you, by voting at elections, promote the reflection of your views in policy?" 74 answered in the negative, and only 24 percent in affirmative. Among workers of private enterprises here even fewer answered in the affirmative—little more than 22 percent, and there were more of those answering in the negative—almost 77 percent (in 1968, at the time of a similar poll of workers of private enterprises, an affirmative answer to the same question had been given by 49 percent, an answer in the negative, by 43 percent) (19).

The workers' attitude toward the policy being pursued is indicated by the following data also: the vast majority of organized workers believes that the country is run by "the big companies and financial circles"—approximately 46 percent. The opinion that policy in Japan is

determined by the "bureaucracy" (19.3 percent), "super-powers like America" (19.3 percent), "some influential persons" (13.6 percent), "the people" (6.1 percent), the "mass media" (13.1 percent), the "unions" (1.8 percent) and "participants in civic movements" (1.3 percent) was expressed also (20).

In the country as a whole, as a rule, 30-35 percent of the electorate, and in the big cities, over 40 percent, does not vote. Only in the 1980 elections did a record percentage of the electorate—74.6 percent—participate, which produced an additional 5 million votes compared with the preceding elections of 1979 (21). A large section of the electorate which did not participate in the voting pertains to those who support no one political party: in different years they vote for different parties. At the time of election campaigns each party attempts to win over such voters, whose electoral behavior could play a decisive part in the reduced or increased representation in parliament of this party or the other.

Interesting regularities are revealed by an analysis of the connection between membership of the trade unions and the support for political parties. Whereas the differences in the political consciousness of workers belonging to different trade union centers, living in different parts of the country and representing different age groups are minimal, workers' electoral behavior and support for this party or the other differ very considerably depending on the trade union of which they are members. The majority of workers who are union members support, as a whole, the JSP—33.3 percent. Those who support no one political party, but who "are supporters of the opposition advocating reforms" constitute 18 percent, and those "who do not support political parties," 12.4 percent. The supporters of the ruling LDP constitute 9.8 percent, those who "are in sympathy with the conservatives," 8.9 percent, supporters of the DSP, 7.7 percent, and of the JCP, Komeito, New Liberal Club and Social Democratic Federation, from 1 to 3 percent (22).

At the same time among workers who are members of unions which are a part of the Council of Unions of State Enterprise Workers the JSP is supported by over 60 percent, among members of unions uniting office workers, approximately 40 percent, and among members of unions of private enterprises, 30 percent (23), that is, the differences are very considerable.

In unions of both state and private enterprises the JSP and the DSP are supported more by workers of the middle and senior age groups, and the proportion of those not supporting any one political party is great among the youth. Supporters of the DSP and the LDP or those who do not support one particular political party but are supporters of the opposition advocating reforms are predominant in the big cities, in the main. More stable support for the JSP is observed in small cities, communities and villages.

A big influence on the electoral behavior of mass strata of the population is exerted by the processes occurring in the life and consciousness of Japanese working people. Most important among these are the gradual reduction in the numbers of the peasant population, migration of rural youth to the cities and the growth of proletarian strata, which are characterized by antigovernment and anticapitalist sentiments.

At the same time the current electoral system, which was adopted shortly after WWII, when the majority of the population lived in the villages, does not in practice take into consideration the rapid development of urbanization and the drift of the population from the rural areas, which are the traditional stronghold of the conservatives. Considerably more members are as yet elected from rural districts, where the LDP has an overwhelming advantage, than from urban districts, despite the fact that the numbers of the urban electorate are far greater than those of the rural electorate. This situation is helping the LDP as yet to preserve a majority of the seats in parliament, but the narrowing of the party's social base cannot fail to be causing certain apprehensions among conservatives. In this connection the ruling circles are attempting to make adjustments to the electoral system which will benefit their candidates. Specifically, in 1982 the LDP attempted to increase its representation in parliament, pushing through a bill according to which each candidate's deposit was doubled. This put LDP candidates, who are generously subsidized by the magnates of finance capital, in a considerably more favorable position compared with those of the opposition parties with limited financial possibilities at their disposal.

The position adopted at this moment or the other by the opposition parties is always reflected in the behavior of the electorate. In instances where they are able to organize cooperation and win over the mass organizations of the working people, the unions primarily, they score the greatest success. A lack of unity of action of the opposition clears the way for the conservatives. A struggle to preserve the predominant positions in parliament has become the day-to-day task of the ruling party. Faced with the threat of the loss of their absolute majority in parliament, the conservatives have been forced to maneuver. In the summer of 1986 Prime Minister Nakasone put forward the idea of simultaneous elections to both houses of the Japanese Parliament (such a maneuver had been carried out for the first time in 1980), which was a considerable success for the conservatives. As in 1980 also, the conservatives' calculation that the opposition parties, of the left particularly, would be unable to finance an election campaign on the broad front of "dual" elections was entirely justified. Considering the lessons of the 1983 elections, the liberal democrats succeeded in conducting the campaign by concentrating the main attention on domestic problems and concealing the policy of a buildup of military potential and at the same time stressing Japan's successes in the economy and the growth of its authority on the international scene.

The results of the 6 July 1986 elections exceeded all the conservatives' expectations: they obtained 300 seats in the lower house (compared with 250 in 1983) and were joined by 4 "independent" members also, and 143 seats in the upper house (compared with 132 in 1983). The opposition parties, which had operated in an extremely disconnected and inconsistent manner, sustained the biggest defeat in their existence, losing 48 seats in the lower house (where their proportion of seats declined from 45.7 to 37.7 percent) and 1 seat in the upper house. The severest losses were sustained by the JSP, which obtained 24 seats fewer in the lower house than at the 1983 elections (85 seats instead of 109); the DSP lost 12 seats in the lower house, the Komeito lost 2 and the JCP managed to preserve the 26 seats it held prior to the dissolution of parliament.

The outcome of the 1986 elections, which afforded the ruling party considerable advantages, showed once again that the opposition parties may confront the conservatives only given firm and consistent cooperation. The present alignment of forces affords them no opportunity to contest the power of the conservatives, but makes it possible to counter implementation of the ruling party's plans to annul the antiwar article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (a twofold preponderance is necessary for revision of the constitution), to which particular importance is attached under the conditions of the strengthening of militarist, conservative, nationalist trends in the country. And the task of surmounting the comminution of the democratic forces and their cohesion in the struggle against the reactionary policy of the conservatives is becoming increasingly urgent.

#### Footnotes

1. "1980 National Population Census," Tokyo, 1980, pp 305-307.
2. ("Yeron tesa nenkan"), Tokyo, 1977, p 177.
3. Ibid., 1984, p 493.
4. Ibid., p 498.
5. Ibid., p 171.
6. Ibid., 173.
7. "Nihon-no keisho koje," Tokyo, 1979, pp 367-378.
8. Ibid., pp 366, 385.
9. Ibid., p 388.
10. T. Fukutake, "Structure of Japanese Society," Tokyo, 1981, p 148.
11. PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, Vol 41, No 2, 1977, pp 214-216.

12. (NIKHON RODO KEKAY DZASSI) No 2, 1980, p 16.
13. JAPAN ECHO, Vol 8, No 1, 1981, p 35.
14. KOMEI No 7 (209), 1979, p 122.
15. ("Yeron tesa nenkan"), 1984, p 498.
16. Ibid., 1977, p 497.
17. Ibid., 1984, p 508.
18. Ibid., pp 177-178.
19. (NIKHON RODO KEKAY DZASSI) No 2, 1980, pp 14, 15.
20. Ibid.
21. ASIAN SURVEY, Vol 20, No 12, 1980, p 1171.
22. (NIKHON RODO KEKAY DZASSI) No 2, 1980, p 17.
23. Ibid.

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**American-Influenced 'Mass Culture' Assailed**  
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[Article by V. Ya. Vulf: "'Mass Culture' in the 1980's"]

[Text] The changes in the perception of the world and political orientations of the Western intelligentsia on the frontier of the 1980's were connected with the "new conservatism" era. Conservatism as a particular policy and ideology has become an active factor of social life. The renaissance of conservative ideas supported by circles of the right expresses a standpoint geared to the preservation and consolidation of the "abiding principles" of a style of life and system of traditional values. This phenomenon is characteristic of all developed capitalist countries, in short, of the Western world.

An exponent of the "new conservatism" ideology is "mass culture" determining both the social behavior and ideological reference points of bourgeois society. The article attempts to analyze the particular features of "mass culture" in the sociopolitical context of the 1980's and study it in direct correlation with its social and political functions.

The sharp turn to the right and the strengthening of conservative-protective ideas have led to attempts to revive the old system of traditional values intended to replace liberal-reformist principles. The French journal *LE DEBAT* explains this change by "concern at the strengthening of the Soviet Union, the old enemy, and a suspicious attitude toward detente" (1). Whence the sharply negative view of the ideology of the protest consciousness of the 1960's, the "human rights" campaign and bitter anticommunism.

The failure of evolved notions has changed the mass principles regulating people's day-to-day activity. Naturally, this has been reflected both in their philosophical level and their ideological reference points. Many people are now opting for the "quiet way". Society is being given the minimum of forces and energy, attempts are being made to find refuge and care in religion, and fear in the face of a disintegration of the true ego is becoming the prevailing fear among intellectuals. This mood is at the basis of the fact that the "new intellectuals," taking traditional bourgeois values as a base, have begun to extol public order, the ideal of a "disciplined" society and respect for the nation, private property, the family and work. They are making of paramount concern the "defense of optimism" and calling for the restoration of a "feeling of confidence". Neither drugs, the "sexual revolution" nor a spirit of anticonsumerism today possess their former resonance. An aspiration to personal well-being, trust in old, proven values and pragmatism in setting life's goals are prevalent in all spheres of social life. Chauvinist motives, support for a "strong state" and an enthusiasm for nationalist stereotypes are in vogue. Some "timeless" system of universal values identified with social "sense": a belief in the highest spiritual order and the classical legal concept of "to each his own" is being constructed. "The strength of neoconservatism is its criticism of the ingenuousness of liberalism and utopian illusions" (2).

In practice these value orientations are connected with the emergence in the West of the "aimless generation". Western youth does not live by utopias, it is today exhibiting astounding skepticism, hardly believes in anything, and, certainly, it is no accident that it is called the "television generation". VCR's and "new wave" rock have "taken up residence" in homes in the past 10 years. A fusion of classical and jazz music has proven to be an inalienable feature of the crashing avalanche of "big beat". Sex and humor constituted the basis of the advertising descending on the consciousness of the generation born on the frontier of the 1960's. Escaping the "mass culture" is almost impossible, and it essentially determines the value orientations of broad strata of the population. The word "success," as a rule, is evaluated in the West in material categories. The socio-psychological values existing at the mass level are distinguished by unabashed pragmatism. The new conservatives, convinced as to the innately egotistical nature of human individuality, are propagandizing recognition of the

need for order to be brought to bear and for the observance of traditions. "Only traditions are of a binding nature and, as the spiritual legacy of our forefathers, are not called in question. These may be prejudices, bias, customs and political concepts, and there is no need to investigate their justification or origin" (3).

The entire contemporary philosophy of life is geared to removing the critical spirit from the ideological-psychological climate. The new ideological-political course is oriented toward decisiveness, the exaltation of an "egotistic approach clothed in the old rags of individualism" and the establishment of firm authority. "Egotism or egocentrism today are being bandied about extensively as a means of therapy for the encouragement of self-assertion, and it is seen as the purpose and meaning of life. People very much in love with themselves are by no means literary phenomena. They are encountered frequently in everyday life" (4). Consumerist egocentrism has become widespread. It is personal consumption which has been the sphere in which modern Western man aspires and hopes to secure his individual success. The development of a consumer mentality has largely determined the present spiritual and ideological-political situation in Western countries. Mass propaganda and advertising are instilling daily in the "average man" the fact that his prestige depends on the acquisition of various items and services. Television serves up as some kind of standard, without which satisfaction with life is inconceivable, fashionable clothing, automobiles, furniture, cottages, yachts and, more importantly, idols personifying "free" people who have it all in their unabashedly possessive sense. The ideal heroes of "mass culture" are active, aggressive, dynamic individuals for whom the main purpose is getting rich and powerful. A fetish is made of consumer items, and a process of positive perception of the existing social system occurs simultaneously.

The new conservatives are attempting to introduce an entrepreneurial spirit to the consciousness and persuade the modern generation that practical goals are more important than any intellectual constructions (the anti-intellectual principle is perceived in their sermons quite strongly). The principles of actuality and achievements in the sphere of "small things" are undoubtedly producing results. Personal self-fulfillment is concealing primitive egotism. Value principles are undoubtedly oriented toward a recognition of traditions. "The new generation of West German youth has returned to traditional values and, mostly, to individual practice and not collective protest," the newspaper *INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE* observes in an article entitled "German Youth: Return to Conservatism" (5). Their idol is the young, apolitical, money-making B. Becker, a "star" of the tennis court from the FRG, and not P. Kelly, the founder of the Green Party. Symptoms, apparently, of a most important change of "signs"—a departure from political engagement in the direction of self-fulfillment in private entrepreneurial activity—are evident in this "middle class" country. The churches are reporting an



increase in the number of young parishioners. University professors and lecturers are reporting that the students have become polite and industrious. Dancing classes and respectable university societies are once again popular (6).

That there has been a rise in the value of higher education and a strengthening of the cult of "business" and a professional career, whose value for this generation is very high, was known at the end of the 1970's. Privatism, that is, an extremely explicit interest in private life, personal prosperity and traditional values, became firmly established in the mid-1980's. The new conformism took shape in the West around the "defly and demagogically revitalized America as the exponent and defender of the ideals of progress, democracy and prosperity for all" (7). The cultural expansion of America has assumed catastrophic proportions. From a youthful age the Frenchman or Italian comes under the influence of the latest J. Bond or "little Meg" advertising the American lifestyle. Paris resisted Americanization longer than Milan or Munich, although I. Erenburg once wrote sorrowfully about the inevitability of American influence on Europe. It is well known that "fast food," the "sex show," jeans and American slang have long been a part of French everyday life. Taking this fact as a basis, the right has begun to sharply criticize the position of former French Culture Minister J. Lang, who ventured to rebel against the cultural imperialism of America. "Yes, France has changed dramatically in the past 20 years. 'Mass culture' has crossed borders without hindrance, but this is only happening because the French lack their own enthralling television programs of the 'Dallas' or 'Dynasty' type, which are watched with enjoyment by intellectuals. The French lack today the art in which they took pride in the past. Renoir and Truffaut, Sartre and Proust are cut off from today, and it would be better to think about how to create new images than to demand protection against the onslaught of American 'mass culture'" (8).

It was not 2 months later that the same J. Lang changed his position sharply in an article devoted to the anniversary of the Statue of Liberty (9).

However, "mass culture" is worrying J. Lang even today, when he is manifestly contriving to demonstrate a "transformation" of his views in support of the United States and to prove that he is not behind the fashion. He is frightened by the "magnetism" of cowboys and supermen proving on television and motion picture screens the superiority of the American way of life. He is worried that the ideals of the American "average man" are becoming serviceable for West European, African and Asian countries. The idea of America's special world mission is becoming a belief that its "mass culture" is universal by virtue both of its heterogeneous origins and the contemporaneity of its appeal.

It has long been customary to divide art into "high" and "low": literature, into prose and fiction, and motion pictures and television, into "didactic" and "commercial," it being forgotten that in terms of its literal

meaning "mass culture" lays claim to being the culture of the masses and expresses widespread views, prejudices and the "very spirit of one's times in the most simplistic, but also, on the other hand, most generalized form" (10).

"Mass culture" is not simply kitsch or second-rate art. "The main condition thereof is the creation of a cultural context in which any artistic idea and any content are stereotyped and trivialized in terms of both content and mode of consumption. 'Mass culture' creates an unthinking, uncritical consciousness which it is easy and simple to manipulate by propagandizing in this way the myths and rules of bourgeois ideology. This is the main, ideological function of 'mass culture'" (11). But it would be an oversimplification to believe that America's cultural expansion is being accomplished only with the help of standard "mass culture" implanting escapism, triviality and frivolousness. The concept of American (and not only American) "mass culture" has undergone an appreciable transformation: hedonism had gained the ascendancy therein in the 1960's, and the "waves of eroticism engulfing the world were coming from America. America was the country supplying 'mass culture'" (12). Many works appeared describing the extent of "social hedonism". Frightened by the disorganization of the mass consciousness of the "middle strata," the new conservatives concentrated on the sphere of traditional political and moral values. The West had arrived at the 1980's with a lenient, tolerant and permissive attitude in respect of a broad range of political, social and moral standards. "Two factors had influenced this situation: permissiveness and a culture encouraging experiment in this field" (13). The most conservative social circles preserved their passion for eccentric forms of art and worldly behavior. "Mass culture" accomplished the integration of all levels of culture, arrogating to itself prestige values.

"The components of prestige culture were symphonic music and rock opera, classical ballet and pornographic dance. 'Mass culture' belongs to the whole 'middle class,' that is, to society, essentially; those who were born in the 1950's and later lived in a world of supermarkets, color television, experiments with drugs, rock and roll and flights to the Moon. The struggle for existence was replaced by the search for a new lifestyle" (14).

Now, in the 1980's, given all the disenchantment with the state and reform policy and all the dissatisfaction with the bureaucratic structure, which is, naturally, giving rise to opposition sentiments among the professionals, the new generation—"technology's children"—lives in a world of electronics and information science, robots and computers and VCR's and nostalgia for old times. It has learned to work with one eye on the television screen and to conceal by outward coldness a longing for truth and its perturbation. However paradoxical, efficiency and concentration have raised the price of human individuality. The elevation of personal independence to the highest value, approval of traditions and the search for



harmony in the private sphere have not, however, lessened the need for comforting illusions and models for emulation. "Personification" has proven the most effective type of advertising and supply of news, in short, of the mass media. "Mass culture" is now oriented toward the "average" and "intellectual" consumer. The expansion of "mass culture" into the elite sphere is the essence which shines through all the phenomena of the modern culture of the 1980's.

In the 1960's drugs, bisexuality, jeans, rock 'n' roll, oriental mysticism, astrology, street theater and love of nature, combined with the hedonistic "leisure civilization," testified to a display of disloyalty to social reality. Antiheroes were in vogue. The world-famous J. Dean, who was seen in only three movies, was for many years the prototype of anti-hero of the angry generation. "Motion pictures, presenting role models and idols for emulation, accustomed Western youth to the 'anti' prefix. The brooding, disrespectful, rebellious J. Dean personified rebellion without a cause and the hippy movement which emerged at that time" (15) ("Rebel Without a Cause," incidentally, was the title of the last and most sensational movie with J. Dean, "the rebellious nonhero of the 1950's," as the British critic P. Haston aptly christened this young man). The idol today is W. Allen, the "director-star" and producer of the celebrated film of 1986 "Hannah and Her Sisters". A public opinion poll showed that in 1985 the idol of the 18-24-year-old generation was the screen actor C. Eastwood, a dexterous, suave American who plays persons who always win out in the face of catastrophe. With the help of idols bourgeois society promotes certain symbols of success common to all, although the social structure essentially limits access to them for the majority of its members.

But antiheroes were popular in the 1960's and 1970's, at the time of "cultural chaos and disruption," the crisis of marriage, the breakup of families and mass enthusiasm for drugs, in the "years of unrest and outbursts". The new conservatives entered the 1980's with an ardent desire to rehabilitate the bourgeois economy, defense and their institutions—family, school, fellowship. The return from antiheroes to heroes—idols—successful and manifest, is essentially a reflection of the changes in the ideological-psychological situation. The degree of recognition of the unity of class interests has become incomparably higher. The "new conservatism" has brought bourgeois society a sense of confidence in its right to the dominating positions and social privileges, and the heroes of the 1980's are imparting a form of universality and general significance to the values which are prevalent in the mass consciousness. They are disputing the very idea of social progress, demonstrating an abrupt departure from left radicalism, and relying only on traditional values.

At the start of the 1960's the idols in the United States were the boxer M. Ali, the Beatles and Rolling Stones groups, the astronaut J. Glenn, Dzh. (sic) Eisenhower and J. Kennedy, M.L. King and the screen actor M.

Brando. At the start of the 1980's the idols were C. Eastwood and R. Redford and M. Jackson and E. Murphy. The world has been standardized. Transistor radios and VCR's, having expelled from everyday life old-fashioned and pleasant indulgences, have become the subject of the general consumption of the American "mass culture" idols. Cultural conformism has become a commodity. "The list of today's heroes is headed by 'stars' of pop culture and mass communications, but we would note that celebrated athletes and public figures attract the attention of the new generation less today. There are no astronauts on the list of heroes. A precise line is drawn between heroes and celebrities. The difference between them is that between positive substance and current social froth" (16). The "new conservatism" is trying to introduce to the mass consciousness a sense of stability and confidence in itself. The overwhelming majority of young people today are conservative and patriotic and shun everything transitory.

The ideological expansion of the new conservatives started the implantation of American ideals in all Western countries, which, naturally, strengthened their positions in the United States also. Its main channel is "mass culture". The most commonplace, entirely conformist, vulgar-sentimental product or what extols the cult of unbridled violence have acquired for their dissemination such a powerful tool as the modern mass media. "Culture today is an accessory of many people and has become an everyday occupation. Something has been lost, perhaps, in this democratization process—some sense of the greatness and mystery of true art. But, on the other hand, in our society we have freed art from narrow cult-like treatment. We have converted it from a cult into culture," the American sociologist A. Toffler writes (17). We have to agree with A. Toffler if by the word "culture" is understood "mass culture". The conversion of culture into commerce and the implantation of American culture as a universal phenomenon has far-reaching political ends. Quite recently even the values of youth culture, refracted via the mass media, were popularizing unexpected and therefore attractive types of worldly behavior and fashions. Life's standards changed under their influence. "The status symbols of the radicals of the 1960's—marijuana and faded jeans—became the lifestyle not only of radical strata. The youth style penetrated both middle age and the middle class. Work shirts, coarse cotton and the entire appearance of the young rebel of the 1960's were an expression of the superficial style of Western society" (18). The "youth boom," of course, encompassed not only the consumer goods sphere; both the average philistine and the intellectual snob paid tribute to "time's darling".

The "Bohemian style" became a part of the arsenal of "mass culture". Today the American press is emphasizing primarily the spread of Americanism to European culture. "In Spain young people in tight-fitting blue jeans and long coats are encountered at every step, as is slang composed of such American words as 'hamburgers' and

'hot dogs'.... American movies dominate the West European screen: they constitute 52.3 percent of films shown in Italy, 70 percent, in Greece, 80 percent, in the Netherlands, and 92 percent, in Great Britain. In France C. Eastwood in the movie "Pale Rider" has already attracted 3 million moviegoers. The penetration of American "mass culture" is a result of American strength and the American value system" (19). The filmmaker is contributing to the spread of Americanism in Europe. The export of "mass culture" begins with the advertising for a film and fashionable clothing. But the main factor which has strengthened "America's image" in Europe in the mid-1980's has been recognition of American efficiency and its unlimited potential. The defense of Americanism is connected with cosmopolitan trends. The French "new philosophers" are explicating their universal world view free from the narrowness of "regionalism" and advocating the birth of a global culture. The group of French ideologists who since 1976 have been criticizing traditional bourgeois culture, demonstrating anticommunist positions here, are called the "new philosophers". They include B.A. Levi, A. Gluecksmann and others. "By no means the objective process of the rapprochement of cultures but aggressive Americanism and the forcible implantation of American culture in all parts of the world" (20) is the universal source in the system of their arguments.

The aggressive essence of American "mass culture" cannot be underestimated: conservative ideologists both in America and in Europe are hoping with its help to "win minds" and "standardize the cultural landscape". "Planetary culture is conceived of as a dissolving of local, national communities and the creation of cosmopolitan values American-style" (21).

However, an anti-American trend also has become pronounced in the bourgeois consciousness in Europe in the 1980's. Western ideologists of a neoconservative persuasion are proposing a program of Europe's cultural revival under Europeanization slogans. In the opinion of the French "new philosophers," Europe and not America is the source of cultural values. They are attempting to defend European culture against Americanization.

The idea of national exclusiveness is at the basis of the thinking of both the American new conservatives and the European ideologists.

A new theme has appeared in the 1980's: the Europeanization of America. "From food to fashion, from politics to economics—the European invasion is noticeable everywhere. The 'Mediterranean diet' and a vogue for all things 'European' are popular in the United States today. 'Made in Europe' is a sign of quality for consumers of clothing, cars and good food. The favorite wines in America are Italian (60 percent of all wines consumed). The increased consumption of French cheese, French fashion clothes, Italian footwear and Italian jewelry testifies that even the increased American patriotism is powerless to control the vogue for European products.

"The Americanization of Europe and the Europeanization of America are two sides of a single coin.... The years when America was gaining strength and confidence and when Europe depended on her have passed. Merely the traces of the old hostility and misplaced ambitions now remain" (22).

The propaganda of entrepreneurial subjectiveness and the call for self-reliance and success are the typical version of "mass literature" and the "mass motion picture product". But time is passing, and a reassessment of values is under way. Both in Europe and in America a departure from the "fundamental values of Western civilization" is observed. Interest in "work values" has become considerably less than in "leisure values". And there is far less optimism among Europeans than among Americans. "Do you think 1986 will be better than 1985?" was a question put by an opinion poll service. The answer: in the United States 65 percent believed that it would be better, 20 percent, that it would be worse, in Canada 53 percent believed that it would be better, 37 percent thought so in Great Britain, 27 percent in the FRG, 26 percent in France, and 18 percent in Japan. In November 1979 only 19 percent of Americans were satisfied with how things were going in the country. Today this figure has risen to 51 percent (23).

The spirit of utilitarianism, efficiency and pragmatism imported from the United States is not promoting optimism. "Solitude permeates culture" (24). In the 1960's the majority experienced a sense of involvement in the surrounding world, today those who are 40 years of age have lost it. People are retreating into egotism and a search for material ends. No one is encouraging a thirst for spiritual values. Man lives alone. The television and the video cassette are replacing human intercourse. "In the broad sense loneliness is the result of noninvolvement in society," the author of the article "Loneliness—An American Epidemic" (25) writes. The transistor and tape recorder are not only filling in man's leisure time but also proving to be a channel via which the consumer mentality and consumer orientation are spread and tastes and behavioral models implanted. A middling type of culture comprehensible and intelligible to the mass consciousness has emerged, and the idea of where the "high" models and "low" versions are is being lost.

The commercialization of culture—a process characteristic of all Western countries—has increased the conformism of the mass consciousness. The most sensational production of last season was the musical "Chess" produced in London by T. Nunn with songs by T. Rice (author of the popular musical "Jesus Christ Superstar") and music by B. Anderson and B. Ulveis. Some \$6 million were spent on producing it. It is interesting that a genre born in the United States has today taken root in Britain. "The musical was once the heart and soul of the American theater, now musicals have shifted to the land of Shakespeare, Shaw and Pinter. And whereas previously London put on what had first appeared in America, everything has now changed: premiers of hit musicals are given in Britain" (26).

"Chess" is a frankly anti-Soviet farce about two chess players, an American and a Russian, and a Hungarian emigre in love with the Russian, on account of which the latter remains in the West. This is a typical example of a rather crude commercial production. The opulent decor and attractive tunes hypnotize the ingenuous public. But no commercial flowering will make good the shortage of true art.

"Mass culture" has filled the bookshelves and the TV magazines. Illustrated weeklies honed by publishers over many years of study of reader demand essentially sell only in sensational forms. Comics and "crime" stories, serious essays and strictly documentary novels and even political biographies are supplied under the sign of sensation. New varieties of writers, essayists and so-called intellectual standard-bearers have emerged. It is well known that both in Europe and in America the society is divided into a series of social and intellectual circles. "Intellectuals of the academic milieu have their own audience and they address their professional colleagues in their circle, displaying no interest in an appreciation of nonacademic circles not connected with them. In an extreme case they are paid peripheral attention. The intellectual standard-bearers, on the other hand, address themselves not to an elite audience, not to a professionally selected public but to the masses, from whom they thirst for recognition and approval" (27). "The relative uniformity of cultural standards is based on a tremendous heterogeneity, the common denominator of which has been the fact that this entire professionally qualified public pertains to the 'new middle class'" (28). What is published for the mass reader means essentially not only qualitative indicators of the mass perception of culture but also indicators for mass perception inasmuch as all these publications are intended not only and not so much to correspond to the taste of the mass reader as to inform him. Standardization of everyday life led to the standardization of entertainment and standardization of the illusory quest for an escape from the customary, tedious routine. A situation arose "where the majority lost a sense of 'strong roots' in society. The cultural vacuum which formed was immediately filled by 'mass culture,' which is being disseminated by the entire ramified machinery of bourgeois ideological-psychological influence and the mass information system, which has expanded particularly quickly (in connection with the development of television)" (29). "Mass culture" assumed a mass nature by no means because television was capable of reaching a vast audience. It was simply that social living conditions had acquired uniform nuances. Musicals, shows, comics and crime stories constitute more often than not what is called "kitsch" and consumer goods, but now the inner nucleus of "mass culture" is far broader. The blending of "mass culture" and the traditional-elite direction of spiritual life (the classics, avant-garde aesthetic experiments) testifies to the Western intelligentsia's desire to have done with the division of culture into "genuine" and "pseudo-culture". The position of the inseparability of mass and elite culture has proven predominant.

The enlistment of the classics and avant-garde experiments in the sphere of consumption has determined the expansion of a function of "mass culture": man is offered a special "environment," residence in a world of prestige values and their appropriation (not assimilation). The combination in a single cultural context of noncombinable phenomena.

"Now writers' stories and their interviews are published alternately with cartoons and nude bodies shot in close-up. The short stories of T. Williams and J. Updike are published among cosmetics, diamond and clothing advertisements. We have entered an age in which an appetite for popularity has been combined with a hunger for money, which has been the decisive factor for those thirsting to make good. Everyone who has taken up the pen wants to be famous like a film star" (30). "Intellectual stars" appeared on the wave of these trends. They were the banner of the times, rushing headlong into satisfying the mass cultural market, and they march in step with the requirements of the day, although looking on themselves as serious authors. Some sense the contradictoriness of their new role, others have switched easily to their new employment and have avoided the torments of spiritual burnout. The "intellectual stars" appeal to superficially educated people, knowing that two attributes are needed for popularity: glitter and novelty. Imparting high prestige status to the phenomena created by "mass culture" is not fortuitous, and an unabashed interpenetration of cultural levels is occurring. The American writer N. Mailer wrote that "today cultural neutralization has lessened the importance of the novelist. I do not believe that J. Updike or S. Bellow are far below Hemingway or Faulkner, although they are less great. Greatness does not depend on the author, it depends on the Times. Those who write today in the style of Hemingway do not inspire the public as before. Its feelings have been blunted too much by television and motion pictures. In any event, it makes sense now writing scripts and producing films and not writing novels" (31). And, further: "I have, alas, become a commercial writer and say this with sadness because there is nothing gratifying in this. When I was young, I thought about literature, now I think about making money" (32). A paradoxical situation arises: N. Mailer in the United States (like F. Sagan in France)—an idol of "mass culture" shaping the tastes of the mass reader—longs for true culture. "I wish I were read by a different public," F. Sagan confesses and... writes for a mass readership.

The "mass culture" of the 1950's-1960's was a vulgar, "market" version of technocratic "progressism" and at the same time the culture of the "consumer society" and "single middle class" (33).

The "mass culture" of the 1980's is a coupling of elite culture with "market" culture, the erasure of the boundaries between them and the appearance of new forms and new content and the creation of a culture industry, "the same which has been so passionately rejected and reviled

by all ideologists of modernism from the American 'New Criticism' through Adorno and the French School" (34). "Mass culture" has shown itself to be a means of the dissemination of a style of living and general system of thinking, crystallizing in a single blend the author, the public, poetry and reality.

The ideological influence of "mass culture" and, consequently, American culture has expanded in the 1980's; rock music is heard in all hotels of the world, videos are shown in 90 countries and black "stars" of the United States are wildly successful in Kenya, where university students in Nairobi fought for seats in the auditorium. In China restaurants and concert halls are usually empty when the American television program "The Man from Atlanta" is being shown (35). The aesthetics of sumptuous entertainment are triumphant, showering in the air, like precipitation, the ideas of the era of neoconservatism. But only the old, traditional values: order, stability and the family ties of bourgeois society seem reliable to the "new conservatism". A retro-art has been born, as if a nostalgia for the old days has begun. "Remember the 1950's? They are back, only they are called 'new wave'," the newspaper INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE observes (36).

It is naive to believe that the psychological basis of conservative "mass culture" is nostalgia for the old days. It is nurtured by different roots: fear of instability and change, a longing to escape from subordination to the bureaucratic mechanism and a desire to isolate oneself in one's own little world, in one's own circle and in one's individual interests. A society based on traditional values has proven to be the ideal in the eyes of the modern generation. "What kind of president would we like to see?" a public opinion service asks. "More conservative" (12 percent), "moderate conservative" (45 percent), "moderate liberal" (24 percent), "more liberal" (8 percent), Americans reply (37).

The middle strata of well-to-do, educated specialists longing for stability and equilibrium constitute the nucleus of the conservative generation both in the United States and in France. A propensity toward traditional values is accommodated in them with adherence to the new value system: life is a blessing only when its content corresponds to man's calling, otherwise he recedes into the sphere of leisure. Utopian illusions are not currently in vogue.

A dominating trend in the mass mentality contributing to the molding of conservatism is nationalism growing at times into unabashed chauvinism. A wave of jingoism is engulfing Americans, and it has intensified in Europe also. "A feeling of real optimism has taken possession of the nation to a far greater extent than was the case at the start of the Kennedy era. The defeat is behind us. The new enthusiasm reflects not only unconsciousness of the Vietnam war but also the attention given by President Reagan to the defense budget. Spending on arms has increased 38 percent since 1980. The younger generation

is imbibing the new atmosphere from movies and television. Today the tone of patriotism is predominant in the entertainment industry" (38).

A highly disturbing aspect has arisen in the entertainment industry—a fascination with the outward style of Nazism and the character of Hitler. Black stormtrooper uniforms and leather belts with metal clasps have proven unusually attractive to the younger generation. "'Pop culture' has found a new hero. The long-legged dancers and stately beauties in M. Brooks' musical 'The Producers' are dressed like young boys of the SS, and the dance which they perform is entitled 'Hitler's Springtime'. For children there are special broadcasts of 'When Hitler Stole the Pink Rabbit,' and for young people, 'The Gestapo: Study of the Experience of Total Extermination'. Hitler has become a pastime. There are games indicating a manifest social deviation from the norm" (39). The clichés of the entertainment industry have adopted Nazi symbols. Variety programs, films, television programs and popular and pornographic publications flirting with the "vogue for Nazism" are striking a blow at the historical memory and weakening historical feeling. The role of art in this erosion is fundamental inasmuch as the majority of the 1980's generation has no direct connection with the "facts" and learns of them second-hand. The appeal to the past is engendering a certain array of feelings—impulses, dreams, hopes, desires—converting these "facts" into something desirable and stirring.

D. Bowie considers Hitler one of the first "rock stars" and uses his name as a harmless toy. Images of the Third Reich have been shown on motion picture and television screens: the films "End to Peace," "Hitler's Last Days," "The Bunker" and "The Winds of War" and the West German documentary "Hitler"; a considerable number of pornographic shows mixing eroticism with fascism and "second-rate" literature describing the history of the Nazi period have appeared. All these "toys" have proven far from harmless, however. Dozens of neo-Nazi groups calling for violence and hate emerged at the end of 1985 in the American city of Seattle. Their methods are more threatening than the actions of the American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan (40).

Commercialization of the symbols of Nazism is a dangerous phenomenon, and not only because the punk ignoramus might ask: "Was this fellow really a monster?" Vampire makeup and spiked-up hair are easily added to the "aesthetics of cruelty" freely developing into a bellicose militarist spirit demanding an outlet. "Mass culture" is summoning into being the most natural instincts of protest against surrounding life which today's punks and young people of loose morals perceive in the distant past of the era of Nazism. In addition, it is cultivating a "vogue for Nazism". "Rock groups are appearing which are all-surpassing in their crude exhibition of the sentiments and other 'equipment' of Nazism. A fashion offering men a Nazi uniform and something

similar for women is prevalent in New York and London. Black shirts with Hitler's portrait or the word 'Bundeswehr' have gone on sale in London. Even more disquieting is the sale at high prices of collections of Nazi insignia, swords, small swords and other appurtenances, not to mention the bargain sale of Hitler's aquarelles, astrology charts which belonged to him, his medical prescriptions and cars and everything on which Hitler laid hands. This greatest criminal of all times and peoples has proven to be an exciting figure. And for a long time to come, certainly, his 'family' relics and discoveries concerning E. Braun and his sheepdog Blondi will be used to tantalize. Not historical authenticity is on the cards but narrative—stories, emblems and the image of fascism, attracting and titillating the crowd" (41).

There is obviously a kinship between the "rebellion of instincts" and a style based on the symbols of death and cruelty. The superficial attributes of Nazi culture have spread relatively rapidly, followed by the unabating aggressiveness of those who, lacking ideas of their own, are borrowing the ideas of Nazism. This is an example of the degrading effect of "mass culture," which is devoid of serious spiritual content. "We are the hippies of the 1980's," the boys worshipping rock music, the punk style and the cult of strength say. Growing alarm in the face of nuclear war and the lack of prospects of their own are hurling them into the embrace of "mass culture," which is engendering dreams of violence, the destruction of life and a perception of their own redundancy. Self-assertion via brutality is proving to be a distinctive version of the rebellious-consumer philosophy permeating the mentality of the present younger generation, which is employing quotations from Nazi times. The historical address is indicated unequivocally. The era of idealism is over.

The spectacle of violence on the screen and on the stage and punks with their outward eccentricity, like aggressive clownery, serve as a "catharsis," as it were, and release of the aggressive aspirations of the personality. In practice this develops into a more dangerous situation. Desperate rebelliousness and a state of enforced idleness and alienation are leading the younger generation to the ranks of the new neo-Nazi groups. In the United States one such group called "The Order" dreamed of turning the country into a racist state or, in the last resort, of the creation on American territory of a racist refuge in the states of Oregon, Montana, Washington and Wyoming. Twentyfour members of this group were subsequently arrested and sentenced to death. The country's racist leaders assembled in June 1986 at an "Aryan national congress" near Lake Hayden in Idaho and discussed the problem of the creation of a "White Sovereign National State" in the United States. Cynicism and contempt for people led to this provocative mob gathering soon developing into acts of terrorism.

"The present culture is a conglomerate of the most varied styles and schools," the newspaper INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE writes in an article entitled "New Bohemia in Manhattan". "Everything is confused now: elite and mass culture, television and suburban culture, pornography, Saturday multiple films, comics and Hollywood weeklies, science fiction and horror films and food store and fashion house lists. All this together constitutes Bohemian life in Montmartre and Montparnasse and on Boulevard St Germain in Paris and the North Shore in San Francisco, in Greenwich Village in New York, that is, in places where the artistic bohemians live, work and support one another" (42). Quite recently all these people adopted leftwing positions, today they have turned to the right. The creative professionals of the 1980's differ sharply from their predecessors. The gap between the mentality of the "average man" and those creating art has shrunk. The old poetry of the Parisian garret has been displaced by the business calculations of the art galleries. Professional contact between artists has intensified. In the 1980's the art galleries have become clubs. Contracts are concluded and money made in them and backstage of experimental theaters. These people are ambitious and thrusting. They want to make money and be successful. Politics does not interest them, they are preoccupied only with themselves. Nicaragua is of no interest to them. Today they are drinking less and, fearing AIDS, indulging less in sex. "The middle class has become less monolithic and has disintegrated into thousands of different specialists engaged in business. The majority of them are conservative and long to enjoy life" (43). Yet making money is becoming increasingly difficult. "In the United States the weekly wage has fallen 14.3 percent compared with 1973," statistics note. The average annual wage for the 30-year-old American in 1973 was \$23,580, for the 40-year-old in 1984 it was \$23,395 (44). The professionals have virtually no faith in political parties' capacity for expressing the interests of the "average man". Confidence in the efficiency of the country's economy declined sharply in 1986: 35 percent of those polled, according to the Office of Public Opinion, declared in January 1986 that they were pessimistic "concerning economic prospects" (45). Both the artistic Bohemia and the younger generation of intellectuals are today indifferent to everything other than their earnings. There are less than 100 activists per 10,000 students.

But there is a sphere in which the most heterogeneous streams of the mass consciousness are united—struggle against the threat of nuclear war. Fear of war is growing in all Western countries. The protest against the policy of the ruling circles adhering to a militarist foreign policy has intensified in the mid-1980's. "One out of every two Americans is opposed to Reagan's plan to forgo the signing of the SALT II Treaty; 70 percent declare that Reagan has not kept his promise to cut back the production of nuclear weapons. Increasing numbers of people believe that the President has not done what he could. The opposition to military assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras is growing and has become far more extensive

than last year; 62 percent of Americans are opposed to the United States' policy to overthrow the Sandinista government in Managua; 55 percent believe that the construction of nuclear complexes should be cut back, 36 percent support an increase in the nuclear arsenal" (46). Among those polled in March 1985, 42 percent of Frenchmen and 59 percent of West Germans supported neutrality in the event of a conflict between the superpowers (47). The movement against the deployment of American nuclear missiles in West Europe assumed extensive proportions.

The maturing opposition mood is seeking an outlet....

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#### U.S. Author on Effect of New Technology on Workers

18070376f Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR* in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 (signed to press 17 Apr 87) pp 132-138

[Article by G. (Tarpinyan), director of the Association for the Study of Labor Problems (United States): "The Working Class and the New Technology"\*)]

[Text] The corporations and the mass media are portraying the development and application of microelectronic technology in the form of some autonomous force, which is subordinate to its intrinsic logic and not dependent on political and economic conditions. This viewpoint concentrates attention on the "influence of technology" viewed in isolation from the economic and political conditions in which it is applied.

In the opinion of spokesmen for the corporations, the cause of unemployment is S&T progress. But inasmuch, according to this view, the development of engineering and technology also constitutes the driving force of economic growth and the creation of new jobs the sole thing that can be done in connection with the so-called technological unemployment is "to alleviate for the displaced workers the adaptation process". Union officials involved in negotiating with corporation representatives know, however, that although the latter are discussing "alleviation of the adaptation process," they are displaying a keen reluctance to incur the corresponding expenditure.

On the other hand, when the question of the impact of technological innovations is approached from the standpoint of defense of the workers' interests, it is seen through the prism of the political and economic forces which are prompting the creation and application of the new technology. Under capitalism the new technology is introduced for the sake of an increase in the amount of surplus value derived from each worker in a particular period of time since it is this which constitutes the source of profit—the driving force of capitalist production. In order to preserve or increase their share of the total profit derived the employers are endeavoring to increase productivity, and where its growth is outpacing market demand for the products and the length of the work week is not shortened, unemployment occurs. The workers of such sectors of American industry as meat-packing, printing and others know full well how this mass elimination of jobs occurs. Such are the conditions wherein the most efficient technology becomes a threat to employment.

However, no less dangerous than a decline in the number of jobs as a result of the introduction of new technology is, from the workers' viewpoint, a situation where the corporations do not modernize production, and their market share declines. Union spokesmen, who are encountering questions of technological change at the negotiations with management, know that the introduction of new technology is a condition of continued employment inasmuch as, given private ownership of the means of production, the use of obsolete technology leads to the closure of enterprises and the bankruptcy of the firms. Workers of the United States' steel industry are familiar with this since a considerable proportion of the stagnant American steel market has been captured by competitors using more modern technology: foreign and American companies owning in the United States small modern mills.

Thus technical progress represents under the conditions of the domination of private ownership of the means of production and the control of the corporations simultaneously both a potential threat to employment and the condition of its continuation. In contrast to what the corporation spokesmen are endeavoring to have us believe, this paradox cannot be resolved by viewing the question of the impact of technology in isolation from the political and economic conditions of its use. Consequently, in order to make successful use of technical progress in the interests of the workers it is necessary to challenge both the logic of the extraction of profits, on which the development and application of new technology are based, and the corporations' exclusive right to determine the number of employees. And it must come from both the union negotiating on behalf of this workman or the other and from the union movement as a whole. As long as the corporations fully control the level of employment and can ensure that the growth of wages lag behind the growth of productivity, the workers can expect no better. This is true both of cases where the technology is replaced and where a company continues to use technology which is already obsolete.



### The Unions' Response

A poll conducted in 1979 of union officials, mediators in the settlement of labor disputes, managers and arbitrators showed the following: "More often than not American unions readily consented to the introduction of new technology. Second in terms of prevalence was the following reaction: initially resistance, then adaptation to the changed conditions. Thus there is no doubt that ultimately the American unions have either readily assented to the introduction of new technology or adapted to it" (1).

In fact, under the conditions of the undivided control of the corporations both the "willing assent" and "resistance" are two sides of the same coin since for the workers the main question is not how to respond to the new technology per se but how to prevent a reduction in jobs and an increase in employment. The introduction of new technology is just one of the tools which the employers have in their arsenal to increase the degree of exploitation of the workers. For this reason viewing technology in isolation from the general question of who controls the level of employment means losing sight of what is most important, the more so in that the use of more accomplished technology contains the possibility of a rise in the living standard, an improvement in work conditions and an increase in free time.

In this respect a better expression of the workers' attitude toward new technology is the "Technological Bill of Rights" proposed by the International Association of Aerospace and Engineering Industry Workers. The first 2 of the 10 clauses of this document say:

new technology must be used such as not to reduce but, on the contrary, increase or maintain at the previous level the number of jobs and contribute to full employment both on the scale of each specific locality and on the scale of the country as a whole;

the industrial workers of a given enterprise should be paid a proportion of the additional income obtained by the firm from the increased productivity and reduced costs per unit product as a result of the use of new technology. It cannot be permitted that this income go solely to increase the firm's capital, managers' salaries and the shareholders' dividends.

### Structural Changes

In the United States, Canada and European countries the development of technology and changes in the use of engineering innovations are at the present time an organic part of the process of profound structural rebuilding which is taking place in their industry. However, technical progress is not the main reason either for this rebuilding itself or the mass unemployment which it is causing. There is a connection between the structural rebuilding of industry and the general slowing of the average annual rate of economic growth which has been

observed in the past 15 years. Production capacity has expanded more rapidly than world demand for industrial commodities. The increase in world industrial capacity is connected with increased international competition spurred by the export of capital by the TNC. Such is the situation in which the new technology is currently being introduced.

Assumptions that the extensive automation of production processes would cause a mass loss of jobs in manufacturing industry were expressed frequently in the 1960's in the United States. In reality, although there has been a reduction in the number of jobs in the specific sectors in which labor productivity growth has outpaced the growth of market demand for their products, for manufacturing industry as a whole the forecast was not justified. Moreover, in the period 1960-1969 the number of persons employed in American manufacturing industry grew by 5 million. In this period the introduction of more efficient technology occurred under the conditions of the growth of the economy of both the United States and the capitalist world as a whole.

In the period 1950-1973 the average annual rate of economic growth in the developed capitalist countries constituted 6 percent, which indicated a healthy level of the economy. In the United States the average annual increase amounted in the same period to 4.2 percent. In the period 1973-1983 the position changed. The average annual economic growth rate fell to 1.1 percent for the developed capitalist countries as a whole and to 1.2 percent for the United States. In addition, whereas in the 19 years from 1950 through 1969 the number of persons employed in manufacturing industry increased annually by an average of 1.7 percent, and the production of industrial output, by 8 percent, in the 14 years from 1969 through 1983 the corresponding indicators constituted 0.7 and 2.9 percent. Approximately 1.5 million jobs were lost in manufacturing industry from 1979 through 1984.

The slowing of the growth rate, which has been observed over a lengthy period, testifies that there are certain contradictions between technical progress and the interests of the corporations, which this progress serves. Indeed, although the introduction of more accomplished technology allows one group of capitalists to temporarily raise the profit norm compared with other capitalists operating in the same sector, this technology has only to become widespread for the profit norm to begin to manifest a tendency to decline. Although the labor of each worker becomes more productive, the number of exploited workers per unit output diminishes. A principal postulate of political economy proclaims that in order to structurally rebuild industry on the basis of new equipment and technology and simultaneously increase the average profit norm it is necessary that the degree of exploitation of manpower rise more rapidly than the capital availability indicator. Whence it ensues that in increasing productivity at their enterprises companies must at the same time lower real wages, weaken union control at the workplace, lengthen the average work day



and step up the intensity of labor. However, these measures also bring about contradictory consequences: in limiting mass demand for consumer goods they lead to a slowing of economic growth, which, in turn, holds back the growth of the use of new technology. Such a decline in workers' purchasing power occurred throughout the 1970's and has intensified in the 1980's, under the Reagan administration.

This multifaceted process testifies that there are more complex relationships between technology and employment than the simple cause-and-effect connection. The system of capitalist exploitation spurs the development of technology, but also holds back its application. Whence it follows that "the influence of technology on employment" should be studied in the context of the specific conditions of the national and world capitalist economy.

### **Exacerbation of the Unemployment Problem Under Current Conditions**

Those who listen to the reports on the invasion of production by robots broadcast on the nightly television news programs and have no other sources of information could gain the impression that the catastrophic unemployment currently raging in the industrial centers of the United States has been caused by the mass use of robots and other production processes based on the use of computers. This impression does not correspond to reality. In fact, as a result of the structural crisis in the main sectors of industry the use of engineering innovations is lagging considerably behind the development of equipment and technology. The new technology has played a far lesser part in the growth of mass unemployment in recent years than such phenomena as the simultaneous increase in the internationalization of production and competition and also the rapid fall in the workers' living standard brought about by the decline in real wages, the increased length of the work week and the growing intensification of labor. I would like to mention that several years ago many economists were heralding in their forecasts the advent of robots and the appearance of "factories without workers". Reality delivered these economists another surprise: in terms of the use of microelectronic technology in production processes the United States lags considerably behind its competitors.

To speak just of robots alone, it was forecast 10 years ago, according to the information of *FORBES* Magazine, that in 1983 sales of robots in the United States would have reached \$1 billion. In reality, as a recent study conducted by an international commission showed, \$169 million worth were sold (2). In 1984 sales of robots on the American market amounted to \$240 million (3). As the journal observed, although the United States occupies first place in the world in terms of the development of robotics, its main competitor, Japan, is ahead in terms of the use thereof. "Of the 50,000 robots used in the world in 1982, Japan accounted for 31,000, and the United States, for only 7,000" (4). There has been no

appreciable change in this correlation since then. The current gap is even more impressive if it is considered that the United States' GNP is more than twice the size of Japan's GNP.

The same situation has taken shape with other engineering processes connected with the use of computers. The slow spread in the United States of microelectronic engineering has been a reason for the reduced competitiveness of American industry on world markets. The paradox is that the United States at the present time occupies first place in the world in terms of the competitiveness of computers and the products of the aerospace and other high-technology sectors of industry and at the same time lags behind Japan and the FRG in the sphere of shipbuilding and machine-tool building and in the production of electrical and other power equipment, industrial fixtures, rubber and plastics. Yet the American TNC have the world's greatest amount of direct overseas capital investments. This indicates that instead of the modernization of technology at their enterprises inside the country the American monopolies prefer in many instances to export capital to countries where expenditure on manpower and other costs are lower than in the United States. Thus while the United States' positions in the world economy have weakened, things are going very well for the biggest American TNC.

The long-term growth of unemployment in the United States has been brought about primarily not by the use of new technology but by a directly opposite phenomenon—the use of obsolete technology under the conditions of intensified competition. The facts testify that it is in the sectors of the economy in which the introduction of new technology has in recent years been most rapid—in services, for example—that the highest increase in the numbers of those employed has been observed. As far as companies of manufacturing industry are concerned, in this case the concern for profits has led to their lagging behind in the introduction in production of progressive equipment and technology and being unable to make full use of it.

This analysis does not call in question the fact that for workers of this sector or occupation or the other the introduction of new technology could threaten a loss of jobs. This is manifested particularly vividly in connection with the fact that in the past 5 years more auspicious conditions, from the viewpoint of the corporations, have been created for obtaining additional profit from the application in production of new equipment and technology as a result of the pursuit of Reagan's antiworker policy—reduced wages and extra social payments, the elimination of work rules protecting the interests of the workers recorded earlier in collective agreements and a further increase in the intensification of labor. In addition, we know of a multitude of instances of the introduction of new equipment at enterprises and in establishments having led to the direct loss of jobs and a deterioration in work and hiring conditions. A large number of such examples is known in such sectors as

communications, banking, retail trade, printing and food industry, engineering and others. Nonetheless, taking the economy as a whole, the application of new equipment and technology is not the main reason for the present catastrophic unemployment level.

The conclusion suggests itself that such a union response to the introduction of new technology as "resistance" is not contributing to an alleviation of the negative impact of this process on employment and does not correspond to the workers' interests. Just as unproductive is an approach whereby the unions "readily assent" to the introduction of new equipment and technology without questioning the corporations' right to eliminate jobs. In both cases the adoption of decisions on the pursuit of this investment policy or the other is under the control of the corporations, and the entire burden of the consequences of this situation is borne by the workers.

### The Progressive Role of Technology

If the unions wish their approach to the introduction of new technology to really correspond to the interests of the working people both at the level of a given enterprise and on the scale of the entire country, they must proceed from the premise that advanced technology contains the possibility of an improvement in the workers' work and living conditions. The use of new equipment and technology has negative consequences for the working people when it is under the control of the corporations, whose aim is an increase in the profit norm. Whence it follows that to mitigate these negative consequences the unions must at all levels—local, national and international—challenge the corporations' exclusive control over decision-making in the sphere of investment policy and their right to determine at their discretion the number of jobs and the conditions of pay. This would be a challenge to the very logic of the capitalist profit system, but it is this challenge which contains the sole effective approach to the problem of the use of new technology.

### Unions' Reference Points

At the time of the conclusion of collective agreements at the present time the unions are already stipulating therein provisions concerning the use of new equipment and technology. As yet the American union movement is concentrating its efforts on achieving an easing of the negative impact of new technology on the position of the working people by way of the incorporation in collective agreements of conditions concerning timely notification, the payment of discharge compensation and professional retraining in connection with the introduction of new technology. Such measures are really of importance for mitigating the negative consequences which the use of new equipment and technology might have for the workers, however, they do not challenge the logic which in some cases prompts capitalist firms to retool, but others, to technical stagnation, and always contains the danger of a loss of jobs.

In order to solve the problem of a loss of jobs both as a result of the introduction of new and also as a result of the preservation of obsolete technology the unions must make guaranteed employment a principal goal of their collective bargaining practice. Industrial unions in other countries have already won the incorporation in collective agreements of clauses concerning a ban on the dismissal of workers as a consequence of the introduction of new equipment and technology. Such provisions are contained, for example, in collective agreements concluded by certain unions of Great Britain and Japan (5).

As observed above, the struggle over the use of new equipment and technology can and should be linked with the broader struggle for the preservation of and an increase in the number of jobs. In this connection several goals, for whose achievement the unions have begun to fight, using here both the negotiations on the conclusion of collective agreements and the development of campaigns for enactment of the corresponding laws, have already been proclaimed.

Shortening of the work week without a reduction in wages. Throughout the more than 50 years which have elapsed since the time when the Fair Labor Practices Act introduced pay at time and a half for work in excess of 40 hours per week the length of the work week has remained unchanged at more than 40 hours. Yet in this time the productivity of workers of manufacturing industry has grown appreciably. Thus from 1947 through 1981 labor productivity increased 140 percent, but real wages before tax increased less than 35 percent. This indicates a tremendous growth of the proportion of value produced which is appropriated by the employers at the expense of the proportion which is received by the workers. The Association for the Study of Labor Problems has estimated that for the workers to receive the same proportion as in the first postwar years the work week would have to be shortened to 27.2 hours, given the same level of weekly wage rate.

If all the unions were to launch a campaign for a shortened work week without a reduction in pay—using here negotiations with the employers and measures of legislative pressure—this might help them ensure the incorporation in collective agreements of articles prohibiting dismissals in connection with the introduction of new equipment and thereby lay a firm foundation for maintaining and increasing employment. In addition, the achievement of these goals would contribute to a rise in the overall purchasing power of the working class, a growth of the living standard and an expansion of demand on the markets in which at the present time stagnation reigns. All this could limit even more the trend toward the elimination of jobs as a result of the application of new technology.

Enactment of a law on the closure of enterprises and their handover to public control. The corporations' policy of a winding down of investments is leading to many

enterprises finding themselves out of date, and their policy of the introduction of progressive technology is leading to a reduction in the number of workers needed to produce the given product volume. Both phenomena bring about the closure of industrial enterprises. It is therefore essential for the preservation of jobs to introduce legislative measures which would limit the closure of enterprises and permit the transfer of closed plants and factories to society, given government financial support.

The expansion of mass demand by way of an increase in wages in accordance with the growth of labor productivity or a higher rate given simultaneous price control. A systematic campaign for an increase in the real wage guaranteed by laws and collective agreements would lead to an expansion of markets, as a result of which new technology could be introduced without a loss of jobs. It should be said that these three tasks represent only some of the strategic goals, struggle for which would permit as the Engineers Union proposes in its "Bill of Rights," a challenge to the corporations' exclusive right to determine at their discretion the number of persons employed and the amount of the wage.

For the success of the struggle for these reforms it is important to achieve the unity of action of unions of different countries for the capitalists are still managing to set the workers of one country against those of another. Thus, for example, the struggle to shorten the work week should not only be of an international nature and be conducted on the basis of concerted standards but should also be accompanied by the unions' international solidarity on the question of increased wages. The absence of international unity of action is making the struggle for reforms even more difficult for the TNC can shift production from one country to another at will, and under these conditions it has become more difficult for the workers to hold on to each position won.

In order to deprive the TNC of the possibility of circumventing the imposed restrictions by way of moving capital to other countries it is also important to simultaneously struggle for the establishment of public control over investment policy in the key sectors of national industry.

Each of these directions of struggle is a direct challenge to the prerogatives of the corporations and the very system of capitalist profit. Some people will probably maintain that more "interim" solutions, so to speak, which are easier to achieve are needed for the solution of the problems born of technical progress. However, although measures to "alleviate the adaptation process" are necessary, they will not solve the problem of mass unemployment. To really solve it it is necessary to change the correlation of forces in favor of the working class, rein in the baneful antisocial activity of the TNC and ultimately thwart their designs. Only by having changed the correlation of forces between workers and capitalists and having challenged the prerogatives of the

corporations is it possible to arrive at the point where use of new equipment and technology enhances the living standard, reduces the need for heavy, monotonous labor and increases the number of jobs and the working people's free time.

### Footnotes

\* The articles of G. (Tarpinyan) and R. Gibson were handed over for publication in RK i SM at the time of the visit to the United States of a USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD delegation at the end of 1986 (see M.I. Lapitskiy, "In the Industrial Heartland of America," RK i SM No 2, 1987) (Translation may be found in JPRS Report: Soviet Union International Affairs. JPRS-UWC-87-001).

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### Marxism-Leninism in Africa: Theory, Practice Evaluated

18070376g Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR* in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87 (signed to press 17 Apr 87) pp 144-159

[Article by A. P. Andreyev and A. A. Ivanov: "Marxism in Africa and the Current Ideological Struggle"]

[Excerpts] Back in 1919 V.I. Lenin observed that "the liberation of the peoples of the East is now perfectly practicable..." (1). Africa will go down in the general history of the latter half of the 20th century as a continent of struggle and revolutions, struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism, poverty and indigence, illiteracy and disease and racism and apartheid and against tribalism and feudal vestiges and backward social structures and neocolonial shackles, struggle which at its highest stage has developed into popular revolutions of tremendous scope and depth, as a result of which a socialist orientation of development has been firmly established and the first steps along the path of the creation of a society of social justice have become possible in a number of African countries.

In this article your authors have set as their goal a study of the socio-historical prerequisites and trends of the spread of Marxism-Leninism in African countries, particularly the states of a socialist orientation, an illustration of the role of the revolutionary parties in the combination of the anti-imperialist movement of the peoples of the continent and scientific socialism in the context of the modern ideological struggle on the world scene and a critical analysis of the propositions of bourgeois propaganda aimed at isolating Africa's revolutionary forces.

Under the impact of the successes of the socialist community countries and the exacerbation of the general crisis of the capitalist system the capitalist development path was rejected in the 1960's in certain African countries (Algeria, Congo, Tanzania and others) after independence had been won. The national-democratic forces of these countries advanced the task of gradual progress toward the building of socialism. In the 1970's this group of states expanded constantly, and Angola, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Madagascar and Ethiopia opted for the socialist orientation of development. There was a consolidation of the social forces advocating an end to the spontaneity of capitalist development and the elimination of man's exploitation of man in a number of countries (Ghana, Mali, Burundi and others). At the start of the 1980's a socialist orientation of development was proclaimed in the Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso and certain other countries. At the present time more than one-fourth of the population of Africa lives in the states of this orientation, and they occupy over one-third of the territory of the continent.

The path of the building in the future of a socialist society chosen by many African countries "corresponds to the true interests and cherished aspirations of the people's masses, reflects their aspiration to a just social system and coincides with the arterial direction of historical development," the new version of the CPSU Program emphasizes (2).

A natural result of the deepening of the social content of the national liberation revolutions and their development in many countries of the continent as national-democratic revolutions tending to develop into popular-democratic revolutions has been the extensive spread of the ideas of socialism and Marxism-Leninism. A combination of scientific socialism and the worker and national liberation movement is under way on the continent as a whole and within individual countries (in specific forms, of course). Marxism-Leninism is in Africa becoming not only a magnetic ideology but also a direct factor of profound transformations of the entire system of social relationships.

Ideological-political processes on the African continent show convincingly that Marxism-Leninism spreads particularly rapidly at pivotal moments of world history, the high intensity of the class struggle and the upsurge of the

revolutionary movement, when social thought persistently seeks radical ways and means of a solution of urgent problems. The attractiveness of the ideas of socialism for progressive national-patriotic forces in African countries amounts primarily to the values of Marxism as a scientific system of learning, the truth of which is confirmed by the entire course of social development. The theory of Marxism-Leninism affords them an opportunity to explain scientifically the reasons for the calamitous position of African countries and their dependent and exploited position within the framework of the imperialist system. Scientific socialism has revealed in depth the exploiter essence of capitalism, the direct creation of which were imperialism and the colonial enslavement of the majority of peoples of the world, and at the same time revealed the paths of the liberation of oppressed peoples and substantiated the inevitable alliance of all forces of the world revolutionary process undermining the domination of the exploiter system.

An important component and inseparable integral part of Marxist-Leninist teaching is the theory of the noncapitalist development of previously backward countries. Corroborated in practice by the experience of a whole number of peoples, it has played a tremendous part in shaping the views of many leaders of the national liberation revolutions in Africa. "The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution," the well-known Ethiopian politician Shimelis Mazenga writes, "and also the subsequent birth of the powerful world socialist system have beyond a shadow of doubt created the necessary international conditions for the movement toward socialism of any country which has set itself this goal" (3).

The countries of real socialism provide by the mere fact of their existence and dynamic development, practice of the new type of social and inter-nation relations and force of example in the solution of most complex problems which capitalism cannot handle convincing answers to the highly urgent questions of social life.

Marxist-Leninist ideas have spread on the African continent by various paths depending on the specific conditions of this country or the other. A big part has been played here by African students who were taught in European countries and America, where they were introduced to the workers movement; and the activity in the colonies of sections and groups of the communist parties of Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and other capitalist countries and progressive labor unions. The great victory of the peoples over fascism given the decisive role of the Soviet Union created conditions conducive to the introduction of many Africans to the ideas of the revolutionary-liberation movement. It is sufficient to say that approximately 3 million Africans participated directly in WWII (4). A great influence on ideological processes was exerted by the general upsurge of the anti-imperialist, national liberation struggle and its radical tendency which had taken shape on the left flank of the liberation

forces in the atmosphere of the spontaneous anticapitalism of the social lower classes. In the 1960's-1980's this tendency gained powerful impetus as a result of the intensification of both the general crisis of capitalism and the contradictions born of the specific features of capitalist structures in African countries.

A tremendous part in the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology, ascertainment of the social potential of the evolving working class and working masses and the increased militancy of their demonstrations in the struggle for a socialist orientation of their countries has been played by the assertive activity of the African communist parties and Marxist-Leninist circles and groups. Communist parties have not yet taken shape in all African countries, but where they exist, their ideological-political role is growing constantly.

The current stage of the development of the communist movement in Africa, which began after 1960, in the main, is connected with the formation of independent national states, a number of which have opted for the prospect of socialist building, the further development of this movement and its conversion into an influential political force (5). At the present time communist parties have been formed and are performing their work in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Senegal, Lesotho, South Africa and Reunion. Whereas in 1939 there were only 5,000 communists in Africa, by the start of the 1980's their number had risen to 80,000 (6). "The communists were the first on the continent," a document of the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Tropical and Southern African Countries (1978) says, "to show the African peoples that struggle against imperialism and for democracy and social progress ultimately means struggle for socialism" (7).

The communist parties proceed from the fact that in many countries of the continent the implementation of profound socioeconomic transformations is possible only given unification around the working class of all anti-imperialist, truly progressive forces capable of creating and strengthening the revolutionary-democratic state and leading the country along the path of a socialist orientation. For this reason Africa's communists are endeavoring to pursue a political course which brings closer together all working people and the exploited on the basis of urgent tasks of social development. The communist parties are performing work among the working class, peasantry, civilian and military professionals, office workers and the middle strata.

The communist parties are showing convincingly in their theoretical and propaganda work that the model of "catchup development" per the capitalist pattern leads to the accumulation of economic, social and political contradictions and a constant intensification thereof and also to a crisis of all social structures. These contradictions cannot be removed merely by efforts from "above". The reluctance of bourgeois-bureaucratic and military-dictatorial circles in a number of countries of

the continent to come to terms with economic and sociopolitical reality and to accommodate the people's demands, the repression of democratic and progressive organizations—all this not only does not correspond to national interests but, on the contrary, leads to even greater difficulties and serious deformations of an economic and political nature fraught with a further deterioration in the situation of the people and a social explosion. Addressing the 27th CPSU Congress, M. Harmel, first secretary of the Tunisian CP Central Committee, observed: "We make no distinction between our specific role in serving the workers' vital interests and the tasks of socialism and our national and democratic role and our persistent activity in the name of broad alliances with all national forces for the sake of the struggle for common goals" (8).

An important contribution to the cohesion of all left and democratic forces and the spread of the ideas of socialism is being made by the theoretical and news journal of the communist and workers parties, *PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA*, which occupies an increasingly big place in the political information of the progressive public and the orientation of the personnel. The organ of the continent's oldest communist party—the South African—the journal *THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST*, is disseminated widely in African countries.

In the atmosphere of the increasing discredit of capitalism and the growth of the power and influence of the socialist community countries an important distinguishing feature of the revolutionary process in Africa has been the dynamic evolution of progressive circles of revolutionary democracy. This has led to the emergence on the continent of political organizations which are transitional from revolutionary-democratic to Marxist-Leninist. It is a question of vanguard parties of the working people, which are guided by Marxist-Leninist teaching. In five countries (Angola, Benin, Congo, Mozambique and Ethiopia) they are the ruling parties. The recent congresses of the MPLA-Labor Party in Angola, the FRELIMO Party in Mozambique, the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin, the Congolese Labor Party and the Ethiopian Workers Party showed their increased political and ideological-theoretical maturity, the strengthening of their positions in all spheres of social life and their important role in the dissemination among the working people of African countries of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

The vanguard parties of the working people in countries of a socialist orientation proceed from the fact that the revolution must inevitably pass through a number of stages of its development, primarily that it will assume a socialist character. They consider as one of their most important tasks in this connection the ideological-organizational strengthening of the forces of the revolutionary vanguard, which might contribute to the formation of the Marxist-Leninist nature of the party and be an important factor of the growth of the national-democratic into a socialist revolution.

The increased ideological-theoretical maturity of Africa's revolutionary democracy and its practical impact on the processes of social change are recognized even by avowedly anticommunist ideologists. Experts from the Hoover Institute for War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University establish with consternation: "As a whole, the Afrocommunism of the 1980's differs considerably from the socialist rhetoric of African leaders of the period of the winning of independence" (19). C. Young, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, notes in this connection the crisis of bourgeois ideology which has clearly come to light in Africa. Anticapitalist trends in the social consciousness are so strong that Africans see "something shameful" in open support for capitalism (20).

The sociopolitical situation in present-day Africa shows that increasingly new organizations and groups are turning to the ideas of scientific socialism. The experience of the national liberation revolutions and the practice of political struggle are bringing the progressive part of revolutionary democracy closer to a scientific comprehension of the essence of the modern era and Marxist-Leninist theory as a most important factor of the social liberation of the people's masses.

When evaluating the prevalence of Marxism in countries of a socialist orientation it is necessary to constantly bear in mind two aspects: the heterogeneousness of revolutionary democracy on the one hand and, on the other, the socioeconomic background against which the processes of the perception of Marxism are unfolding. Whereas in some countries (Algeria, Madagascar, Tanzania and others) predominantly representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, professionals, office workers and the middle strata are in power, in a whole number of other countries (Angola, Mozambique, Congo, Ethiopia and others) professionals—civilian and military—of a Marxist persuasion, who reflect the interests of the working class and toiling peasantry, have come to leadership. In the first group of countries the revolutionary-democratic parties are in terms of their social composition and social base parties of a broad coalition of the working people given the predominant role of the petty bourgeois strata. In the second case vanguard parties of the working people have been formed, which may be seen as representatives of a kind of original form of proletarian, communist movement.

In studying the specific socioeconomic background of the African continent it needs to be borne in mind that colonial enslavement, distorting and deforming social and class delineation, held back the formation of the factory-plant proletariat. There are in present-day Africa only 27 million wage workers. Of these, 35.3 percent works in industry, transport and municipal service and communications enterprises, 30.7 percent in agriculture and 34 percent in services. The total numbers of workers on the African continent, according to the calculations of the USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute, is put at 24 million (21). And although the dynamics of the

development of African industry show a trend toward a constant growth of the industrial proletariat, the growing capital-intensiveness of industry is objectively limiting the numbers of persons employed in the modern sectors of production. In addition, the African working class is taking shape unevenly. In North African countries workers constitute 32.4 percent of the economically active population, in Southern Africa, 43 percent, and in the countries of Tropical Africa, where approximately two-thirds of the continent's population lives, 7.4 percent (22). An important factor influencing the process of the formation of a proletariat is the existence in some countries of rich natural resources and active efforts on the part of the national state to involve them in the economic turnover.

African reality is fully confirming V.I. Lenin's idea that "the strength of the proletariat in any capitalist country is incomparably greater than the proletariat's share of the total population" (23). The high concentration of the proletariat in the main urban centers and ports at comparatively few, but frequently quite large enterprises is contributing to the rapid growth of its class consciousness and assertiveness. Although the working class in the emergent countries is not yet the hegemon in the revolutionary process, in a number of cases it has the potential to be such. "At the current stage of the national-democratic revolution," a document of the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Tropical and Southern African Countries said, "the proletariat is still characterized by certain subjective and objective weaknesses. But it remains the most consistent force in the struggle for national and social liberation, the building of the national economy, industrialization, the development of cooperative forms of management and the surmounting of tribalism—this very great calamity of the African peoples—and also for general cultural revival" (24).

Of course, the African working class has both quantitatively and qualitatively as yet not reached the level of the proletariat of capitalist countries but in tendency it is the most socially assertive and dynamic social force. In the countries of a socialist orientation, where the public sector in the economy occupies the commanding positions, the growth of the ranks of the working class is of a purposeful and planned nature. The efforts of the revolutionary-democratic state in the sphere of development of the system of the vocational training of the working people and the formation with the aid of specialists from the socialist community countries of a young replenishment of national detachments of the working class are contributing to this. Together with the quantitative growth of the workers and the replenishment of the ranks of the proletariat with skilled workmen important changes are occurring in countries of a socialist orientation showing the formation of the working class as a "class for itself". The workers as a whole and their representatives are endowed with broad rights and powers and are participating actively in the building of the new society (25).

At the same time, however, it should not be forgotten that the workers movement in Africa is essentially only in the initial phases of its development. A regular proletariat is only just taking shape. It is surrounded by tremendous masses of yesterday's peasants and migrant hunters who have not severed their ties to the land. Substantial strata of the proletariat are still in the grip of traditional vestiges of the past and nationalist and reformist ideology.

The predominance in the industrial sector of African countries' economy not so much of labor-intensive as capital-intensive production is leading under the conditions of rapid demographic growth and the increasing migration of the population to the cities to the formation of huge masses of unemployed urban lower classes and the swelling of the lumpen-proletarian, pauper stratum. According to the estimates of Soviet specialists, the overall level of unemployment and partial employment in Africa constitutes 40 percent of the numbers of the gainfully employed population (26). The urban unemployed masses are turning to traditional forms of mutual assistance and forming a variety of clan, group and ethnic associations. In the sociopolitical plane they frequently represent a nutrient medium for protests of both a left-extremist and reactionary nature. The decline nature of the consciousness of the lumpen-proletarian, pauper elements is a considerable obstacle to their involvement in the process of revolutionary socioeconomic transformations, when constructive activity is of paramount importance.

As a whole, it may be observed that at the current stage of the African countries' social development the process of the spread of Marxism-Leninism is occurring in the ranks of progressive workers organizationally united in trade unions and revolutionary parties, in the ranks of the peasantry and among civilian and military professionals, office workers and the student youth and also representatives of the middle urban strata, whose philosophy has in recent years been marked by an appreciable shift to the left.

Africa's revolutionary parties are endeavoring to perform constant work on spreading the scientific-socialist world outlook among the broad masses of the population. A system of political education and party training is taking shape and effective forms of agitation and propaganda are gradually maturing in the countries of a socialist orientation. Many working people are for the first time being introduced to the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist theory and gaining an idea of socialism as a social system at illiteracy elimination courses and in political groups at enterprises and in establishments. In these countries the mass media are publishing popular articles on scientific socialism and illustrating pertinent problems and tasks of the current stage of the national-democratic revolutions. The party-political journals explain the basic categories of Marxist-Leninist theory and show on the basis of specific examples their significance for the present-day struggle to build a socially just

society. Local radio prepares popular programs on the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. In Congo the Voice of the Congolese Revolution radio is conducting a special lecture series on the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and political economy. The extensive sale in countries of a socialist orientation of social and political literature is contributing to the spread of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

The training of professional party and ideological personnel is conducted in special educational institutions, in higher party schools included. And besides the Higher Party School, each regional center in Congo has local party schools working under the supervision of the Congolese Labor Party Central Committee Ideology Department.

In the countries of a socialist orientation great attention is attached to ideological work with the youth. The higher educational institutions, the universities, colleges and lycees included, of these states teach a course in social and political disciplines: Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy and history of the world communist movement. Thus a political education course has been introduced in all schools in Mozambique. Schoolchildren are studying the history of their country and the national liberation movement in inseparable connection with the experience of the world revolutionary movement and the practice of the spread of Marxism-Leninism worldwide. In Benin all high school graduates attend an ideological-political, patriotic and combat training seminar. In Congo the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist theory and social science are studied in practically all secondary educational institutions. Political training, the program of which incorporates study of the documents and policy line of the PAIGC, has been introduced in the schools as of 1979 in Guinea-Bissau.

The increasingly extensive study of Marxist-Leninist theory is dictated by the historical need for the socioeconomic development of African states. Marxism-Leninism provides at a truly scientific level of social cognition answers to the questions posed by the very practice of the liberation struggle. It makes it possible to correctly evaluate the role of the class forces participating therein, reliably outline the basic trends and prospects of social development and see clearly the reference points of the building of a society of social equality and social justice.

Groups of social scientists of the progressive school, whose theoretical views are greatly influenced by Marxist-Leninist methodology of analysis of social phenomena, have taken shape in many African countries in recent years. The "Marxism and Africa" conference, in which representatives of the social scientists of neighboring countries also—Uganda, Zimbabwe and Mozambique—participated, was held in the Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) University Development Institute in 1983. The "Karl Marx and Africa: 100 Years On" jubilee conference was held in 1983 in Nigeria. The JOURNAL OF AFRICAN MARXISTS, which devotes its material to an analysis of



the continent's problems from the standpoints of Marxism-Leninism and the theoretical elaboration of paths of Africa's socialist development, began publication in Lusaka (Zambia) in 1981. The journal's editorial board is made up of Marxists and leftwing radicals from Ghana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Cameroon, Nigeria, Tanzania and South Africa. The publication of the journal reflected the increased interest of the radical-left professionals in Marxist theory, but revealed here an equivocal approach to its many propositions. And although African radical-left theorists are at times characterized by the unduly academic nature and theoretical exclusiveness of research, isolation from the actual problems of the class struggle and a considerable eclecticism of world outlook, it has to be mentioned that a gradual departure from the ideas of Western petty bourgeois radicalism has been traced in their recent works. An increasingly large place is taken up by criticism of the methodological and sociopolitical principles of bourgeois sociology in the study of African societies and attempts to interpret from Marxist standpoints the new problems confronting the national liberation movement at the current stage. Ideologists of the radical-left school are coming to the conclusion that the sole alternative to global capitalism in Africa can only be the "revolutionary socialist type of development," which has for almost three decades now "been accompanied by considerable successes" (27).

Voluminous literature is published in the West's anti-communist centers, leading universities of capitalist countries and under the aegis of "charitable" foundations which attempts in one way or another to discredit the theory and practice of the progressive development of African countries of a socialist orientation. Books, brochures and articles prepared to the order of the CIA and other subversion departments are actively pushed through various channels into the young states. The conservative, bourgeois-liberal and national-reformist concepts which they propagandize correspond in their class essence to the interests of the neocomprador bourgeoisie and corrupt bureaucratic "elite," for whom the national liberation struggle ended with their accession to power. These strata are today advocating not so much the elimination of neocolonial exploitation as more auspicious conditions of participation therein. Partnership with foreign capital, which is ultimately subordinate to the strategic interests of the West, is strengthening conservative trends among the African bourgeoisie. The nationalism of the local bourgeoisie is being used increasingly as a means of stupefying the masses with the poison of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. Forming a bloc with local reaction, many bourgeois authors are not ashamed to exploit the anticolonial feelings of the African peoples, maintaining that Marxism is a Western teaching based on the experience of Europe and that for this reason it is organically unacceptable to the emergent countries.

Thus the American commentator D. Lamb attempts in the book "The Africans," which is tendentious and

thoroughly steeped in anticommunism, to have the readers believe that the ideology of Marxism-Leninism is "unattractive" to Africans inasmuch as it has not elaborated a "satisfactory development model" and has not provided for "political stability". "In fact there is no doctrine," D. Lamb unfoundedly maintains, "that is so contrary to the conditions of Africa as communism" (28). Moving on the same logic circuit is Babacar Sine, editor of the journal *REVUE AFRICAINE DE COMMUNICATION*, which is published in Senegal, who maintains that "the categories of Marxism, particularly historical materialism (the theory of class struggle, planned management of the economy and so forth), are alien to the specific conditions of Africa" (29). However, the natural question arises: why is Marxism-Leninism being proclaimed the ideological-theoretical basis of an increasingly large number of African emergent countries and why is it becoming increasingly widespread on the continent?

Not only commentators who are unversed in questions of theory but also representatives of bourgeois academic circles are assiduously avoiding a sober, scientific analysis of this question. The above-mentioned joint work of professional Africa experts "Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa" may serve as an example. The authors of the voluminous work, which is saturated with prolix academic arguments, have ultimately reduced Marxist-Leninist ideology to a kind of "secularized religion," in whose structure the USSR plays the part of "communist Vatican". According to the logic of the bourgeois Africa experts, the ideology of "Marxist-Leninist revolution, class struggle, the vanguard party and the dictatorship of the proletariat (even where the latter exists purely nominally)" is needed by "radical African groups" for the purpose of ideological symbolism for institutionalization within the framework of "international communism" and legalization with its assistance of their "totalitarian" political structure (30). The authors of another bulky work, "The New Communist Third World," which was prepared under the leadership of P. Wales, professor at the University of London, endeavor to prove the futility of the attempts "to extrapolate to Africa the European political experience". "Africa," the authors of the book conclude, "is only just becoming aware of the unpleasant truth that Marxism is not a universal instrument of cognition" (31).

In elaborating propositions concerning the "particular African culture" and the "particular philosophy" of the African bourgeois authors are wittingly or unwittingly portraying an entire continent outside of the effect of the laws of social progress and attributing to Marxists here what they have never maintained. No Marxist will deny the distinctiveness of the social realities of Africa. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that V.I. Lenin even emphasized, addressing representatives of communist organizations of peoples of the East: "You are confronted here with a task which has not previously confronted communists of the whole world: taking communist theory and practice as a basis, you need to know



how, with reference to distinctive conditions which do not exist in European countries, to apply this theory and practice to conditions where the main masses are the peasantry and where it is necessary to tackle the task of struggle not against capital but against medieval vestiges" (32).

For communists it has always been axiomatic that the general regularities of socialist revolution and the building of socialism are inevitably manifested in national-specific forms. And for this reason the concept of the "inapplicability" of Marxism-Leninism in Africa is without either historical or gnoseological justification. In this same concept Marxism-Leninism is simply arbitrarily depicted beyond the framework of the general scientific achievements of mankind. Yet this formulation of the question is encountering an increasingly emphatic protest even among nationalist African theorists, not to mention the progressive philosophers who are advocating a consistent application of the principles of Marxist analysis to a study of the past and present of the African peoples. "The tremendous historical significance and applicability of Marxism, as theory and method, to an analysis of many aspects of African reality" (33) is today perfectly obvious, P. Hutonji, a philosopher from Benin, writes.

Any attempts to undermine the unity of Marxism-Leninism and artificially break it down into various national and regional "versions" inevitably lead to the substitution for it of bourgeois and opportunist concepts. Marxist-Leninist teaching is uniform by nature and is an integral scientific system of knowledge and revolutionary action. As a consequence of the internationalization of the productive forces capitalism put an end to the local nature of social processes in individual countries, regions and continents. F. Engels even observed that "the world represents a uniform system, that is, a binding whole" (34). V.I. Lenin spoke of the need for cognition of the "unity and connection, interdependence and integrity of the world process" (35). Developing Marxist teaching in the era of imperialism, V.I. Lenin pointed out that imperialism had engendered relations between countries and peoples wherein mankind was connected in a common economic and sociopolitical complex based on the metropolises' domination of the colonies. World economic relations constructed per the "center—periphery" principle have today put the neo-colonial economy in the position of agrarian-raw material appendage of the former metropolises and integrated it even more in the world economy of the capitalist system with its inherent contradictions. The entire imperialist system as a whole, rent by class, national and interimperialist contradictions, has become the eve of socialist revolution, cognition of the nature and realities of which is provided by Marxist-Leninist theory. Thus capitalism has simultaneously with the enslavement of Africa itself also prepared the conditions for its own rejection there since, as V.I. Lenin wrote, "the gigantic majority of the population of the earth is ultimately instructed and raised for struggle by capitalism itself" (36).

Many decades of colonial domination have distorted and deformed the process of African states' social development and preserved many surviving structures. But they have not abolished nor could they have abolished the general regularities of social progress: the appearance of new productive forces and production relations, the formation of a class society and class struggle, the growth of the role of the people's masses in social life and the maturation on a bourgeois-democratic basis of national liberation revolutions, which under current conditions are tending increasingly toward anticapitalism. The Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of African Countries (1978) emphasized in its document: "The same objective regularities of social development which operate throughout the world are being manifested on our continent also—in a form corresponding to the national features and historical singularities of the countries of our continent and its islands" (37). Viewing, however, the emergent countries merely through the prism of traditions, exotica and backwardness, as many representatives of bourgeois African studies do, means flying in the face of the objective logic of facts. Congo President Denis Sassou-Nguesso said, answering the question of a French journalist as to why there were in the squares of Brazzaville slogans linked with the names of great Marxists while Africa was so zealous in its protection of its distinctiveness: "I should not have to explain to you that Marxism is a philosophy, a science. You want to enclose it within borders and fence it off. It is allegedly viable in Europe, Asia and Latin America, but not in Africa. There are on all these continents countries which have implemented this science creatively and achieved significant results.... You believe that Africa represents something mysterious and you talk about Africanization and distinctiveness, but do other continents not have distinctiveness, Europe, Asia or America, say?" (38)

Repudiating the false concept of the "unacceptability" of Marxism-Leninism in Africa, which is widespread in bourgeois science, S.P. (Gey), prominent figure of the Party of Independence and Labor of Senegal, wrote in the party journal GESTU: "Since revisionists and falsifiers of Marxism have existed they have always endeavored to prove that Marx created his teaching for some countries, but not for the whole world." The reasons for such assertions are perfectly obvious. The bourgeoisie has always aspired to confine the influence of Marxism to some local framework and is today persistently attempting to wrest the emergent countries away from world socialism. The role of the Marxist scholar, S.P. (Gey) continued, "armed with a progressive scientific theory, which he puts at the service of the liberation of his people" (39), is exceptionally great in this connection in any country.

Understanding full well the danger contained in various revisionist and reformist concepts, the revolutionary parties of Africa are conducting an active struggle against the falsifiers of Marxism. In the article "Struggle Against

Ideologies Hostile to Marxism-Leninism" S. Gomu-Futu, chief editor of the Congolese journal *LA REVUE DE SCIENCES SOCIALES*, notes that African parties adhering to positions of Marxism-Leninism have to struggle against both external and internal anticommunism. The anticommunism of domestic reaction, although borrowing its ideas mainly from the neocolonialists, at the same time makes active use for its own purposes of the ideological-political and cultural-historical features of African reality. As the most important tasks confronting African progressive parties the author mentions, first, struggle against avowed anticommunism, whose ideologists are even advocating the need for the imperialist powers' armed intervention against young progressive states with vanguard parties in power; second, "ruthless struggle against the bureaucratic and comprador bourgeoisie, which is opposed to socialism and which declares an absence of social classes in Africa" and is actively opposed to "revolutionary Marxists, setting as its goal their isolation from the people's masses"; third, struggle against the theories of African social democracy, which enjoys a certain influence among the professionals and also petty bourgeois nationalist circles connected in one way or another with foreign capital (40).

The idea that the spread of "orthodox Marxism" in the emergent countries entails sociopolitical upheavals and bloody conflicts has gained wide currency among various anticommunists. Such, for example, is the viewpoint of the American political scientists L. Gann and P. Duignan. The Africans, they believe, are themselves to blame for the exacerbation of interstate and internal contradictions, having turned to Marxist-Leninist ideology of class struggle and entered into confrontation with the leading imperialist powers instead of having stuck to the well-trodden path of capitalist "modernization" under the aegis of the West. The ideologists of anticommunism maintain that the main blame for the disturbance of the "harmony and balance" of African society lies with the "Afro-Marxist states"—the countries of a socialist orientation—which it is necessary to "neutralize by way of an increase in their neighbors' military power" (41).

To destabilize the socioeconomic situation in countries of a socialist orientation the ruling circles of the Western powers are employing the most diverse methods. They are practicing food blackmail, endeavoring to preserve and consolidate technological dependence, consenting to a deliberate deterioration in trade conditions and creating military-political border pressure in order to divert the already scant resources of the young states for military purposes. The practice of imperialism's direct rearing of a counterrevolutionary rabble, which by its bandit raids is preventing a normalization of the economic mechanism, has become most prevalent. Operating via South Africa, imperialist reaction has for more than 10 years now been mauling the fledgling economy of Angola and Mozambique. UNITA bands are plundering and killing in Angola, in Mozambique the population is being terrorized by the cutthroats from the so-called

Mozambican National Resistance. In Ethiopia imperialist reaction is supporting in every possible way and arming separatists and creating military tension on its borders.

However, despite the most difficult external and internal conditions, the countries which have made a socialist choice, relying on the assistance and support of friendly countries, have as a whole made appreciable progress in movement along their chosen path. This is also established by those who harbor no sympathies toward them. Thus IMF experts were forced to acknowledge that "the high and rapidly growing level of state capital investments has stimulated the growth of the Algerian economy" (42). Despite the negative impact of the economic crisis which had erupted in the West and the fall in the world oil price, in the First Five-Year Plan (1980-1984) the annual rate of economic growth in Algeria constituted 6 percent. Some 710,000 new jobs were created in the country in the 5-year period. Algerian working people's living standard has risen appreciably. The employment problem is gradually being solved by way of the creation of new jobs. The draft plan for the second 5-year period (1985-1989) in Algeria contemplates the creation of 946,000 new jobs. The planned annual growth of agricultural production is 4.5 percent (43).

Overcoming economic difficulties, the young progressive states are perfecting the proportionality of the development of individual sectors of the economy and forming national specialist personnel. In the solution of these problems they are making creative use of the experience of the building of socialism in the USSR and other socialist countries. And it is not fortuitous that the burdens of the international economic crisis of the capitalist system have not led in practically any state of a socialist orientation to social upheavals like "bread" and "rice" riots. On the contrary, this development of events is characteristic of countries of a capitalist path, as was the case in Tunisia in 1984 and in Sudan in 1985. In the latter case the explosion of popular malaise led to the fall of the Nimeiri regime and democratization of the political structure of the state.

African Marxist-Leninists are showing in their ideological-political work that the young states cannot overcome the economic, social and political crisis in the modern era without emphatic progress toward socialism. They are constantly explaining the need for and possibility of the socialist orientation of African countries, elaborating theoretical and practical questions concerning the stages, forms and goals of this process and its driving forces, analyzing the experience of the progressive development of the young states and conducting an active struggle against bourgeois-nationalist views which discern in the spread of Marxism the "importation of foreign ideology". They are showing by their entire activity that the truly national ideology is that which corresponds to the interests of the people's masses and their national and social liberation, and in this sense Marxism-Leninism cannot be a "foreign ideology". What is really foreign for

the African peoples is the ideology of imperialism, which once did much to enslave the countries of the continent and keep them now in the system of neocolonial oppression.

The world communist movement values highly the internationalism of African Marxist-Leninists and their contribution to a strengthening of the unity of all democratic forces. They are firmly defending a policy of peace and international security and conducting an active struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism, Zionism and apartheid and all forms of racism. Their consistent and untiring struggle is making an important contribution to the cause of the revolutionary renewal of the continent and the consolidation of progressive anti-imperialist trends.

The increasingly broad influence in Africa of the Marxist-Leninist theory of socialist revolution and an important component thereof—the concept of the gradual transition to socialism, bypassing or breaking with capitalist development, and also the realization of a wide-ranging democratic program of a socialist orientation—testifies to the deepening crisis of anticommunism and its incapacity for holding up the victorious march of Marxist-Leninist ideas.

#### Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 39, p 321.
2. "Material of the 27th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1986, p 136.
3. LA REVUE DE SCIENCES SOCIALES No 2, 1985, p 95.
4. See P.I. Manchkhya, "Urgent Problems of Present-Day Africa," Moscow, 1979, p 18.
5. For more detail see "The Great October and Africa," Moscow, 1980, pp 14-40.
6. See P.I. Manchkhya, "Africa En Route to Social Progress," Moscow, 1986, p 90.
7. THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST No 75, 1978, p 22.
8. PRAVDA, 3 March 1986.
19. "Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa," Stanford, 1981, p 116.
20. C. Young, "Ideology and Development in Africa," New Haven, 1982, p 3.
21. See A.A. Gromyko, "Africa in World Politics," Moscow, 19086, pp 80, 83. Available statistics in African countries count as wage workers only the working people employed at enterprises with a number of employees of 10 and more. If, however, the persons employed at smaller enterprises are considered, the numbers of workers increase considerably.
22. Ibid., p 83.
23. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 40, p 23.
24. THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST No 75, 1978, p 10.
25. See for more detail "The International Workers Movement. Questions of History and Theory," vol 7, Moscow, 1985, chapter V.
26. MEMO No 8, 1986, p 62.
27. "Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World," Brighton, 1983, p 33.
28. D. Lamb, "The Africans," New York, 1984, p 190.
29. B. Sine, "Le marxisme devant les societes contemporaines," Paris, 1983, p 13.
30. See "Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa," Stanford, 1981, p 117.
31. "The New Communist Third World," New York, 1982, p 373.
32. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 39, p 329.
33. "Digest of Articles: Rethinking Marx," New York, 1984, p 108.
34. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 20, p 630.
35. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 29, p 135.
36. Ibid., vol 45, p 404.
37. THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST No 75, 1978, p 6.
38. Quoted from LES CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, March 1984, p 88.
39. GESTU No 8, 1983, pp 19-20.
40. See LA REVUE DE SCIENCES SOCIALES No 4, 1985, pp 46-47.
41. L. Gann, P. Duighan, "Africa South of the Sahara. The Challenge to Western Security," Stanford, 1981, p 100.
42. JEUNE AFRIQUE, 24 January 1979.
43. PRAVDA, 13 January 1985; 1 March 1985.

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# **Economic Intensification of CEMA Countries Described**

18070376h Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS*  
*SOVREMENNY MIR* in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87  
(signed to press 17 Apr 87) pp 160-166

[Article by B. I. Medvedev: "The CEMA Countries: Strategy of Acceleration"]

[Text] The countries of victorious socialism subordinate the development of the national economy to the goals of the increasingly full satisfaction of the working people's requirements. This basic economic law of socialism combined with the plan principle assures the possibility of the accelerated and crisis-free progress of the productive forces. At the same time a complex of objective and subjective factors, among which are the changed conditions on the world market and currency-finance problems, the inordinate acceleration of the investment process and the lagging of the structure of production relations behind the actual development of the productive forces have led to the growth of inauspicious trends in the economy of a number of socialist states. The fraternal countries see the way out of the current situation on the paths of the utmost acceleration of economic development, primarily an acceleration of S&T progress.

The strategy of the acceleration of socioeconomic development elaborated by congresses of communist and workers parties of the CEMA countries provides for a

fundamental change not only in the dynamics but also in the quality of economic growth and its transfer to an intensive footing. This is insistently demanded by both the reproduction situation which has taken shape in the sphere of labor and material resources and the interests of realization of large-scale socioeconomic programs of a rise in the working people's living standard and the need to surmount the inauspicious trends which emerged in the economy of the majority of CEMA countries in the 1970's-start of the 1980's.

Particularly difficult were the years of 1981-1982, when the average annual rate of growth of the CEMA countries' per capita national income (except for Vietnam) declined to 1.3 percent, and that of industrial production, to 1.5 percent. A certain improvement in the situation had come to light by the mid-1980's—the rate of growth of the production of national income and industrial production rose, and the degree of foreign economic balance, which had been upset in a number of countries in the 1970's, increased. However, the planned 5-year quotas in the majority of CEMA countries in terms of the main economic indicators remained unfulfilled. In all the European CEMA countries the growth rate of the national income and production of industrial output was lower than in the latter half of the 1970's.

It should be added to this that on account of the need to pay off debts on a large scale and pay credit interest to Western countries the dynamics of national income used for consumption and accumulation were lower in 1981-1985 (except for Cuba) than the dynamics of national income produced (see Table 1). This discrepancy was particularly noticeable in Hungary (11 percentage points in 1981-1984), the GDR (18 points in the same period) and the CSSR (8 points).

**Average Annual Rate of Increase in National Income and Industrial Production  
in the CEMA Countries in 1976-1985 (%)**

		Bulg.	Hung.	Viet.	GDR	Cuba	Mong.	Pol.	Rom.	USSR	CSSR
National income produced	1976-1980	6.1	2.8	2.5	4.1	4*	5.5	1.2	7	4.2	3.7
	1981-1985 (planned)	3.7	2.7-3.2	4.5-5	5.1	5*	7.1		7.1	3.4-3.7	1.9-2.7
	1981-1985 (actual)	3.9	1.4	6.8	4.4	8*	6.3	-0.8	4.4	3.6	1.6
Production of indust.	1976-1980	6	3.5	2.5	4.9	3.5	8.4	4.7	9.6	4.4	4.6
	1981-1985 output (planned)	5.1	3.4-4.1	4-5	5.1		9.9		8.75	4.7-5.1	2.7-3.4
	1981-1985 (actual)	4.7	2.2	13.6	4	8.8	9.7	-0.5	3.8	3.5	2.4

\* Gross social product.

Sources: K.I. Mikulskiy, "Economic Growth Under Socialism," Moscow, 1983, pp 380-382; VOPROSY EKONOMIKI No 7, 1986, PP 99, 101; EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV No 2, 1986, p 109.

A difficult situation took shape in agriculture. The aggregate increase in the CEMA countries' agricultural product in 1981-1985 compared with the preceding 5-year plan constituted 6 percent, including 6 percent in Bulgaria, 12 percent in Hungary, 25 percent in Vietnam, 9 percent in the GDR, 11 percent on Cuba, 18 percent in the MPR, 10 percent in Romania, 6 percent in the USSR and 10 percent in the CSSR. In Poland gross agricultural production in 1985 had grown 11 percent compared with 1980, but in the period as a whole had declined 2 percent relative to 1976-1980.

Despite the growth of the wages and other monetary income of the working people, the augmentation of the material base of socio-cultural and consumer service, the continued implementation of housing construction programs and improvement of health care and public education, the living standard of the population in a number

of countries has risen relatively slowly. Real income per capita grew 19 percent in Bulgaria, 7-8 percent in Hungary, 22 percent in the GDR, 11 percent in the USSR and 6 percent in the CSSR. In Romania the increase in the real wages of workers and employees constituted 8 percent, and the real income of the peasantry per person employed, 12 percent.

Having critically analyzed the situation, the congresses of the communist and workers parties of the CEMA countries put forward bold, but at the same time realistic, scientifically checked programs of an acceleration of their socioeconomic development. The indicators adduced in Table 2 provide a general idea of the current 5-year plan (1986-1990) and also the period up to the year 2000.

Table 2. Growth Rate of the CEMA Countries' Economy in 1986-1990 (%)

	National income	Industrial production	Agricultural production	Capital investment	Income of the population
Bulgaria	20-25	25-30	6-8	25-30	12-15
Hungary	15-17	14-16	7-10	19-20	
GDR	24-26	22-24			22
Mongolia	26-29	30-34	18-20	24-26	20-23
Poland	16-19	16		19	
Romania	44-49	33-37	30-32	9-13	
USSR	19-22	21-24	14-16	18-22	13-15
CSSR	18-19	15-18	6-7	10-12	

Sources: RABOTNICHESKO DELO, 21 February 1986; 13th MSzMP Congress. CEMA SECRETARIAT PRESS BULLETIN No 18, 1986, pp 9-13; UNEN, 29 May 1986; 20 November 1984.

A comparison of the tasks set in different countries for an acceleration of socioeconomic development shows their fundamental uniformity and unidirectional nature. The main means of acceleration common to all countries is S&T progress, in which the Comprehensive Program of the CEMA Countries' S&T Progress up to the Year 2000, which was adopted at the CEMA Session 41st (Special) Sitting, is designed to play a most important part. At the same time each country also has much that is distinctive in its socioeconomic development and the forms and methods of perfecting the social production management mechanism.

Thus the implementation of a wide-ranging program of the technological upgrading of production and a breakthrough in its intensification in order by the end of the century to have raised the country's material-technical base to a qualitatively new level is planned in Bulgaria in accordance with the decisions of the 13th Bulgarian CP Congress (April 1986). The production of such sectors as electronics and biotechnology will increase at a preferential rate, and the role of machine building as the basic factor of S&T progress will grow. This will create the basis for a growth by the year 2000 by a factor of 2-2.5 of social labor productivity, and in the strategic sectors and

industries, by a factor of 3-4, and an approximate doubling of national income produced.

The acceleration of the country's economic development will create the basis for the solution of social questions. It is planned that the average wage of workers and employees will increase by an annual 2-3 percent, and retail commodity turnover, by 4-4.5 percent. For the purpose of an improvement in the population's housing conditions it is contemplated by 1990 having built approximately 360,000 apartments, and 50 percent of them, what is more, will have no less than three rooms.

The accomplishment of the set tasks is closely connected with an improvement in the country's economic mechanism, the basic direction of which is deemed to be the speediest realization in practice of the principle of enterprise and organization self-management. A considerable amount of work in this sphere has already been done. Bulgarian working people are participating actively in the selection and assignment of enterprise executive personnel, from team leaders and shift and shop chiefs through the general director, exercising supervision of management activity and working on enterprise management committees and councils—bodies elected at general meetings of the enterprise workforce consisting of

workers and engineering-technical personnel employed directly on the shop floor to the extent of no less than 50 percent. Some of the rights which were previously the individual prerogative of the enterprise executive have been transferred to the enterprise management committees and councils here.

The central task of the economic policy of the MSzMP in 1986-1990, as defined by the party's 13th congress (March 1985), is the revitalization of Hungary's socio-economic development and an augmentation of the country's material-technical base.

Particular attention in the coming period will be paid to the efficient development and modernization of the manufacturing sectors of industry, a broadening of the selection of goods and services and measures for the utmost economies in fuel and power and raw material resources. An important part is also assigned an increase in the production of agricultural products. It is planned by 1990 having achieved an annual cereals harvest of the order of 17.5-18 million tons.

The problem of an improvement in the foreign economic balance is pertinent for the country, as before. Addressing the 13th MSzMP Congress, J. Kadar, first secretary of the MSzMP Central Committee, observed that Hungary had managed to remain solvent and reduce the debt by approximately 15 percent, but that this had been achieved at a "price of tremendous efforts" (1) and under the conditions of deteriorating proportions of foreign trade exchange, which led to the loss in 1981-1984 of 47-48 billion forints (in 1980 prices).

The second key problem is securing the conditions for a tangible rise in the working people's living standard. In accordance with the congress' guidelines, this is to be achieved primarily thanks to the increased efficiency of the national economy, an acceleration of the rate of economic development, profitable management, the more rational use of work time and a strengthening of labor discipline.

An inalienable feature of the life and activity of the workforce of Hungarian enterprises is their active participation in the adoption of decisions concerning questions connected with the organization of production and pay. A form of management whereby enterprise councils or elective boards operate is being introduced at approximately two-thirds of Hungarian enterprises. It is also contemplated that enterprise directors will be elected directly by the working people or their delegates and elective representatives and also that the practice of the selection of institution executives by competitive examination will be extended.

The acceleration of the socioeconomic development of the GDR and the further intensification of social production are inseparably connected with an improvement in economic management. An interesting structure of the

economic mechanism incorporating as the basic economic component 156 integrated works operating in industry, construction, transport and communications has been found in the GDR. These works are under the direct jurisdiction of 11 ministries and serve as an important factor of the republic's dynamic economic development.

In the coming period the works are, in accordance with decisions of the 11th SED Congress, to become the base of the economically efficient creation and application of key technologies. The further development of the works will be directed along a path of transition to the manufacture by their own efforts of components determining the quality of the end product.

The directives of the 11th SED Congress pertaining to the 5-year plan for the development of the GDR national economy in 1986-1990 envisage that the decisive source of satisfaction of the national economy's need for fuel, power, raw material and intermediate products is to be economies therein secured by way of an appreciable reduction in material consumption, the development and introduction of new materials and technology, an extension of the processing of resources and a growth of the involvement in economic turnover of secondary raw material and intermediate products per unit of commodity industrial output of 4 percent per annum, and in respect of the most important energy sources, of 3.3 percent.

Another important factor of growth is the mass manufacture of high-grade products corresponding in terms of their S&T level and consumer properties, including design and functional reliability, to the best world models. The task that has been set here is that of an annual renewal of the production range of more than 30 percent.

In the sphere of social policy the problem of the solution by 1990 of the housing question is advanced as the central issue. It is contemplated for this purpose building and modernizing 1,064,000 apartments. The population's real income will grow in planned manner, by an average of 4 percent a year, and retail commodity turnover will grow 4 percent, including a 5.3-percent growth in industrial goods, and 2.7 percent for food-stuffs.

An important place in the SED social program is occupied by measures to improve health care and public education, develop the system of preschool establishments and recreation centers, expand tourism and improve cultural services.

Big tasks to accelerate socioeconomic development confront the Cuban national economy. In accordance with the decisions of the Third Cuban CP Congress (February 1986), it is planned to implement in 1986-1990 S&T programs providing for the rational use of scientific potential and the accomplishment of strategic tasks of

development of the economy. The country's annual economic growth rate will constitute 4 percent, and labor productivity will grow by an annual 3.5 percent.

There will be a pronounced increase in the production of individual commodities of importance to the country's economy: a 15-percent increase in sugar, a twofold increase in citrus fruit and a 57-percent increase in steel. Power generation will increase by an annual 4.3 percent, oil production will rise to 2 million tons, and there will be a 50-percent increase in its refining.

The dynamic development of the economy will permit the speedier and more successful solution of social problems. It is intended by 1990 having built 285,000 homes (65,000 more than in 1981-1985), and the construction of 27 hospitals, 45 clinics, 12 stomatology clinics, 87 retirement homes and 26 invalid centers will have been completed. The production of medicines will have increased 65 percent compared with the preceding 5-year plan. The social consumption funds will increase at a steady pace.

The next 5-year plan and the period up to the year 2000 will be an important stage in the expansion and strengthening of the material-technical base in Mongolia. It was observed at the 19th MPRP Congress (May 1986) that in the course of socialist industrialization the MPR would gradually become an industrial-agrarian country. However, neither industrialization nor Mongolia's conversion into an industrial-agrarian country are ends in themselves but are subordinate to the task of completion of the optimum material-technical base of socialism, that is, the formation of the optimum sectoral and territorial structure of the national economy determined in the MPRP Program.

A 20-25-percent increase in the social consumption funds is contemplated in the social sphere together with a growth of the population's monetary income. The minimum pension will be raised 30 percent. It is planned in the 5-year period building 1.2 million square meters of living space and providing the cities and localities with more amenities.

The tasks of the socioeconomic development of Poland were determined by the 10th PZPR Congress (June-July 1986). The congress summed up a difficult period in the life of Polish society, which had been filled, as W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, emphasized, "with both tension and excitement and labor and accomplishments." W. Jaruzelski stressed that "the collapse which occurred as a consequence of mistakes of the strategy of the past decade, the wave of social discontent which arose and also the offensive of counterrevolutionary forces which lived as parasites thereon—all this coincided with a serious exacerbation of the international situation, the latest attempt by imperialism to turn back the course of history....

"The situation was dramatically difficult. However, the party did not lose faith in the good sense of the working class and our people's sense of patriotic responsibility" (2).

The particular significance of the 10th PZPR Congress is that it adopted the first party program in the country's history, which formulated the tasks of the next stage of socialist building in Poland. The 1986-1990 plan puts the main emphasis on an acceleration of S&T progress. The Polish Council of Ministers report in this connection observed that a 15-20-percent reduction in energy consumption could be achieved as a result of the expanded use of microelectronics, the automation of the control of fuel consumption processes and the electrification of production in metallurgy, mining and chemical industry and certain other sectors.

The process of economic reform begun in 1982 in accordance with a decision of the Ninth PZPR Congress will continue in Poland in the current 5-year plan. The task now is to augment the strategic role of centralized planning, increase enterprises' initiative and independence and make fuller use of economic instruments in management of the economy.

A most important task in the sphere of social policy is the streamlining of wages and their alignment with the results of enterprises' economic activity. The pursuit of such a policy in the current situation is the sole correct one since the experience of the country's development in preceding years has shown that a high living standard of the population cannot for any length of time be maintained by artificial measures, among which a principal place was occupied by the attraction of outside financial sources. Nor can the living standard be raised thanks to a reduction in capital investments. For this reason it is planned in the coming period to increase the proportion of accumulation in the national income and to use a considerable amount of capital investments to modernize production capacity. As far as consumption is concerned, its growth will be provided for by way of the commissioning of as yet unutilized potential.

The latest 5-year plan is to be an important stage in the socioeconomic development of Romania, which plans the highest rate of growth of the economy of all European CEMA countries (see Table 2). The Romanian CP Central Committee report to the 13th party congress (November 1984) observed that "the 13th congress marks the transition to the third stage of implementation of the party program. The main task of the 1986-1990 five-year plan is the unswerving continuation of the policy of building the comprehensively developed socialist society and the country's advance toward communism" (3).

The economic strategy of the Romanian CP stipulates that by the year 2000 Romania will be a comprehensively developed industrial-agrarian country. The industrial commodity product will have increased by a factor of 2.1-2.4, and its quality will have risen to a new level.

The social policy of the Romanian CP provides for a further growth of the income of the country's population and its enhanced cultural level. Great attention is being paid to housing construction—it is contemplated by the year 2000 having provided each inhabitant of the country with living space of 14 square meters, and together with additional premises, of 16-20 square meters. Practically every Romanian citizen will have one residential room with additional premises.

The task set in the CSSR for the period up to the year 2000 is a more than two-thirds increase in national income. A considerable reduction in the materials- and energy-intensiveness of production and a two-thirds increase in social labor productivity are to be secured here.

The decisions of the 17th CPCz Congress were geared to a surmounting of shortcomings and an acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development. Importance here will be attached to the 1986-1990 five-year period, which is to lay the foundations for the accomplishment of tasks set for the period up to the year 2000. It is interesting to note that it is contemplating securing the planned rate of growth of national income given a lower rate of growth of capital investments.

A new step forward will be taken in a rise in the material and cultural living standard of the working people, income will grow, social security will improve and health care, the education sphere and so forth will be further developed on the basis of an intensification of social production and the increased efficiency and quality of the work of all its components. A big housing program, in accordance with which 480,000 new apartments are to be built in the period 1986-1990, has been outlined.

Among the most important tasks of CPCz policy are, as the 17th party congress observed, the development and improvement of socialist democracy and an extension of the working people's participation in the control of society. A number of specific steps has already been taken in this respect. Thus in accordance with the "Set of Measures To Improve the System of the Planned Management of the National Economy After 1980," which was put into effect in 1985, the role of production conferences and collective agreements has increased. This has been expressed, in particular, in the fact that the content of the collective agreements incorporates commitments of management and the trade union organization representing the working people pertaining to plan fulfillment, the introduction of new equipment, creation of the conditions for a growth of labor productivity, a strengthening of labor discipline, an improvement in work and social conditions and the workers' increased material interest in the results of their labor. The working people's participation in management, which is effected, as the 17th CPCz Congress emphasized, in many ways, will continue to be extended.

The 5-year period on which the CEMA countries have embarked and the period through the end of the present century will not be easy for the fraternal socialist countries. Difficult and intensive work on realization of the decisions of the congresses of the communist and workers parties providing for an acceleration of socioeconomic development, the restructuring of many aspects of economic and social life, an extension of production democracy and a strengthening of social justice lies ahead. The CEMA countries possess all the essential prerequisites for this, both material and organizational.

#### Footnotes

1. "13th MSzMP Congress. Budapest, 25-28 March 1985," Moscow, 1985, p 72.

2. TRYBUNA LUDU, 30 June 1986.

3. SCINTEIA, 20 November 1984.

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#### Collective Monograph Analyzes Youth's Attitude Toward Labor

18070376i Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87* (signed to press 17 Apr 87) pp 182-183

[Ye.D. Voznesenskaya review: "The Youthful Replacement Shift of the Working Class: Today and Tomorrow"]

[Text] The utmost enhancement of the role of the human factor is the aim and simultaneously the condition of realization of the strategy which has been adopted in the socialist community countries of an acceleration of socioeconomic development based on an abrupt change toward an intensification of social production. Sociologists studying social problems of the working class are confronted with the most important task in this connection of an extended and comprehensive study of problems of the younger generation for at the current stage of the development of the majority of socialist community countries it is the youth which is the main source of the formation of new replenishments of the working class.

International studies in this field conducted within the framework of the Multilateral Cooperation Problem-Solving Commission of the socialist countries' academies of sciences on the subject "The Working Class in the World Revolutionary Process" have a long tradition. Such joint work—it is a question in this case of the research project "Social Aspects of the Formation of New Replenishments of the Working Class"—has yet again borne tangible fruit. Problems of the formation of socio-occupational orientations and the actual processes connected with the completion of the education, start of



the labor activity, adaptation to work and social mobility of the youth which began (or is beginning) its working life in the 1970's-1980's were the subject of a comprehensive study which was decanted into a weighty collective work. The high degree of authenticity of the conclusions which were obtained was largely determined by the fact that the theoretical-empirical base of the new work\* were, in particular, the results, which underwent a second analysis, of the preceding research project, "Life Paths of the Youth in Socialist Society" (1), which was carried out by the same group of authors, and also of other international comparative studies (2). Extensive use was made also of the data of national statistics and the results of national sociological studies (3).

The difficulty of conducting international research is understandable, and the certain narrowness and merely partial comparability of the statistical data in different countries make additional difficulties. This is why a particular specialization within the framework of the set range of problems with regard to the possibilities and available process stock of the research groups participating in the joint work was provided for. In accordance with this, each national section of the international research project developed a specific range of problems.

The Soviet researchers concentrated their attention on social and demographic problems of the choice of profession, rightly believing that the demographic situation now exerts a decisive influence on the processes of formation of the new replenishments of the working class. Indeed, today's youth of the socialist countries is embarking upon working life under highly complex demographic conditions characterized, in particular, by the youth's reduced share of the population. The most difficult situation is taking shape in the USSR, where, owing to the low birthrate in the 1960's (the so-called demographic "echo" of the war), there will be essentially no increase in the latter half of the 1980's in the able-bodied population, and in the coming years the national economy will have to develop given a practically constant number of workers. The analysis of this situation leads the Soviet specialists to the conclusion that in the very near future the youth will have to assume additional loads in study, work and reproduction of the population compared with preceding generations. The dynamics of employment in the USSR national economy show that the leading trends in the immediate future will be a rapid diminution in the numbers of persons employed in agriculture, little change in the numbers of those employed in industry and a rapid increase in the numbers of persons employed in the service sphere (see p 49). In these spheres of activity, which will supply the largest number of jobs, significant amounts of simple, unskilled labor, falling, incidentally, to the lot of increasingly educated young people, will, as is known, be preserved in the immediate future together with the skilled types of labor. The experience accumulated by the socialist countries in overcoming the contradictions which arise shows that the ways of solving these problems may vary, but, as the Soviet researchers emphasize,

their most efficient solution is connected with the implementation of socioeconomic transformations for the purpose of the elimination of unskilled and for this reason low-prestige types of work as quickly as possible.

Another important contradiction being encountered by today's youth at the start of its career is that between the structure of society's need for personnel by occupation and the structure of the youth's vocational proclivities. A study of the scales of occupational preferences conducted in the socialist countries has shown that the highest prestige among the youth is enjoyed by the occupations requiring higher education; at the same time, however, occupations in the sphere of agriculture and many service trades maintain their low prestige (see p 55). As a whole, the high requirements on the part of the youth and the orientation toward creative, meaningful work and professions connected with complex technology correspond to the basic directions of the development of the socialist society. There continues to be a need for people working in such professions, naturally, and it will grow, but at the same time, as mentioned earlier, there is also a continuing need for people whose labor does not presuppose higher education.

The constantly growing level of the younger generations' education is contributing to the elevation of professional expectations. As the Bulgarian scholars showed, in the majority of socialist countries in the 1970's the numbers of trainees of all levels of the education system increased. This growth is continuing, albeit at a slower pace, in the 1980's also (p 235), which means a growth of the proportion in the overall numbers of the youth of those acquiring higher and secondary specialized education. The experience of some socialist countries testifies that under conditions of an insufficient rate of technical development the high rate of training is leading to overeducation phenomena. A decisive role in overcoming this contradiction belongs to the development and improvement of the forms and methods of the vocational-technical preparation of the younger generations for work. The wealth of experience of the organization of vocational education in the GDR presented in the monograph by the German colleagues is of interest in this respect (see p 363 and appendix).

New and complex research tasks are arising in connection with the analysis of the youth's material and social position inasmuch as the law of distribution according to labor which operates under socialism makes for a certain inequality in the material position of different groups of the population, the youth included. The analysis made by Hungarian scientists of the correlation of the youth's material living conditions compared with senior able-bodied groups showed that the material-social position of today's youth is in a whole number of indicators inferior to the position of other groups. The opportunities of today's youth for an improvement in its material-social conditions, for obtaining housing, in particular, are fewer in comparison with the youth cohorts of the preceding decade (see p 288 and appendix). According to

the data obtained in Hungary, the amount of the wages of the youth is less than among elder able-bodied groups of workers and grows more slowly. As the Hungarian specialists believe, this situation in income distribution corresponds increasingly less to the spirit of the times, which is largely determined by the S&T revolution. Increasingly often the productivity of young specialists, particularly in professions directly connected with the S&T revolution, grows more rapidly, by virtue of the more appropriate vocational training, than among the representatives of the older generations of workmen, who are more experienced, but armed to a lesser extent with modern knowhow. In this situation the existing differences in wages and their rate of growth between the youth and people of an older age are exerting a particularly inauspicious influence on the mood of the young worker and reducing his orientation toward starting a family and having children.

The Hungarian specialists also cite as an important problem the continuing differences within the younger generation caused by groups of youth's membership of different social strata (p 312 and appendix). Demands arise in this connection on the system of social institutions involved with the youth: the elaboration of measures for the purpose of preventing the consolidation of social inequalities and reducing the negative effects of unequal starts in life are needed. At the same time, as the Hungarian specialists emphasize, an unfavorable position in individual spheres of the youth's activity is compensated—fully or partially—by advantages in other spheres; some inequities could even perform a stimulating role.

The main, fundamental conclusion which the authors of the monograph reach, perhaps, is the fact that to a considerable extent the conditions which will determine the position of the youth in the future represent factors which are by no means of a specifically youth nature but are connected primarily with the particular features of socioeconomic development. "The clearer the goals of social development are formulated, the better and more efficiently the younger generation may be oriented" (p 418). Such is the book's—highly pertinent—important and well-founded conclusion.

#### Footnotes

\* "Social Aspects of the Formation of New Replenishments of the Working Class: Trends, Problems, Experience (International Study)". Editorial board: K. Gospodinov (Bulgaria) (Ye. Andich) (Hungary), W. Haltiner (GDR), S. Kosel (Poland), V. Shubkin (USSR) and P. Sak (CSSR). Under the general editorship of (Ye. Andich) and V. Shubkin. Budapest, 1985, pp 421 (repro.).

1. Its results were presented in a series of summary joint monographs (including "Working Youth: Orientations and Life Paths," Budapest, 1980; "Working Youth," Sofia, 1983; "Working Youth: Education, Profession,

Mobility," Moscow, 1984; "Youth and Labor," Sofia, 1983), which was commended in 1984 by the International Prize of the socialist countries' academies of sciences for outstanding joint study in the field of the social sciences.

2. See, for example, "Youth and Higher Education," Sofia, 1982. This work presents the results of a joint Soviet-Bulgarian study conducted at the end of the 1970's.

3. See, for example, W. Adamski, "Dwa pokolenia pracownikow przemyslu," Warsaw, 1980.

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**Book on Role of Social Democrats vs Apartheid**  
18070376j Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS*  
*SOVREMENNY MIR* in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87  
(signed to press 17 Apr 87) pp 188-190

[V.Ya. Shveytser review: "Social Democrats and the African South"]

[Text] The attitude toward events in Southern Africa, which constitute an important factor of the current international situation, has to a considerable extent become the touchstone testing the correspondence of word and deed of international social democracy, which has primordially declared, as is known, as a fundamental principle of its activity support for oppressed peoples. The approach of social democracy to the liberation movements of the southern part of the African continent has in the past two decades undergone an appreciable evolution, which is studied in V.G. Shubin's book.\*

It shows the objective factors which brought about this evolution, primarily the activity of the liberation movements themselves and its interconnection with the general nature of the world situation. Thus, for example, the transition in the latter half of the 1960's-first half of the 1970's from "cold war" to a relaxation of international tension contributed to the stimulation of the struggle of the patriots in Angola and Mozambique; the "carnation revolution" in Portugal led to the final collapse of one of the oldest colonial empires; the liberation struggle of the Zimbabwean people gained new impetus under the conditions of the weakening of the positions of imperialism. For its part, social democracy, making a considerable contribution in the 1970's to the detente process, thereby objectively contributed to the successes of the peoples who had thrown off the colonial yoke. Having, however, taken in the detente period the path of cooperation on the international scene with the socialist countries, it was forced to take stock of their scrupulous and consistent position of support for liberation movements, which ultimately forced it to also overcome its once characteristic high-handedness in respect of Africans.

The positive evolution on this issue, which showed through quite clearly in circles of international social democracy, particularly following the accession to the levers of leadership of the Socialist International (1976) of W. Brandt and such of his associates as O. Palme, B. Kreisky and K. Sorsa, was closely interconnected with the modification of their approach to a whole number of key foreign policy problems. In fact, it was impossible in advocating international detente and the removal of centers of tension not see the actions of imperialist reaction in Southern Africa as one such center. Having subsequently extolled the concept of a new world economic order, it was impossible to adopt an impartial attitude toward the acute economic problems which had been bequeathed their former colonial possessions by Portugal and Great Britain. In declaring nonacceptance of the predatory activity of the TNC it was impossible to abstract oneself from the fact that South Africa had become the patrimony of many international monopolies, and the object of exploitation there were primarily black Africans. Finally, in campaigning for "human rights" it was impossible to close one's eyes to the scandalous violations of these rights by the apartheid regime.

All these facts are considered by the author when he analyzes the positions of social democracy in respect of the liberation movements and also the political practice of the ruling parties from Socialist International ranks confirming social democratic declarations or contradicting them.

Studying the forms of the assistance which social democracy rendered the national liberation movements of Southern Africa, the author adduces data on cash amounts and food granted at the end of the 1960's-first half of the 1970's the MPLA, FRELIMO and the PAIGC by the social democrats, Swedish and Dutch primarily, from both party funds and resources obtained along government lines in a period when the corresponding parties held office. This mechanism is functioning today also. A particular positive role, the author notes, is also performed by material assistance rendered the ANC and SWAPO and also the "front-line states" by certain social democratic governments and organizations (p 171).

However, social democracy as a whole is not ready for practical support of the African liberation movements' armed struggle. Social democrats always aspire to the settlement of problems on the paths of an "amicable agreement" between the colonizers and their victims and are prepared to participate as a "third force" in such a settlement (at times remaining, as the example of Zimbabwe testifies, behind even conservative West European political forces). How does this turn out in practice? The book adduces data testifying that at the start of the 1970's, for example, certain of Great Britain's Labor Party leaders sought contacts not with the ANC but with the legal opposition in South Africa. In the same period some social democratic leaders established contacts with the enemies of the MPLA from the UNITA organization.

Undoubtedly, support for the splittists by no means enhanced the prestige of social democracy, leaving the patriotic movements with the impression of a certain opportunist approach to their struggle on the part of social democracy.

The ambiguity and inconsistency of this approach was manifested to the greatest extent on such an important issue as the economic relations of the corresponding West European states and colonial, racist regimes. On the one hand the Socialist International demanded in special sections of foreign policy declarations adopted in the 1970's-1980's a winding down of the West's trade relations with South Africa and the imposition of an embargo on supplies to the racists of a number of strategic commodities and weapons used in the fight against the patriotic forces. On the other, however, no government headed by parties which are members of the Socialist International complied fully with these recommendations. In addition, the facts attest the close economic cooperation with South Africa of Great Britain's Labor government in the latter half of the 1970's and the French and British governments headed by socialists in the present decade.

The author reveals the underlying motives of such a discrepancy between "word and deed". Social democracy, whose functional role consists also of "administrator" of capitalist society, is endeavoring to protect from the difficulties connected with the embargo the local monopolies, justifying its actions by "concern" for national interests; another social-reformist argument against the use of economic "levers" in respect of the racists is the reference to the fact that a suspension (or limitation) of trade with South Africa in a period of economic crisis would be reflected in the social position of the working people and lead to the loss of their jobs in export-oriented industry. We would note that in this case the social-reformist leaders are manifestly speculating on the low level of class consciousness of individual categories of the working class, many representatives of which put their material interests above the principles of true internationalism.

The author analyzes the specific dialectic of the manifest discrepancy between the theory and practice of social democracy, drawing conclusions of procedural significance for an understanding of the essence of the social democratic element of the workers movement. He observes that "the vagueness of the wording characteristic of Socialist International documents affords the social democratic parties an opportunity to interpret them in their own way and to justify their policy therewith, even if their positions differ among themselves appreciably" (p 145). In addition, "the resolutions passed at its congresses have been the resultant, as it were, of the forces operating in its ranks, the members of the Socialist International and individual detachments within them" (p 76).

The latter circumstance is particularly pertinent for an understanding of the complex, ambiguous process of differentiation within the ranks of social democracy and the factors which have brought it about. This specific political position or the other occupied by the corresponding parties is the horizontal parameter of this differentiation. This is why, for example, the declarations against apartheid of the French socialists, in opposition, in the 1970's were not embodied in the corresponding practice under the Mauroy-Fabius governments. The main vertical parameter of this differentiation is intraparty delineation. The fact that it is the left socialists which are, as a rule, the active participants in mass movements of solidarity with the liberation struggle of the peoples of Southern Africa undoubtedly makes the left flank of social democracy the catalyst of its democratic, international potential. Unfortunately, this aspect of social democratic practice is studied very cursorily in the book.

The author points to one further important fact, which some experts sometimes lose sight of. It is a question of area singularities influencing not only the delineation within social democratic parties and between them. Specifically, Great Britain's "colonial nostalgia" combined with its traditional relations with the former dominion, South Africa, is reflected in the Labor Party also, making its practice largely coincident with the policy of the Conservatives. Another example is neutral Sweden, a state in which the humanitarian tradition of aid to the weak and the oppressed has long been manifested at the international level also. It was not fortuitous that the policy in respect of the peoples of Southern Africa pursued by the bourgeois governments in office in the period 1976-1982 was no worse than the practice of Sweden's Social Democratic Party. Such national singularities, the author reasonably observes, could explain the fact that the differences in the positions of individual parties of the Socialist International "...are frequently more pronounced than between social democratic and bourgeois parties of individual West European countries" (pp 117-118).

Analyzing the motives of social democracy's interest in the events in South Africa, the author points to the fact that the inevitable future fall of the apartheid regime could lead to the formation in this country of a party of a social-reformist persuasion. This forecast is supported by both the historical traditions of laborism in South Africa, where a corresponding party existed at the start of the century, and the high level of development of South African capitalism, which is leading to an expansion of "the social strata among the black population of South Africa which could potentially be a base of social-reformism and receptive to its ideology" (p 165). To the objective conditions which might contribute to an expansion of the positions of social democracy here we would also add the stability and pluralist nature of bourgeois democracy (it is a question as yet, of course, of the "internal life" of the white minority).

While making social-reformism the ideological rival of Marxism-Leninism on the African continent, the said circumstances are not, of course, an insurmountable obstacle to the cooperation of the communists and social democrats in the business of final decolonization. Devoting a special section of the book to this problem, V.G. Shubin studies the available experience of such cooperation both in mass solidarity movements and in joint or parallel actions within the framework of international organizations, highlighting particularly the points of contact which make it possible to hope for a promising future for such interaction.

An important merit of V.G. Shubin's work is the vast amount of diverse material which he uses: Socialist International documents, protocols of congresses of its leading parties, government reports and press material permitting this conclusion or the other to be argued convincingly. The author has also used documents of the national liberation movements of Southern Africa illustrating the mutual relations of the patriotic forces of this region and social democracy. V.G. Shubin, who worked for a long time on the Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Asian and African Peoples, was also able to make use of much that was afforded him by personal contact with some of the characters of the book.

#### Footnote

\* V.G. Shubin, "Sotsial-demokratiya i borba protiv kolonializma i aparteida" [Social Democracy and the Struggle Against Colonialism and Apartheid], Moscow, "Nauka", 1985, pp 190.

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#### Book Views West German Neoconservatism's Effect on Workers

18070376k Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS* I  
*SOVREMENNY MIR* in Russian No 3, May-Jun 87  
(signed to press 17 Apr 87) pp 190-192

[I.Ya. Kiselev review: "Position and Struggle of the FRG Working Class Under the Conditions of the 'Neoconservative Shift'"]

[Text] Under the conditions of the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and the further exacerbation of all contradictions of bourgeois society FRG monopoly capital is endeavoring to shift onto the working people and the broad masses the difficulties of economic and social development connected with the profound and painful conflicts and costs of S&T progress and the structural rebuilding of production, the troubles caused by the increased competition on domestic and world markets and the burden of the militarization of the economy and the arms race. The goal of the monopoly oligarchy is to achieve a cardinal redistribution of

national income in its favor and, what is most important, prevent at any price a further development of crisis cataclysms weakening the bourgeois system and undermining its foundations. For this purpose circles of the right, having taken possession of the levers of state power, have begun to actively implement a wide-ranging program of "social dismantling" incorporating a reduction in appropriations for social needs, the artificial acceleration of the growth of unemployment, the privatization of some previously nationalized enterprises and an offensive against the social and labor rights and freedoms won by the working class at preceding stages.

Among the gains of the working class of the FRG, particularly of the 1960's-1970's, an important place is occupied by the provisions of labor and social legislation; it is in this sphere that the changes which have occurred most recently are studied in detail in the book in question.\* The specific feature thereof is the comprehensive approach to the problem at issue and a combination of socioeconomic and legal analysis.

According to the calculations available in the FRG, more than DM200 billion were saved the budget from 1982 through 1985 at the expense of the working people. The conservative coalition government sought reductions in social appropriations from the budget and amendments to legislation which reduced the amounts of social payments and services and eliminated some of them completely or made the conditions of their assignment more complex. But the authors show not only the general results of the "social dismantling"—the deterioration in the material position of the working people, the extraction of additional profits by the concerns and the extensive development of the "new poor," which has embraced, according to certain estimates, 15-20 percent of the population (p 132). The book provides a detailed and extended analysis of the reactionary shifts in the FRG's labor laws. These changes have occurred in two main areas: the first concerns the position of the unions, enterprise work councils, the workers' collective-bargaining rights and the right to strike, the second, the labor contract, work time and industrial hygiene.

The question of the abolition (in accordance with the new version of clause 116 of the Work Incentive Act of 25 June 1969) of the payment of government allowances to workers who have been temporarily laid off or who have been dismissed as a result of labor conflicts not at enterprises where they worked but at other enterprises is studied in particular detail. The book shows that this measure, which at first sight deals with a secondary issue, could have far-reaching consequences for the union movement.

The point being that the practice of the employers' use in the antistrike struggle of mass lockouts, whose victims are not only the strikers but also a large number of workers indirectly affected by the strike (so-called "cold lockouts" "legalized" at the start of the 1980's by the federal Labor Disputes Court), is very prevalent in the

FRG. Thus in response to a strike of metalworkers in the lands of Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hessen, in which 57,500 persons participated, over 350,000 workers and employees employed in metal-working industry and other sectors were subjected to lockouts in 1984.

The payment of compensation to the victims of "cold lockouts" alleviated their situation to some extent, enabling them to hold on until the end of the labor conflict. The abolition of these allowances not only causes a direct deterioration in the material position of the workers who are the victims of "cold lockouts" but is also a blow to the strike movement in general, appreciably harms the interests of the unions and weakens them. In undertaking this legislative reform the ruling circles endeavored to kill not two birds even with one stone but three: weaken the strike movement of the proletariat; introduce discord in the worker environment; and bleed union funds or, in any event, give rise in the unions to fear of the danger of their depletion, which would tie the hands of the union organizations and dampen their militancy (pp 78-79).

In connection with the examination of this and other antistrike actions of FRG ruling circles the authors adduce interesting material on the new strategy of the strike struggle developed by the West German unions with regard for the changed economic and political situation in the country ("new strategy of flexibility"). Its characteristic features are the politicization of strikes, the more active and timely explanation of their aims to the broad public, the staggered and gradual enlistment in the strike of different detachments of the proletariat in accordance with a plan drawn up in advance, support for the strikers by as large a number as possible of workers who are not party to the labor conflict directly and the maximum use of such forms of struggle as the brief warning strike and the solidarity strike (pp 68-73).

Union freedoms, particularly the "wage rate autonomy" principle signifying the unions' right to conclude collective agreements freely and without hindrance, are being subjected to new attacks at the present time in the FRG. The Federal Constitutional Court has given a constricted interpretation of the principle of trade union freedom, explaining that it is defensible not as a whole but only "at heart" (p 49). As far as the "wage rate autonomy" is concerned, it is under constant threat owing to the direct and indirect intervention of the state in the collective-bargaining process and government authorities' imposition of work conditions and economic parameters profitable primarily to the capitalist monopolies. There are incessant attempts by the ruling circles to foist on the country a coalitions act, which, the authors believe, pursues three goals: the formation of an official rate-regulating authority, which in the interests of capital would determine at least the rules concerning the amount and movement of wages; the transference to West German soil of the American Taft-Hartley Act; and the establishment of a certain minimum of demands in respect of the unions' internal structure (p 48).

The biggest changes to FRG legislation concerning individual labor laws were made by the 26 April 1985 Employment Incentive Act, which the book analyzes (pp 31-32). It provides for considerable changes in the legal regulation of the labor contract and causes a considerable deterioration in the legal position of wage workers in the sphere of relations with the employers, which is of vital importance to them. This act is seen by conservative circles of the FRG merely as the first step on the path of implementation of further reforms designed, they maintain, to adapt the legal regulation of labor to the "demands of the times," but in practice to the new conditions of capitalist reproduction and the new methods of exploitation. A number of new laws is in the pipeline. Meanwhile the conservative government has made 250 amendments of a reactionary nature to labor, social and tax legislation (p 15).

The book concludes with an examination of the working class' struggle for its rights and also the alternatives to the neoconservative social policy developed by the FRG's democratic forces. Particular attention is paid to the demand for the guaranteed right to work, which, together with the preservation of peace, is seen by the German Communist Party as "the most important task of the present day" (1). The material of the last, eighth, congress of the German CP, which was held in 1986, emphasizes: "The right to work is man's inalienable right, prerequisite of the satisfaction of people's most important need and their personal self-realization and an essential condition of the use of society's cultural and spiritual wealth" (2).

The authors of the book emphasize the dialectical contradictoriness of the very formulation of the question of the possibility of realization of the right to work under the conditions of the capitalist socialist system characterized by objectively inevitable relative overpopulation, mass unemployment and the brutal exploitation of wage labor. Full realization of the right to work is inconceivable under capitalism and presupposes the socialist transformation of society. However, as the authors rightly note, denial of the possibilities of the struggle of the proletariat for the right to work and the possibility of winning certain, partial elements of this right under the conditions of the bourgeois system disorients the proletariat and leads to a weakening of its revolutionary potential. Realization of the right to work is a long, highly contradictory process, and it begins under capitalism even as an integral and inalienable part of the class struggle, and its first step, furthermore, is the demand for legal recognition of this right as one of man's fundamental rights (pp 24-25).

The authors' attempt to interpret the struggle for the right to work under capitalism in two dimensions—tactical and strategic—is of interest. The first incorporates such partial rights as the right to a job, education and increased qualifications, equal pay for equal work and protection against collective and individual dismissals. In the second (strategic) dimension the right to work

presupposes the elimination of man's exploitation of man and the possibilities of his fullest self-realization in the production process; winning the right to work in this dimension undermines the very foundation of capitalist production relations, and in this sense the struggle for the right to work is closely linked with the struggle for the revolutionary rearrangement of capitalist society (p 26).

The book emphasizes the close, organic connection between the struggle of the working class for social and economic rights and the struggle for peace and against the arms race. Peace is a most important prerequisite of social progress, and the struggle for peace and the struggle for social progress and democracy are ultimately being conducted against one and the same enemy, against two aspects of the single strategy of the reactionary and aggressive forces of monopoly capital.

The book would have benefited, in our view, had it studied in greater detail the ideological principles of the social policy of the West German conservatives. Not everywhere have the authors succeeded in organically combining the socioeconomic and legal analysis (thus the separate examination of the right to work and the position of the unemployed seems unwarranted to us); some sections (the decline in the real wage, the 1984 metalworkers' and printers' strikes) have not been woven into the logical fabric of the book and appear to be contrived insertions.

As a whole, the monograph by scholars from the GDR, of pertinent subject matter and containing a wealth of interesting factual material and the latest data on the economic and social development of the FRG and the position of the working class of this country, merits a high appraisal. It will undoubtedly be of interest to a broad readership.

### Footnotes

\* M. Premser, A. Ondrusch, "Kampf um soziale Rechte in der BRD. Eine Aktuelle Analyse," Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republic, 1986, pp 144.

1. "Seventh German CP Congress," Moscow, 1985, p 31.

2. UNSERE ZEIT, 3 May 1986, p 11.

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